We spoke first about London anti-aircraft defence and, in particular, shelters. Morrison was guarded and elusive on the topic of ‘deep shelters’ (in favour of which he himself recently spoke with great enthusiasm from the opposition bench), with words to the effect that he was ready to ‘study all practical proposals’ in this sphere.

Then he switched to political matters. The threat of an invasion, according to him, has passed. The focus of war shifts to the Near East. To save the world, a united front of England, USA, the USSR and China should be created.

I objected, arguing that it is hardly possible to expect such grandiose combinations at a time when England and the USSR cannot successfully resolve (and through no fault of our own) even the relatively small issue of the Baltic States.

Morrison began explaining to me why there has been no movement on the Baltic issue: ‘We would very much like to do something pleasant for you, but we do not want to do something unpleasant for America. And that is understandable. If we do something pleasant for you – we still don’t know what we’ll get in return. And if we do something pleasant for America – we know very well what we’ll get in return. We will get what we most need at this time. So pleasing the USSR conflicts with pleasing the USA, and it is absolutely clear where our choice must lie. Otherwise we would be bad merchants and politicians. I can assure you that the British government is very keen to reach agreement with the Soviet Union, but not at the expense of the United States.’

Straightforward and cynical, as always with Morrison. Still, I prefer his lack of ceremony to the sugary syrup of Attlee and Greenwood.

C[omrade] Vyshinsky received Cripps at the latter’s request on 11 November. Cripps was in a very agitated and irritated state of mind.

Cripps began with a statement to the effect that he regards C[omrade] Molotov’s refusal to see him on 22 October and receive the British proposals an unfriendly act. The news of C[omrade] Molotov’s visit to Berlin (without any response being given to the British proposals) only confirms this. Cripps asks C[omrade] Vyshinsky to answer two questions: (1) Should he understand this as a rejection of the British proposals by the Soviet government? (2) Can he report to the British government that C[omrade] Molotov’s visit to Berlin in the current situation indicates the Soviet government’s unwillingness to improve relations with England? Cripps finds it useless to make further efforts to improve relations between the two countries and will convey his views concerning Molotov’s visit to Berlin to the British government.

C[omrade] Vyshinsky replied that it would be wrong to link C[omrade] Molotov’s visit to the Soviet government’s attitude to the British proposals of 22 October. These are two different things. The purpose of C[omrade] Molotov’s visit is clearly stated in the communiqué published on this matter.

As far as the proposals of 22 October are concerned, C[omrade] Vyshinsky can only express his personal opinion regarding the sentiments they elicit in Soviet government circles. This opinion can be summarized as follows: C[omrade] Vyshinsky fails to understand what England wants from us. The proposals of 22 October give us less than we already have. C[omrade] Vyshinsky wonders how the British government, itself under siege, could have made such proposals at all?

Cripps, speaking more calmly, said that the general basis should be agreed upon first, while individual questions could be discussed later. Cripps was very anxious during the conversation, expressed his indignation, etc., but C[omrade] Vyshinsky put him firmly in his place.

Then Cripps asked whether the rumours were true that the USSR had decided to withdraw from Balkan affairs and was prepared to acknowledge German hegemony in this part of the world.

In reply C[omrade] Vyshinsky referred him to the clarification given in Krasnaya Zvezda in connection with Arapetyan’s article.

Cripps stated that the quarrel over the Baltic ships could hardly be settled before a general agreement between England and the USSR had been concluded.

C[omrade] Vyshinsky, however, insisted on the satisfaction of the demands set out in the Soviet note of 9 October.

Cripps also declared that the Baltic sailors were not lacking for anything (this is absolutely untrue).