A great muddle and a great variety of views. There were no two people who would agree with each other.

My thoughts (although I did not voice them fully today) are as follows.

England has enough cards in hand to avoid defeat and successfully extricate itself from the war. But will England be able to play its cards well? That’s the crux.

There are four major problems facing England today:

(1) military,

(2) foreign policy,

(3) India,

(4) domestic policy.

Since Churchill came to power, the first problem has been addressed, and, although it is too early to draw a definitive conclusion, seems to be on the path to being resolved. The production of aircraft and weapons has increased sharply, the organization of the army has been expedited, rapid strides have been made in fortifying the island, and the danger of a German invasion has receded. Of course, much remains to be done, but progress is smooth and there are grounds to believe that the problem will eventually be solved. The current British government has been playing this card rather well.

The second problem has not been solved, and it is still not clear how it will be solved. Halifax remains in charge of the FO, whose personnel is still thoroughly imbued with the old Chamberlain spirit. The British government has been playing this card badly, which has particular consequences for relations with the Soviet Union – the key question in the current situation.

The third problem is locked in a stalemate. The viceroy’s statement of 7 August and Amery’s speech in parliament on 14 August have failed to indicate a way out of the deadlock. Perhaps this will change with time, but up to now the British government has been playing this card badly, too.

The fourth problem has not yet been raised. Essentially, it concerns the very considerable weakening, if not complete elimination, of the domination of the bourgeoisie in England’s economic and political machinery and, accordingly, the enhanced influence of working people, above all the proletariat. The British government has been playing this card badly, too.

These are the problems facing England today (when still considered within a capitalist or near-capitalist framework).

Will the Churchill government be able to solve these problems, at least so as to emerge from the war without defeat? For it seems unrealistic to expect such an outcome if these problems are not resolved in a more or less satisfactory manner.

Will it be able to? I don’t know. Time will tell.

Of course, everything would change if the possibility of a peace treaty were to emerge within the next few months. But can this happen?

At the moment I can’t see such a possibility emerging. The crux of the matter is that the imperialist interests of England and Germany conflict to such an extent that they cannot be reconciled at this stage. Over six years following Hitler’s rise to power, desperate attempts were made to find a path of compromise. For three years (1937–39), England was led by a man who was prepared to do whatever was required to come to terms with Germany. In principle, Hitler, too, was always an advocate of an agreement with England against the Soviet Union and France. The ‘subjective’ factor, on both sides, was expressly in favour of an agreement. Yet an agreement was not reached! Worse still, the matter culminated in war. Why? Because the ‘objective’ factor – the conflicting imperialist interests of the two states – turned out to be far stronger than the ‘subjective’ factor: the desire of Chamberlain and Hitler (and the elements they represented) to reach an agreement.

This also applies to the current prospects of peace being concluded in the near future. On what basis could this happen? I still can’t see any.

Supposing Hitler were to say: let’s divide up the world – I’ll have Europe, you’ll have the British Empire, and some ‘colonial trifles’ will go to Germany and Italy. Clearly this is the best that England might expect from Hitler at present. Would an agreement be possible on such a basis?

The young Rothenstein couple paid us a visit a day or two ago. I put that question to him and his reply was: ‘No, it would not be possible. And here’s why. England’s sole advantage over Germany today is its command of the seas. This is what makes it so difficult for Germany to conquer England. Were we to conclude peace now on the basis of Hitler’s present conquests, it would mean that, with all the resources and shipyards of Europe at his disposal, he would be able to build a fleet to equal ours in some 5–6 years, and England would become a toy in his hands.’

These words betray the underlying cause of the ‘belligerence’ currently sweeping both the ruling circles and the population at large, including the workers, although among the latter this cause often appears under the pseudonym, ‘the struggle against Nazism’.

That is why I don’t see any prospects for an early peace – under the essential condition, of course, that the Soviet Union continues to pursue policies no less wise than it has hitherto. And I’m fully confident it will.