According to him, the British government, on its own initiative, declared to the Norwegian government at the very beginning of the war that it would consider any attack by Germany on Norwegian territory as an attack on its own lands. The British government even suggested putting this statement in writing, but Koht declined the offer so as not to create the impression that a military alliance existed between Norway and England.

The Norwegian government received information about German preparations for an attack on Norway more than once during the winter, but no attack followed. Little by little the Norwegian government ceased to believe such rumours. Three days before 9 April the N[orwegian] G[overnment] received fresh reports of a threatened assault but, drawing on past experience, did not treat them seriously. So the German attack struck the N[orwegian] G[overnment] like a bolt from the blue.

The N[orwegian] G[overnment] did not appeal to the Allies for help (Colban’s communication that three days after the German invasion began the N[orwegian] G[overnment] appealed to the Allies through the British minister in Oslo proves inaccurate). The Allies themselves ‘came to the rescue’. The cooperation between the Norwegians and the British was extremely fragile throughout the campaign. The British thought they knew better than the Norwegians and completely ignored their advice and suggestions. This led to a fundamental mistake. Norway had men but not enough weapons. But rather than immediately sending aircraft and weapons to Norway, the Allies began sending men without planes and virtually without armaments. Moreover, in whatever they did, the Allies were always too late. This was shown most vividly at Trondheim. The Norwegian government learned about the Allies’ decision to withdraw from southern Norway 24 hours before its implementation. As a result the Norwegian army found itself in an exceptionally difficult situation. Narvik was taken by the Norwegians, French and Poles (some 6,000–7,000 people in total) without the participation of a single Englishman, if we discount the British ships lying at anchor. When the British government decided to evacuate Narvik, the N[orwegian] G[overnment] asked that it be left the British arms and planes. With those resources Norway would have been able to continue the war. The British government, however, did not agree, under the pretext that it needed all this on other fronts. By an irony of fate, the planes which the British refused to leave to Norway failed to make it home, together with the aircraft carrier Glorious, which was sunk by the Germans.

Koht also mentioned the plan for the ‘neutralization’ of northern Norway (Prytz told me about this not long ago). According to Koht, this project originated not in Norway but in Stockholm, and was advanced by a Swedish friend of Göring’s. Koht deduces from this that the Germans would not have been averse to pursuing such a strategy…

The immediate reason for Koht’s visit was to clarify the nature of the relations between the N[orwegian] G[overnment] in exile in England and the Soviet government. Koht had taken an interest in this matter while still in northern Norway. The Soviet government answered then that relations remained normal and added (on its own initiative) that it had no claims on Norwegian ports. The N[orwegian] G[overnment] was touched. But how do matters stand now? Koht asked me to make inquiries and inform him of the Soviet government’s reply. I said I would do so. Koht also wanted to know whether the Soviet government considered it desirable to restore the independence of Norway after the war. I referred to the general principles of Soviet foreign policy.

The entire N[orwegian] G[overnment] is in London. The British government has offered it the use of a castle some 100 miles away from London, and the ministers will move there imminently. King Haakon is also here, but he will be staying in Buckingham Palace. The N[orwegian] G[overnment]’s finances rest on two foundations: the gold reserves which they managed to bring out of Norway and the income from Norwegian shipping which has been practically nationalized for the duration of the war and which is managed by the Trade and Shipping Mission in London (a large institution with about 250 employees). Up to 80% of Norwegian tonnage is presently located outside Norway.

Koht told me, among other things, that Germans are currently conducting a major campaign in Norway against the N[orwegian] G[overnment] and Haakon, demanding that the Storting should renounce the former and dethrone the latter. One hundred of the Storting’s 150 members are present in Norway, so a quorum exists. Koht does not exclude the possibility that Germany, by applying pressure in various forms, may force the Storting to make the decision it wants. That would be followed by the formation in Norway of a pseudo-government in German hands. Koht did not say so directly, but he was obviously concerned by the question: How would the Soviet government act in this case? Would it recognize a pseudo-government or not?

I informed Koht that we would be closing our mission in Oslo imminently, leaving only a consulate. This seemed to give him some cheer.

Koht said that eleven years ago, on his way from Oslo to Moscow (then he was just a professor), he paid me a visit in Helsinki. I tried but simply couldn’t recall this.