It all began on 20 May, when Halifax summoned me and said that the Cabinet had decided to send Stafford Cripps to Moscow as special envoy. For about a week leading up to this, I heard ‘rumours’ from all sides that the new government wanted to turn a new leaf in its relations with the Soviet Union. It was being said that the prime minister would invite me for a heart to heart talk, that the question of the British ambassador in Moscow would be settled, and that the absurd ‘correspondence’ concerning trade negotiations would be annulled. Personally, I thought that the question of the British ambassador in Moscow should come first. And when Halifax began speaking to me about improving Anglo-Soviet relations, I expected to hear that either Seeds would be returning to Moscow or that the British government was going to request an agrément for a different ambassador. Halifax’s news concerning a special envoy greatly disappointed me and I inquired rather coolly about the purpose of this envoy’s mission. Halifax sighed, pondered for a moment, and said: ‘To explore the possibilities.’

‘What kind of possibilities?’ I asked.

Halifax replied that he meant the ‘possibilities’ of a general improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations, in particular the ‘possibility’ of a trade agreement with the USSR.

I expressed my surprise that even now the British government was planning merely to ‘explore possibilities’, instead of getting down to practical matters, but promised to convey Halifax’s message to Moscow.

As was to be expected, the British scheme did not appeal to Moscow. Indeed, what need have we of some astral special envoy, whose obscure mission is to explore the possibilities? Moscow, however, took some time over the reply and finally sent it to London on 26 May. The answer was that the Soviet government was prepared to receive Cripps, or any other person authorized by the British government, only not in the capacity of a special envoy, but as an ordinary ambassador accredited on the same basis as I was accredited in London.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had been getting impatient. In the week between my meeting with Halifax and the arrival of the reply, Halifax and Butler asked me several times whether there had been a response from the S[oviet] G[overnment] and each time I had to disappoint them. On 24 May, Butler telephoned me and said that notwithstanding the absence of a reply from Moscow, the Foreign Office had decided, after receiving Cripps’s consent, to send the latter off on his journey. The international situation, Butler said, was becoming increasingly threatening and travelling between London and Moscow more and more difficult – so why not let Cripps fly to Athens immediately and await his final instructions there. While Cripps was travelling, London and Moscow could discuss his status. What’s more, time would be saved: in Athens, Cripps would be halfway to Moscow. I told Butler I would prefer a different procedure: first London and Moscow should agree upon at least the key issues concerning Cripps’s visit, and then he could set out, otherwise all sorts of complications and surprises might emerge. Butler, however, stuck to his guns and there was nothing left for me to do but to convey the FO’s decision to Moscow. Butler said that Cripps would fly out from England with two travelling companions on 25 May.

I received the aforesaid reply from Moscow on the morning of 26 May and delivered it to Halifax that very evening (even though it was Sunday). The foreign secretary was confused and unpleasantly surprised. He told me that the issue of a British ambassador in Moscow had only just received the attention of the government. Four days earlier, it had been decided to recall Seeds and replace him with someone else. Halifax was just about to inform me of the decision and request agrément for the new ambassador. Unfortunately, not all the procedural details had been arranged, so Halifax would only be able to inform me of the name of the new ambassador in a few days’ time. But what should we do with Cripps in the meantime? After all, he had already left and was probably halfway there, perhaps even in Athens.

Halifax sighed again, pondered, and proposed a solution: let Cripps go as a special envoy, and in a couple of days the British government would announce the appointment of a new ambassador, who could arrive in Moscow in three or four weeks’ time.

I objected, saying that the Soviet government was ready to receive one, not two, representatives, and this sole representative must be the ambassador.

Halifax began fidgeting and tried to convince me that his proposal was highly practical. As a last resort, the British government would be prepared to give Cripps the rank of ambassador for the period of his mission in Moscow, though such a solution did not appeal to Halifax personally: the rank of ambassador is usually given in cases when the special envoy intends to stay in the country to which he is sent for a long period of time (like Hoare, who has just been appointed ‘ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary on a special mission’ to Spain), while Cripps’s mission was conceived as only a short-term measure.

‘Or at least I hope so,’ Halifax added.

In conclusion, Halifax asked me whether, regardless of my doubts, I could convey his suggestion to Moscow. I promised to do so.

My meeting with Halifax occurred between six and seven in the evening. At 9 p.m., when I was at home, the telephone suddenly rang and to my very great astonishment I heard the following words: ‘Cripps speaking.’

‘Where are you calling from?’ I asked in bewilderment, thinking that perhaps he was calling from somewhere in France.

I was wrong. Cripps was in England and was calling me from the aerodrome he was meant to have left from the previous day. But for various reasons, the plane was still there and take-off was only expected the next day. On Saturday morning I had been looking for Cripps and rang him at home. Cripps had been informed of my call and now wanted to know what the matter was. I laughed to myself about the coincidence and replied: ‘Two hours ago I gave the Soviet government’s reply concerning your visit to Halifax. I advise you to get in touch with him before leaving.’

‘What is the nature of the response?’ Cripps asked.

I briefly related the key points to him. Cripps thanked me and hung up.

An hour had not passed before the telephone rang again. It was Cripps: ‘I’ve just spoken to Halifax. Everything has been arranged. I’ll receive the proper appointment. Halifax will summon you to see him on this matter tomorrow.’

‘I shall be waiting,’ I said. ‘I wish you a good journey and a successful trip.’

Cripps thanked me and hung up once more.

The following day, 27 May, I waited in vain for Halifax’s invitation. Butler finally called at about seven o’clock in the evening and asked me to come to his apartment right away. I thought he wanted to inform me of Cripps’s appointment as ambassador, but that turned out not to be the case. Butler started questioning me once again about the nature of the Soviet government’s reply which I had conveyed to Halifax the day before, and tried to clarify whether there was any hope of the Soviet government agreeing to receive not one but two British representatives: the ambassador and the special envoy. I left Butler in no doubt. On parting, Butler told me that the matter of Cripps’s status would probably be resolved the following morning.

On Tuesday, 28 May, news of the agreement between Leopold of Belgium and the Germans reached London. The mood in town was one of alarm and vexation. The atmosphere in parliament was highly charged. I met Butler in the lobby after Churchill’s speech. He told me that the decision concerning Cripps had indeed been taken and that he would inform me about it officially tomorrow. Now, however, he could tell me unofficially that Cripps had been appointed ambassador.

‘Ordinary or “on a special mission”,’ I inquired.

‘I’m afraid, “on a special mission”,’ Butler replied.

‘That’s a mistake,’ I said. ‘It will only cause complications. It would be better to drop “special mission”.’

‘You think that would be better?’ Butler asked.

‘I’m absolutely sure of it,’ I concluded.

Nonetheless, when the next morning, 29 May, Butler informed me officially that Cripps had been appointed ambassador, it appeared that his rank was that of ‘ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary on a special mission’. Butler justified this by the fact that according to British law, an MP could not occupy a post whose salary was paid for by the government (the division of legislative and executive power!). Therefore, a member of the House of Commons could not be an ordinary ambassador, but only an ambassador ‘on a special mission’. Nor could he receive a salary from the Foreign Office, but must content himself with a ‘grant to cover his expenses’. However, such an ambassador should present his credentials on the usual basis, and is in no way tied to the duration of absence from the native country. Butler pointed to historical precedents, the most significant of which were the cases of Goschen,

William Edward Goschen.

who was appointed ambassador to Turkey in 1880, and Edward Grey,

Edward Grey, Liberal foreign secretary, 1905–16; ambassador to the USA, 1919–20.

who travelled to America in his day.

I expressed my regret at the British government not following my advice, but Butler disclosed that the Cabinet had already passed the decision and that the Foreign Office would send instructions to Le Rougetel

John Helier Le Rougetel, first secretary at the British embassy in Moscow.

(the chargé d’affaires in Moscow) that very day to request agrément for Cripps from the Soviet government.

‘True,’ Butler added, ‘Cripps’s appointment has not yet received royal approval, but that is not so important.’

Le Rougetel was received by C[omrade] Molotov on 31 May and requested agrément for Cripps. Surely, C[omrade] Molotov told him that the Soviet government wanted an ordinary ambassador, not one ‘on a special mission’, adding that it was ready to receive Cripps or any other person authorized by the British government. C[omrade] Molotov also noted that the British government evidently desired to send a person of leftist leanings to Moscow. The S[oviet] G[overnment], however, thinks that it is not the personal convictions of the ambassador that matter, but the fact that he represents his government. If that condition is satisfied, we are indifferent to the ambassador’s party affiliation.

C[omrade] Molotov’s reply reached London on the evening of 1 June, and the Cabinet decided at once to satisfy our wishes and appoint Cripps ambassador without a ‘special mission’.

Cripps was hardly prepared for the ambassadorship: ‘I have no more idea than the man in the moon as to how I shall run the embassy! – which is, I imagine, a large establishment with many servants etc. etc.!! However all these things will no doubt sort themselves out in due course.’ Cripps papers, diary, 4 June 1940.

On the morning of Sunday, 2 June, the deputy head of the northern department, Maclean, invited Korzh to probe the possibility of allowing Postan

Michael Postan, born Moisei Efimovich Postan in Bessarabia in 1898, Postan studied at Kiev University, where he was an active member of a Zionist socialist party. He left Russia after the revolution and became a prominent medieval historian in Cambridge, in full denial of his past. He served as an expert on Russia in the Ministry of Economic Warfare during the war.

to join Cripps as commercial adviser to the embassy (Postan, a Russian born in Bessarabia, emigrated in 1919 and is now a British subject and professor of economics at Cambridge). Maclean also informed Korzh that Le Rougetel had been given new instructions to request agrément for Cripps as an ordinary ambassador.

Yesterday, 4 June, Le Rougetel met C[omrade] Molotov once again, having received agrément for Cripps. C[omrade] Molotov mentioned in passing the undesirability of Postan’s appointment. C[omrade] Molotov had no objections to Cripps arriving in Moscow prior to the receipt of his credentials from London.

Thus, Cripps’s destiny has at last been decided. Excellent. But there is one very curious thing.

The Foreign Office mandarins are furious at Cripps’s appointment. First, because he is not one of theirs, and secondly because he is Cripps. Hence all the sabotage. At first this manifested itself in the wish to send Cripps in the capacity of ‘special envoy’, and then in the raising of various juridical obstacles to his appointment as an ordinary ambassador (the Foreign Office planned to appoint Sir Maurice Peterson, the former ambassador in Madrid, as ambassador in Moscow). The Foreign Office ‘experts’ undertook an assiduous search for ‘precedents’, right back to the time of Queen Anne

Queen Anne of Great Britain, 1702–14.

(mostly on the question of the possibility of an MP being appointed ambassador), and found none. They joyfully informed Halifax and Butler that it couldn’t be done. But when the Soviet government stood fast, the British government was finally forced to bestow on Cripps the rank of ambassador on the usual basis and juridical justifications were immediately found. The same ‘experts’ soon found a small ‘note’ in Sir Erskine May’s

Thomas Erskine May, British constitutional theorist.

treatise on parliamentary procedure, which states that an MP can be appointed ambassador without losing his parliamentary position. The complex problem was thus resolved. When Butler, in reply to a question in parliament, quoted this ‘note’, the Chamber burst into laughter.

However, I fear that the sabotaging of Cripps will not stop at that. The Foreign Office machine is too strong, while Butler, who seems to sympathize with Cripps, is not firm or influential enough to restrain the ‘experts’.

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Cadogan indeed warned that Cripps had ‘not yet won his spurs in diplomacy’. It was assumed in the Foreign Office that Cripps would not remain in Moscow as ambassador ‘for more than a brief period’; TNA FO 371 24847 N5689/40/38, 2 June 1940; Thurston, the American chargé d’affaires in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 5 June 1940 in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1940, I, p. 605. Cripps remained ambassador in Moscow until early 1942.