He told me, among other things, that the N[orwegian] G[overnment] did not immediately ask the Allies for help. It hesitated for two or three days and held talks with the Germans. It was only after Germany demanded that Haakon recognize Quisling’s

Vidkun Quisling, founder of the Norwegian Fascist Party, 1933; installed as a Nazi puppet ‘minister president’ of Norway, 1942–45.

government that the N[orwegian] G[overnment], acting through the British minister in Norway, asked England and France for help.

In the first few days, this assistance was promised in the most resolute and definite terms. Chamberlain, Churchill, Halifax and Hoare – Colban had contact with all of them – were lavish with their promises. In particular, they promised very serious aid in Trondheim. But, when the time came to translate promises into action, all manner of ‘difficulties’ and ‘obstacles’ suddenly arose.

Colban was not informed about the evacuation of southern Norway. He learnt about it by chance, from one of his acquaintances, on 30 April. Gripped by anxiety, he hurried to Halifax for clarification. Halifax confirmed the fact of the evacuation and tried to throw dust in Colban’s eyes with his explanations.

And what’s the upshot of it all?

Even Colban, gentle and quiet as a ladybird, is deeply outraged by the conduct of the Allies.

‘We’ve been a pawn in England’s hands,’ he said bitterly.

Colban did not use the word ‘betrayal’, but that was the sense of everything he said to me today.

Indeed, the Allies thrust their aid on Norway, drew her into the war by promising support, and then left her at the mercy of fate without even bothering to inform Colban of their decision.

A lesson in brazen cynicism.