Why indeed did Roosevelt decide to send Welles? Because he lacks reliable information about what is going on in Europe. Kennedy is fanatically ‘pro-war’ (he is a typical ‘Munich’ man), and all the information he sends to Washington is tinted accordingly. Phillips

William Phillips, American ambassador to Italy, 1936–41.

(ambassador to Italy) compromised himself in the president’s opinion back in 1938, when he asked Roosevelt for leave on the eve of the Munich Conference, assuring him that all was calm in Europe and that no complications were to be expected in the near future. Since then the president has taken a very sceptical view of Phillips’s reports. Finally, the United States has had no ambassador in Germany since the Jewish pogroms in late 1938. So Roosevelt sent Welles to obtain information about the situation in Europe which he could trust.

What task was Welles set? A twofold task. To collect information and to try to find out whether there is any basis for concluding peace in the European war in the near future. Roosevelt is interested in the latter from the point of view of world politics as well as from the point of view of US domestic policy, for he has to decide whether he is going to stand for a third term as president at the elections this year. If peace is possible and near at hand, he will not submit his candidacy; if it is not, he will.

What impressions did Welles gain from his tour of Europe?

(1) Italy. Welles liked Mussolini, who gave him the impression of a man sincerely striving for peace. In Welles’ opinion, Roosevelt should ‘cooperate’ with Mussolini on the issue of ‘peace’. Mussolini’s price for supporting peace is approximately the following: Djibouti, Italy’s representation at the council of the Suez Canal, the settlement of the question of the status of Italians in Tunisia (not Tunisia as such, or, at any rate, not the whole of Tunisia), the internationalization of Gibraltar, and financial aid from the City.

(2) Germany. Contrary to what is written in the newspapers, Hitler was very calm during his meeting with Welles and gave the impression of being a ‘moderate’ person. Welles left Berlin with the notion that Hitler wants peace and is ready to conclude it on approximately the following conditions: a ‘little Poland’ is restored on an ethnographic basis, but it should be deprived of any military significance; Bohemia and Moravia should form a single state entity and be dependent to a certain extent on Germany; Germany gets back its former colonies (in this area Hitler concedes the possibility of various compromises); the Western powers allow Germany, without any interference on their part, to form its own ‘economic empire’ out of Scandinavia, Central and S[outh]-E[astern] Europe on the basis of preferential treatment on the Ottawan model. Hitler also gave Welles to understand that the development of economic relations with the USSR was part of his programme. But Hitler threatened that if peace was not concluded in the near future, he would pursue the war seriously, on the largest scale, and would crush England and France in six months using secret military inventions at his disposal. Of the other German figures, Welles liked Göring best, finding him to be a ‘serious and reasonable man’.

(3) France. The French leaders struck Welles as very belligerent, and at the same time greatly worried among themselves about the course and outcome of the war. He liked Reynaud and Mandel most of all. Welles left Paris with the impression that France was not yet ready for peace.

(4) England. In London Welles met the king, Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, Churchill, Eden, Stanley, Attlee, Greenwood, Sinclair and others. In its list of individuals whom it advised Welles to meet, the FO ‘forgot’ Lloyd George. Welles corrected the mistake himself. Then the FO assigned him 30 minutes for a talk with Lloyd George. Welles came to see the old man and talked with him for nearly two hours, totally disrupting the official schedule. Welles said afterwards that compared with all the other conversations he had in London, his conversation with Lloyd George was a ‘breath of fresh air’. Lloyd George recommended that Roosevelt launch a peace initiative and invite Mussolini and the pope to participate. All the other people Welles met in England largely repeated what they always say about the war. Chamberlain made it clear that he was ready to conclude peace ‘at the first opportunity’, but on conditions, of course, which Hitler could hardly find acceptable at present. Churchill told the American guest that he did not quite understand why the USA was so anxious about peace. Churchill expressed himself as follows: ‘A murder has been committed in a house. Two policemen rush to the house and seize the murderer. At that moment a stranger approaches the policemen and urges them to free the murderer. Why? On what grounds? It’s unclear. In any case, if the policemen were to reach the conclusion that the murderer should be freed they would do so themselves, without the interference of a stranger.’ On the whole, London also struck Welles as belligerent, but less so than Paris.

What are Welles’ definitive conclusions? Even he is probably still unable to say. His tour is not quite over. On his way back from London he met Daladier in Paris and talked with Mussolini once more in Rome, where he also paid a visit to the pope. Mussolini must have informed Welles about Ribbentrop’s recent visit to Rome. Welles will be preparing his report and conclusions en route from Genoa to New York. He will refine them in Washington.

Meanwhile I’ve heard that, upon leaving London, Welles expressed the opinion that: (a) neither side will be able to win, and (b) he can as yet see no basis for peace in the near future.