The ‘general line’ followed by the British government since the outbreak of war has been to ‘neutralize’ the USSR in order to facilitate the struggle against Germany. The British government’s reasoning was simple: better one enemy than two. That is why I heard so many statements in October and November about the desire ‘to improve relations’, culminating in Stanley’s trade proposals.

Now the situation is changing. The British government has practically given up any hope of ‘improving relations’ (the lack of a reply to Stanley’s proposals played a major role here) and is looking for a new direction on the ‘Russian question’. Now a ‘French concept’ (ascribed to Daladier and Gamelin) has emerged, which assumes that it would be dangerous for the Allies to tolerate a situation in which the Soviet Union remained neutral till the end of the war. For this would mean that when the major European capitalist powers have exhausted their resources, the USSR alone would have fresh forces and an intact army. What would then become of Europe and the capitalist system? (By the way, I remember hearing in the spring from someone in Geneva that the Turks, who were insisting at the time to France that a tripartite mutual assistance pact was essential, subscribe to a similar notion.) The USSR, therefore, must be drawn into the war – on the side of the Allies if possible, or on the side of Germany if this is inevitable. The main thing is to ‘bleed’ the USSR. To support their concept, the French adduce various additional arguments: the war in the west has turned out to be easier than expected; the Red Army, to judge by the Finnish experience, is less formidable than was assumed; and therefore Britain and France could cope with two enemies, all the more so as the USA would definitely render extensive aid in this case, or even enter the war.

Until recently all those French arguments were met with scepticism in London. Now a clear shift can be observed. A majority in government still adheres to the old concept of ‘neutrality’, but some ministers have begun speaking in the spirit of the French thesis. The more so as it seems that the British government recently received assurances from Washington that the USA would probably enter the war on the side of Britain and France, should the Soviet Union join Germany.

The severance of diplomatic relations between Britain and France on the one hand and the USSR on the other is seen as the first step in drawing the USSR into the war. And then who knows? Perhaps it will be possible to switch the war and attack the USSR through a united capitalist bloc, including Germany.

Strange rumours are afloat in this connection about the ‘White Book’ on the summer talks in Moscow, which the British government is preparing and which should appear in early January. It’s said that the advocates of ‘neutralizing [the Soviet Union]’ want to word it in such a way as not to eliminate the possibility of maintaining relations at their present level or even improving them in future. The advocates of the French thesis, on the contrary, want to edit the ‘White Book’ in such a way as to guarantee after its publication either a clear severance of relations or, at the very least, the recalling of ambassadors.

At the same time, strange news is arriving from the USSR. The consular department of the British embassy in Moscow has summoned a British representative of an Anglo-American company from Leningrad and suggested that he leave the USSR as soon as possible. The US embassy has advised its citizens in the USSR to leave the USSR before 1 January. It is known that the consular section of the British embassy in Moscow has already made preparations for evacuation via Rumania.

It’s obvious that some kind of anti-Soviet brew is currently being cooked up in London, Paris and Washington. Will it come to the boil? Will it lead to the rupture of diplomatic relations or at least to the recalling of ambassadors?

Time will tell.

He persevered with his distinctive modus operandi of attributing his own ideas to his interlocutors. On his way to visit Lloyd George on Christmas Eve, Maisky had stopped for tea with the Webbs (who assumed that this was ‘a farewell visit’). He told them that he regarded the state of Anglo-Soviet relations as ‘serious’, and that he expected the publication of a White Book on the 1939 negotiations.

See diary entry for 5 January 1940.

It would expose Molotov’s duplicity in carrying on military talks with the British, while secretly arranging for the pact with Ribbentrop (and would also expose Maisky’s own ploys). This was bound to lead to the severance of relations between the countries and to the granting of assistance to the Finns in their war against Russia. In his telegram to Molotov following dinner at Lloyd George’s, Maisky conveyed at length the advice of the trustworthy politician to bring the war in Finland to a swift end, echoing almost verbatim his own exposé to the Webbs a couple of hours earlier.

DVP, 1939, XXII/2, doc. 890; Webb, diary, 24 December, pp. 6794–6. See also Carley, 1939, pp. 239–40. On British policy towards Russia, see Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, pp. 15–24.

]