We talked mostly about A[nglo]-S[oviet] relations. Elliot welcomes our readiness to seek ways of improving Anglo-Soviet relations. In response to my comment that, in order to ensure the improvement of relations, British diplomats should cease working against the USSR, Elliot said that Soviet accusations are highly exaggerated.

Then Elliot surveyed the global situation, making some observations along the way. In his opinion, British and Soviet interests in the Far East coincide: both sides want to prevent Japan’s victory in China. In Turkey, these interests, far from conflicting, are complementary. Britain is desperately keen for Ankara and Moscow to maintain a very close friendship, if only from its own egotistic considerations, namely, that the value of Turkey as an ally would fall steeply if its neighbour were an unfriendly or even simply indifferent USSR. As for Finland, the British government wishes above all for a peaceful settlement of the Soviet–Finnish dispute. Britain has no interests of its own in Finland, and it could hardly help Finland should help be needed (the case with Poland is instructive in this regard), so the British government would very much welcome an agreement between Moscow and Helsinki in the nearest future.

I retorted: ‘So what’s the matter? Why, in practice, do British diplomats follow the opposite line on the Finnish question?’

Elliot made reference to English public opinion, which is violently pro-Finnish, and to the pressure exerted on the government by Labour, which has close ties with the Finnish Social Democrats and Cooperatives (Tanner

Väinö Alfred Tanner, Finnish social-democrat foreign minister, 1939–40.

is the president of the International Cooperative Alliance) and is doing its best to help them.

I replied that I did not find his arguments terribly convincing. I adduced my own, showing that the issue was not just ‘public opinion’ but also the government.

At this point Elliot decided ‘to take the bull by the horns’ and stated directly that one should look at the root of the matter. The root of the matter is that Moscow and London are deeply suspicious of each other. The entire atmosphere of A[nglo]-S[oviet] relations is poisoned by this suspicion. As a result, even the most straightforward step taken by one side is immediately interpreted in the most menacing light by the other. Both sides live in an atmosphere of perpetual nightmare and invented fears. If the Soviet and British governments really do want to improve relations, then it is essential, first of all, that they change the current atmosphere. The suspicions and fears that have accumulated must be dispelled. The British government is of the opinion that personal contacts between members of the Soviet and British governments would be the best way of achieving this. Hence the idea of Elliot heading a delegation of ministerial colleagues and noted MPs to travel to the Moscow agricultural exhibition, about which we spoke in August. Unfortunately, the trip never took place. It was already too late. Hence now the idea of trade talks and sending Stanley to Moscow, about which Halifax and Stanley spoke to me a month or so ago. But there has been no response from us to this proposal. A great pity. Some members of the government interpret the delay as the Soviet government’s unwillingness to improve relations with Britain. Elliot himself does not think this to be the case, but he does think that unless Anglo-Soviet relations improve in the near future, they will begin to deteriorate. To what end? Elliot sees no good grounds for this deterioration.

I argued that relations between countries are defined not by fine words or personal contacts, but by deeds. The actions of British diplomats speak for themselves.

Then Elliot suddenly uttered out of the blue: ‘What is the sense in our disarming ourselves in advance? After all, we haven’t had the slightest signal from you to indicate that you really do want to improve relations.’

I parried this lunge.