At lunch, the conversation was, of course, mainly about the war. Hore-Belisha, as befits a minister of war, takes a negative view of the idea of peace.

‘Peace with Hitler,’ he said, ‘is impossible. A different government is needed in Germany to make peace. We shall fight until we have such a government. Let it be a government of communists – I believe this may conceivably happen at the end of the first year of the war – we don’t care. It’ll be easier for us to come to an arrangement with communists than with Hitler.’

I made an attempt to elucidate what exactly Hore-Belisha intended to come to an arrangement with communists about, but he was very evasive and vague. Still, I understood from some of his allusions that the future, post-war Germany should be disarmed and built on the ‘federation’ principle. In other words, we are dealing once again with the partitioning of Germany.

Hore-Belisha spoke about the war itself with greater interest and greater energy.

‘We do not intend to launch large-scale offensive operations,’ he said. ‘Our tactics are defensive in principle. We would be only too glad for the Germans to begin a broad offensive along the Maginot Line or even across Holland and Belgium, for they would then suffer colossal losses, while British and French losses would be negligible. There are no impregnable military positions in the world. Any position can be taken, if enough lives are expended. Even the Maginot Line can be broken. But, even if the Germans were to carry through such an operation, they would be too exhausted to be able to deliver a decisive blow. The Germans understand this, and that is why I think that, at least until spring, things will be relatively quiet on the western front.’

‘In other words,’ I remarked, ‘you are saying that the Germans will also be waging a war of attrition?’

‘No, that’s not what I think,’ Hore-Belisha retorted. ‘Germany cannot risk such a war. It needs a rapid solution, or at least an attempt at one. That is why I fear some kind of mad move on the part of Hitler.’

‘What do you mean?’

‘Well, a massive air bombardment of England, for example. Hitler may go for broke and throw all his air force against us at once.’

I inquired about the effectiveness of the air defence. [Hore-]Belisha replied that it was now in good order: 130,000 people, all over England, are involved in it. The country is saturated with anti-aircraft artillery. In London, in particular, any enemy plane would find itself under fire at any given moment from 50 to 100 anti-aircraft guns. On the whole, the British think (based on Scotland’s experience) that the enemy loses 25–30% of its machines every raid. The joint Anglo-French air force is presently equal to, or a little weaker than, the German air force, but it will be notably stronger by spring. Irrespective of American deliveries, Anglo-French production is immense (a monthly output of 1,500 machines in England) and is increasing each month.

Hore-Belisha revealed interesting information concerning the war at sea. Before the war began, the Germans had a maximum of 65 submarines (including 30 of the ocean-going type). The British and the French have destroyed at least 22. The Germans are able to manufacture 5–8 submarines monthly, but the main problem is the crews, which require long training and outstanding bravery. Here, the Germans find themselves in a tight spot. The British are fighting the submarines with torpedo boats, light cruisers, and special craft which are halfway between torpedo and mosquito boats. These vessels are cheap and quickly assembled. Hore-Belisha is confident that even though German submarines may inflict certain losses on Britain, they are not able to threaten the country with a serious blockade.