First and foremost I was interested in the prospects of Hitler’s ‘peace offensive’. Butler replied: ‘None for the moment. Not because we are against peace – on the contrary, we very much wish to avoid war, and that is why we need a solid and lasting peace and assurance about this peace. We need the assurance that if we conclude peace today, it will not be broken in six months’ time. We are ready to pay a high price for a solid and lasting peace of 20–25 years. We would not even refuse Germany substantial colonial concessions. We have a large Empire and we do not need every part of it. Something could be found for the Germans. Not Tanganyika, of course, which could easily be turned into a naval and air base on the Indian Ocean, but perhaps Togo, Cameroon, etc. But we must be guaranteed that if we make concessions now and conclude an agreement, peace and the status quo will be ensured for at least a whole generation. Otherwise it makes no sense.’

Molotov quizzed Maisky about whether he thought Butler had been hinting at a possible Soviet mediation ‘with a view to concluding peace with Germany on particular terms’. Maisky had not gained any such impression, but thought Butler did subscribe to the idea; DVP, 1939, XXII/2, docs. 695, 700 & 704. Ironically, Butler, who had been criticized by the Russians for his enthusiastic support of appeasement, would now become the target of Maisky’s courtship in the Soviet attempts to create a ‘peace offensive’. See, for instance, RAN f.1702 op.4 d.848 l.3, 20 Nov. 1939, letter to Butler.

‘What kind of guarantees do you want?’ I asked.

Butler replied: ‘Either Germany must have a different government, which we can take at its word, or the peace treaty and its observance must be guaranteed by all the great powers, including the USA and the USSR. The USSR was not admitted to the Munich settlements, and experience shows that such a treaty has no value. Any future decision has to be taken with the participation of the Soviet Union. Since I see no possibility at the present moment of a treaty being concluded that would provide for a solid, lasting peace, we have no way out but war, counting on the superiority of our resources over those of Germany. That is why Hitler’s “peace offensive” is to be considered a failure. But that does not of course preclude another “peace offensive” in the future, one which may have much better chance of success. “Peace offensives” will probably arise more than once in the course of the war. One or other will meet with success.’

‘But which?’ I intervened.

Butler just shrugged his shoulders.

Then the conversation moved on to Anglo-Soviet relations. During the whole period of his employment in the Foreign Office (since Eden’s retirement) Butler has upheld the view that no contradictions exist between Britain and the USSR and that rapprochement between them is therefore possible and desirable. Butler was highly critical of the way in which Anglo-Soviet talks on a tripartite pact were conducted. Today, without concealing his regret about the failure of those talks, Butler assured me, like many before him, that the British government wants very much to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, but does not know where to begin. Politics? Trade? Dispatching a member of the Cabinet to Moscow? But who exactly? Could I not make a suggestion? Or perhaps a new ambassador should be appointed to replace Seeds? In short, he covered almost exactly the same ground with me as had Eden, Elliot and Churchill. Butler dropped obvious hints that he would not be at all averse to visiting the USSR himself. As always, I was very circumspect and refrained from giving advice.

As if to prove the sincerity of the British government’s desire to improve relations with the USSR, Butler touched upon two questions:

(1) Poland. The British government does not contemplate the restoration of Poland within its former borders. All it aspires to is an ethnographic Poland (resembling the ‘Duchy of Warsaw’ of Napoleonic times) guaranteed by the USSR, Germany, Britain and France. Nobody in Britain is thinking of returning Western Ukraine and [Western] Belorussia to Poland. Zaleski,

Count August Zaleski, Polish foreign minister, 1926–32, and foreign minister in the Polish government in exile, 1939–41.

who recently visited London, also made no claim on the territories occupied by the Soviet Union, but – oh, these incorrigible Polish gentlemen! – he did demand East Prussia on strategic grounds. Zaleski envisaged the expulsion of Germans from this province of Germany and its colonization by Poles.

(2) Turkey. England considers Soviet–Turkish friendship to be in its own interest and would be prepared to assist in every possible way the conclusion of an agreement between Moscow and Ankara. Butler added that Turkey was in constant contact with London during Saraçoğlu’s

Mehmet Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Turkish foreign minister, 1938–42, and prime minister, 1942–46.

stay in Moscow, and the British government sanctioned all those changes in the Anglo-Turkish pact that would follow from the Moscow talks. Thus, the British government did not object to Turkey’s non-participation in a war against the Soviet Union under any conditions. It was also prepared to accept the closing of the Straits to warships. She stood only against the division of the Balkans into Soviet and German ‘spheres of influence’. On the whole, Butler merely elaborated in greater detail what Halifax told me yesterday. He even admitted that recent weeks have shown how little Britain can do to influence events in Eastern Europe. The British government is prepared to draw from this the necessary practical conclusions.

What Butler told me is very interesting, but needs to be properly digested. Clearly, the British government is greatly concerned about the current situation and would like to set Anglo-Soviet relations straight. But what’s behind all this? We must see.