Maisky repeated his now familiar apologetic narrative of the events leading up to the pact, suggesting that ‘In a world such as this where wild beasts were loose every country had to take certain precautions for its own safety’; TNA FO 371 23682 N5426/92/38.

Maisky, who, according to Eden, ‘talked almost the whole time’, did advise him that the Kremlin would prefer to see someone who enjoyed the British government’s confidence, and that it would ‘probably always be doubtful of this if they were dealing with a Left Wing politician while the Government of this country was Right Wing’. Seeds’ health had been failing for a while, and he was being held – most conveniently – as a scapegoat for the failure of the negotiations with the Russians. Following a Cabinet meeting on 30 September in which his judgements were questioned, Halifax met Dawson tête-à-tête for dinner on 5 October and ‘discussed with him possible Labour names to succeed Seeds’; TNA FO 371 23682 N5426/92/38; DVP, 1939, XXII/2, doc. 682. The dissonance between the versions has been spotted by Carley, who is correct in attributing it to Maisky’s need to save his policy ‘and perhaps also his head – since he had to keep the British interested in negotiations’; M.J. Carley, ‘“A situation of delicacy and danger”: Anglo-Soviet relations, August 1939–March 1940’, Contemporary European History, 8/2 (1999), pp. 184 and 191. See also Dawson papers, diary, Box 43; and Aster, ‘Sir William Seeds’, pp. 142–5.