(1) The fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy remain unalterable. The Soviet–German relations are being governed by (a) the Soviet–German Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 and (b) the Soviet–German communiqués of 18 and 22 September in connection with the Polish affairs (no contradiction between the USSR and Germany, demarcation line).

(2) The present demarcation line in Poland cannot be considered as the final state frontier between the USSR and Germany. The future of Poland, however, is dependent on so many factors and contradictory forces that it is impossible at present to foresee the final sequel of all that interplay.

(3) The USSR would be prepared to start trade talks if Great Britain really desires such talks, as the USSR takes a neutral attitude with regard to the war in the west now and contemplates maintaining this neutral attitude in the future, but with one important reservation: the USSR contemplates remaining neutral in the future if Great Britain herself by her attitude and behaviour towards the USSR does not compel the Soviet government to interfere in this war.

Halifax was not fully satisfied. He asked whether we intended to form a buffer Polish state, but I was unable to satisfy his curiosity on this score. In addition, he was obviously bewildered by the statement that the USSR would remain neutral only so long as England did not force her to intervene in the war, and asked me anxiously: ‘Have we done anything to you?’

I replied that except for various complications in matters of trade (the delay in issuing licences for the goods we had bought, for the orders carried out for us, etc.) we held nothing against England for the moment, but who could vouch for the future? War is war, and in war anything can happen.

With regard to the question of the trade complications, Halifax said that these difficulties would be settled along with other matters during the proposed trade negotiations.

Halifax asked in some detail about the current situation in the Polish areas occupied by the Soviet army. Using the information which I receive every day on Moscow radio, I told him about the temporary administrations being set up in cities and towns, the peasant committees, the opening of schools, factories and shops, etc. Halifax asked how the local population was greeting the Red Army. I replied: ‘That depends. Landlords and factory owners are hardly enthusiastic, but peasants, workers and Jews are highly sympathetic.’

I related some facts to illustrate my point.

‘So what do you do with the landlords?’ asked Halifax.

‘Nothing. They have nearly all fled.’

‘And what if any of them had remained?’

‘That would depend on who that specific landlord was. If he had been responsible for any serious sins in the past, he would have been arrested and put on trial. If he was a good person who hadn’t sullied his name in any way in the past, he would have been left alone. I must tell you, though, that there are few decent people to be found among the Polish landlords, if any. The Polish landlord is one of the worst representatives of his class in Europe.’

At Halifax’s request, I gave a brief description of Polish landownership and the poverty and exploitation of the Polish, Ukrainian and Belorussian peasantry.

‘And what do you do with the landlords’ land?’

‘It is confiscated without exception and distributed among the peasants.’

Halifax shook his hand and uttered gloomily: ‘A grim tale.’

His landlord’s heart couldn’t bear it.

I noticed one curious detail. Judging by the nature of the questions he posed to me, it was clear that Halifax wanted to sound me out as to whether we considered the fate of the part of Poland we had occupied to have been definitively resolved, or whether we allowed for the possibility of it changing in the future. When I told him about the distribution of the landlords’ land, Halifax sighed heavily and no more questions followed. The answer to the question that concerned him was as plain as daylight.

At the end, Halifax touched upon the first point.

‘Still,’ he remarked, ‘I just can’t reconcile the events of recent weeks with the foreign-policy principles proclaimed by Mr Stalin at your last party congress.’

I looked at Halifax with half a smile and replied: ‘There’s this folk tale we have. A peasant fell ill and took to his bed. While he lay there helpless, one of his neighbours took his horse, another stole his cow, and a third grabbed his plough. When the peasant recovered and went back to work, he saw that he had been robbed. He went to the house of the first neighbour, punched him in the face and took his horse back. Then he came to the second and third neighbours, and got his cow and plough back in the same way. Can the peasant’s actions be qualified as “an act of aggression”? No, they can’t. He simply retrieved that which his neighbours had illegally appropriated when he was weak.’

‘So you think that this Russian tale has relevance to recent events?’ Halifax asked.

‘Undoubtedly,’ I replied, ‘with the sole difference that in this case the USSR didn’t punch anybody in the face. We did not start a war in Poland to return the regions taken away from us in 1920. But when the Polish state collapsed and the Polish government fled abroad, when Poland became a ‘no man’s land’ under the threat of German occupation of its entire territory, then the USSR intervened and said: that which was illegally taken away from us 20 years ago must now be returned. What objections can there be to our way of acting? None. That is why I dare to assert that there is no contradiction between our principles and our actions in the area of foreign policy.’

Halifax did not reply. I doubt, though, that he entirely agreed with me.