Ribbentrop has flown in to Moscow surrounded by 32 attendants! That’s just like him. I remember that when he was ambassador in Britain, he travelled between London and Berlin accompanied by no fewer than 30–40 adjutants. The negotiations have already begun.

Boothby telephoned. In his private capacity, but on behalf of his friends in the government, he expressed the hope that the following would be made clear to Ribbentrop in Moscow: in the event of war, the USSR would have its hands free. This could save the peace. Several Conservative MPs spoke to me in the same vein today.

The Greek and Danish envoys came by. Both are very worried and frightened. Especially the Dane. He confessed to me directly that he failed to see any way out of the situation except war.

Preparations for an emergency are in full swing in the city. Shelters are being dug, piles of sandbags are being heaped up in front of buildings, windows are being blacked out, museums and picture galleries are being emptied, the evacuation of schools, women and children is being organized, and instructions are being given over the radio about what to do with… cats and dogs.

Tension is growing, along with the expectation of something frightful, menacing and unavoidable. Is this serious? Or are these just psychological preparations for a new Munich? We’ll see. There’s no doubt that Chamberlain would like a second Munich very much. The trouble is that Hitler’s appetite is growing fast, which makes a repeat of Munich more difficult.

What if Poland decides to fight? What then? Will Britain and France support her? Who knows? The experience of the past year obliges one to be cautious in making predictions.

Beneš came over for lunch. A short, skinny, sprightly man with bright eyes and greying hair. We conversed tête-à-tête. Beneš thanked me for my action in connection with his telegram to the League of Nations at the Council session in May. Then he familiarized me with his plans.

He is staking everything on war, a great European war in the nearest future. Only such a war can lead to the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Beneš kept asking me what I thought about the likelihood of an imminent war, and noted with satisfaction every remark I made that could be interpreted as suggesting that war would break out in the next few weeks or even days.

In concrete terms, Beneš’s thoughts are as follows. If war breaks out in the nearest future, he will form a Czechoslovak government under his premiership and seek recognition from the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. A historical precedent exists: Belgium in the First World War. Nearly all Belgium’s territory was occupied by the enemy, but the Belgian government continued functioning in France and was recognized by the Allies. The Czechoslovak territory is now also occupied by the enemy, but the Czechoslovak government could function in England and be recognized by the said four powers. Beneš already has his ‘chancellery’ in London: the embryo of the future government.

Beneš’s misconstrued account in his memoirs of his conversation with Maisky is a reinterpretation of the Munich Agreement in the face of the brewing Cold War and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, and has misled historians. See I. Lukes, The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II (London, 1999), p. 40; J. Barros and R. Gregor, Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler, and the invasion of Russia (Chicago, 1995), ch. 1. Beneš’s anachronistic impressions were that ‘the Soviets want war, they prepared for it conscientiously’ and were convinced that ‘the time has come for a final struggle between capitalism, fascism and Nazism and that there will be a world revolution which they will trigger’ when the rest of the world is exhausted by the war. See E. Beneš, Memoirs of Dr Eduard Beneš (London, 1954), pp. 138–9.

In the event of war, Czechoslovakia plans to form its national army in France, comprising one or two divisions. It will form part of the French armed forces, but it will retain national command and colours. The army will be recruited from Czechoslovak émigrés, whose total number in all countries reaches 100,000. Presently, up to 2,000 Czechoslovak officers have been enlisted in the French Foreign Legion. In the event of war, they will command the Czechoslovak troops. A Czechoslovak division might also be formed on the eastern front, in Poland, but this is less certain as yet. The French government views Beneš’s military plans with sympathy.

In financial terms, the Czechoslovak movement is more or less secure. It is financed by various sources, and particularly generously by American Czechs, but never by foreign powers. Beneš’s ties with Czechoslovakia are very tight. He receives complete and reliable information from his country almost daily.

Roosevelt is fully sympathetic towards Beneš’s plans. Beneš had a couple of meetings with the president during his visit to America. Beneš told me with obvious satisfaction that Sumner Welles

Benjamin Sumner Welles, American under secretary of state, 1937–43.

(under secretary of state) had visited him at his place on behalf of the president on the eve of his departure from the United States and told him: ‘For me, you are still the president of Czechoslovakia.’

I asked Beneš what the British government thought of his plans.

Beneš replied that he had not yet discussed his plans with the British government and had not had meetings with any of the Cabinet members, but intended to do so very soon. Beneš was interested in the Soviet government’s opinion on the same matter. I promised to find this out for him.

Naturally, we also spoke about current events. Beneš seemed somewhat puzzled by the reports in the press concerning Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact, but he didn’t seem greatly concerned. Beneš told me in this connection that Hilger,

Gustav Hilger, economic and political expert in the German embassy in Moscow, 1923–41.

the German embassy counsellor in Moscow, went to Berlin in early August and made a report on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations to German leaders, mostly the military. It was decided at that meeting that the immediate signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR was essential in order to counteract Britain and France. Hitler objected at first, but the military succeeded in winning him over by skilfully arguing that a war on two fronts might otherwise arise. The result was Ribbentrop’s journey to Moscow.

Hitler’s plan is to secure Soviet neutrality, crush Poland in three weeks, and then turn to the west against Britain and France. Italy will probably remain neutral, at least in the first phase of the war. That was the subject of Ciano’s recent talks with Ribbentrop in Salzburg and then with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. The Italians don’t want to shed blood over Danzig, and a war stemming from a German–Polish dispute would be most unpopular in Italy. Besides, the combat capability of the Italian army is highly questionable. Italy’s economic situation is lamentable. She has neither oil, nor iron, nor cotton, nor coal. Should Italy take part in the war, she would be a heavy burden – military and economic – to Germany. That is why, in the end, Hitler did not object to Italy retaining neutrality.

Germany has already mobilized 2 million people. Another million and a half were called to arms three days ago. With such forces Hitler hopes to implement his plan single-handed.