When negotiations between the military delegations opened in Moscow on 12 August, the Soviet side inquired about the British and French missions’ letters of credentials. It turned out that they had not brought any with them. Naturally, this produced a very bad impression. The Soviet side asked the British and the French to get the required letters from London and Paris. A few days later these were received and presented, but… they turned out to be so general and vague that it became clear to us that London and Paris had no serious intention of concluding an agreement.

Next came the issue of Poland. When the British and the French, having set forth their considerations concerning the assistance they could provide to Poland in case of need, asked the Soviet side what it could do for Poland, Comrade Voroshilov outlined our plan. Since the USSR does not have common borders with Germany, it could of course offer effective aid to Poland, France and Britain only if Poland were to let the Red Army pass through its territory. This is the only way the USSR could engage in combat with Germany. Comrade Voroshilov indicated two possible routes for the Red Army: one army would head to East Prussia through the Wilno and Nowogródek provinces, and the other to Breslau through the Krakow province. The British and the French decided that Warsaw had to be asked about our proposal and initially wanted us to make a corresponding démarche there. We refused categorically. Then the British and the French addressed Warsaw themselves. The Polish government refused categorically to let the Soviet troops pass through its territory and even announced that it did not need any assistance from the USSR. Poland would manage by itself if Britain and France fulfilled their duty. What shocked the Polish most was the prospect of the Red Army marching through Wilno, Piłsudski’s

Józef Klemens Piłsudski, Polish prime minister, 1926–28 and 1930; minister for war, 1926–35.

birthplace. ‘The shade of Piłsudski,’ they exclaimed theatrically, ‘will rise from his grave if we allow the Russian troops to pass through Wilno.’ The French tried to reason with the Poles, while the British remained neutral. In the end, the Poles insisted on having it their own way. The response from Warsaw was conveyed to the Soviet delegation. The latter wanted to know what the British and French thought about the Poles’ decision. They shrugged their shoulders and said they were unable to change anything.

The negotiations stalled on this issue. Deadlock had been reached. Indeed, what’s the use talking to the British and the French if the Poles refuse categorically to accept the only plan that could save Poland?

Once again it has become clear that London and Paris are not serious about an agreement. Or, perhaps they even incited the Poles to reject our proposal?

Some major decisions, one feels, are in the offing…

Guo Taiqi told me that after many delays and hesitations, the British government has at last given China a 3 million pound loan for 14 years at 5% interest. They made it a condition, however, that the agreement should be kept secret. This shows how much the British fear the Japanese.

A curious detail. When everything was ready, the head of the Foreign Office’s far eastern department called Guo Taiqi and asked him for a letter confirming that the signing of the agreement in China would not be divulged. Guo Taiqi said that he would provide such a letter, provided the Foreign Office asked him about it in writing. The Foreign Office got scared and belted up.

By 16 August the negotiations had reached stalemate, while the German pressure was mounting. Marshal Voroshilov warned that ‘a definite’ response to the Soviet request to enter Poland ‘as soon as possible was of cardinal importance’.

The British account is in E.L Woodward and R. Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy (London, 1947–48), Third Series, VII, Appendix II.

On the same day, Molotov insisted, in conversations with the American ambassador, that he attached ‘great significance’ to the negotiations and was ‘counting on their success’, so long as they were concluded with ‘concrete obligations’ for mutual assistance, rather than with ‘general declarations’.

SPE, doc. 427, 16 Aug. 1939.

Doumenc duly alerted his government. He believed the Russians ‘clearly expressed the intention not to stand aside … to act in earnest’. He was impressed by the detailed and ‘precise’ statement of the Soviet delegation concerning their military resources, and estimated their assistance to be ‘considerable … between 70 and 100 per cent of the forces we would put up’.

SPE, docs. 430 & 431, 17 Aug. 1939 & doc. 435, 20 Aug. 1939.

A partially positive French response was conveyed to Voroshilov on 22 August, together with a draft agreement which declared the ‘general objective’ of the three powers to form an eastern and western front and to render each other unrestrained assistance. However, the nature of such assistance was left open, to be decided by ‘the course of events’. When the two met in the evening, it emerged that Doumenc could neither vouch for the British, nor could he explain the position of either Poland or Rumania. He should perhaps have been more attentive to Voroshilov’s insinuation that ‘certain political events’ could not be excluded. Indeed, the die had been cast. By now the news had been broadcast that Ribbentrop and a retinue of forty people were flying to Moscow the following morning to sign a non-aggression pact.

RGASPI, Stalin papers, f.558 op.11 d.220 ll.125–36.

]