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23 June

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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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23 June

Halifax invited me over and started complaining bitterly: we were creating unnecessary difficulties, we were absolutely unyielding, we were using the German method of negotiation (offering our price and demanding 100% acceptance), and as a result we were delaying the conclusion of the agreement and dealing a heavy blow to the cause of European peace. Halifax ended his bitter outburst with a direct question: ‘Do you or don’t you want an agreement?’

Page 568

I looked at Halifax in astonishment and replied that I did not find it possible even to discuss such a question. The foreign secretary’s complaints struck me as entirely unfounded. I supplied Halifax with the same statistics that had produced such a strong impression on Hoare yesterday. The arrow hit the mark this time as well. Halifax became confused and, trying to conceal his feelings, commented with a forced laugh: ‘Of course 16 days were enough for you: it doesn’t take much time to keep saying “no”!’

‘Excuse me, Lord Halifax,’ I retorted, ‘the Soviet government did not just say “no” to you; it also submitted three detailed drafts of counter-proposals.’

Halifax decided not to continue the argument and moved on to the last two talks (21 and 22 June) with C[omrade] Molotov in Moscow. He confessed that, despite the large quantity of telegrams he had received from Seeds and Strang, he couldn’t quite grasp what the problem was. Why weren’t we satisfied with the last British formula which, in his view, covers all possible cases of aggression in the Baltic? Why did we insist on naming the three Baltic States in the agreement? Could I not clarify in greater detail the Soviet point of view?

I answered that negotiations were being held in Moscow, and that I was not up to date with their every detail. If Halifax was perplexed or had doubts, the best approach was to seek clarification in Moscow. Halifax obviously did not like my reply, but there was nothing he could do.

I then asked Halifax why he objected so stubbornly to the naming of the Baltic States in the agreement. Halifax referred for the hundredth time to the ‘reluctance’ of these states to receive guarantees from anyone and, as his trump card, declared that he knew of no precedent in history when guarantees had been imposed on a country that did not request them.

I replied that I was far from convinced about the strength of the Baltic States’ ‘reluctance’. It was more likely that Latvia, Estonia and Finland did not want to ask for guarantees themselves for various reasons, but would not have anything against guarantees being ‘imposed’ on them by the powers of the tripartite bloc.

‘As for the absence of a corresponding precedent,’ I continued, ‘I cannot agree with you. First, it is not forbidden to establish new precedents. Secondly, it’s not true that there have been no such precedents in history. Please recall the Monroe doctrine. The USA declared unilaterally in 1823 that they would regard any attempt by members of the Holy Alliance to extend “their system” to South America as a threat to their security and welfare. Why can’t the three great powers of Europe in 1939 do something similar in respect of the three Baltic States?’

For the English, precedent is everything. My words made a definite impression on Halifax, but first he tried to laugh them off: ‘So you would like us to initiate a Monroe doctrine for Europe?’

‘Not for Europe,’ I replied in the same tone, ‘but at least for the Baltics.’

Page 569

Halifax shrugged his shoulders. Will he draw the appropriate practical conclusions, with all the ensuing consequences, from my appeal to the memory of Monroe? I don’t know. At every step of the conversation I could sense Halifax’s annoyance and displeasure.

Maisky himself was unsettled by the rigid Soviet stance and embarrassed by Halifax, who reminded him that in Geneva Maisky had assured him that, if his government accepted the principle of a treaty of mutual assistance, ‘the rest would be easy’. This, Halifax concluded, ‘had certainly not been the case’; see Halifax’s report in TNA FO 371 23069 C8979/3356/18. In his memoirs Who Helped Hitler?, pp. 149–50 Maisky again constructs an apologetic and anachronistic narrative which misleads his readers to assume that he is actually quoting from his diary.

[Maisky’s claim in his diary that the triple alliance was a viable alternative to the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact should be examined against the backdrop of the ongoing German–Soviet negotiations, about which he was not informed. Examination of the protracted Soviet–German negotiations of 1939 casts doubt on the notion that the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact was signed under duress, in the absence of any alternative, at the twelfth hour. True, on his appointment as foreign minister, Molotov does not seem to have received any explicit instructions to change the course of policy and seek political rapprochement with Germany. For the moment, the alternatives remained a full-fledged agreement with the West or isolation. Both policies had been endorsed by Litvinov. The obvious advantage of isolation for the Soviet Union was its ability to preserve its newly acquired position as holder of the balance of power, by delaying choosing for as long as possible. And yet a retreat into ‘isolation’ was also a convenient cloak under which alternatives could be cultivated. Alas, the relevant archival material remains under lock and key in Moscow. By the time of Molotov’s appointment, the bankruptcy of collective security had been conceded and the new prospects in Germany recognized. Earlier in the year, Litvinov himself had intimated to Nahum Goldman,

Nahum Goldman, founder, with Stephen S. Wise, of the World Jewish Congress and one of the earliest to warn of the threat posed by Hitler.

the Zionist leader, that if he ever read in the newspapers about Litvinov’s dismissal ‘it would mean a rapprochement between Fascist Germany and the Soviet Union and an approaching war’.

Quoted in Fleischhauer, Pakt, 407–8. A succinct but insightful historiographical survey of the issue is in M.J. Carley, ‘Soviet foreign policy in the West, 1936–1941: A review article’, Europe-Asia Studies, 56/7 (2004). See also Carley, ‘End of the “low, dishonest decade”’; G. Roberts, ‘On Soviet–German relations: The debate continues’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50/8 (1998); J. Haslam, ‘Stalin and the German invasion of Russia 1941: A failure of reasons of state?’, International Affairs, 76/1 (2000).

Soviet policies were examined by the ‘men of Munich’ through an ideologically tinted prism. Likewise, Stalin’s decision to consider the German option emerged from an obsessive suspicion that Britain and France were resolved to divert Hitler eastwards. The decision was further sustained by cold calculations concerning the economic and military benefits to be reaped from such an agreement. As early as July 1938, State Secretary Weizsäcker asked Merekalov about Soviet ‘concrete plans and offers’ for expanding economic collaboration with Germany. The Politburo responded favourably only in December, in the wake of the Munich Agreement. Though the economic negotiations made strides in January 1939, Stalin suspected that Hitler’s overtures were mainly aimed at undermining the tripartite negotiations and encouraging the West to extend the scope of the Munich Agreement. He therefore discouraged Schnurre,

Karl Schnurre, the architect of the economic cooperation established between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany after the signing of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact.

the head of the East European economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, from visiting Moscow.

In early May, Hitler issued Operation Weiss, the directive for the attack on Poland. Within a week, Stalin was given detailed information about the German designs by military intelligence. The report reinforced Merekalov’s assessment that, in the intervening period before he embarked on the offensive, Hitler would seek Soviet

Page 570

neutrality. Stalin was little swayed by the report – ‘contradictory and unreliable cypher telegram’, he commented. Marking time, he instructed Mikoyan on 12 May to ignore ‘the unserious’ new German economic proposals. The Kremlin’s persistent suspicion of collusion between Britain and Germany is discernible in a twelve-page detailed memorandum (which had hitherto eluded historians) submitted to Molotov on 15 May. Bearing the title ‘English diplomacy’s dark manoeuvre in August 1914’, it sought to demonstrate how the events of that period ‘resemble very closely the manoeuvre of May 1939’. While scanning it attentively, Molotov underlined numerous references to the alleged British consent in 1914 to remain neutral and to guarantee France’s passivity if Germany diverted the war eastwards. His misgivings and scepticism concerning the ‘humiliating’ British proposals for a triple alliance were apparent in correspondence with both Maisky and Surits.

RGASPI, Molotov papers, f.82 op.2 d.1140 ll.166–8 & 173–84.

It seems that the reason the Politburo continued to pursue negotiations was fear of facing Germany in the future, allied to Poland, and with Britain and France neutralized.

See Haslam, ‘The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938’, p. 444.

Schnurre, however, persevered and informed Astakhov on 15 May that Germany entertained ‘no aggressive intentions towards the USSR’ and sought measures ‘to remove [Soviet] mistrust’. The deep-seated Soviet suspicion that the German overtures were ‘a kind of game’ aimed at driving a wedge between Moscow and London was reaffirmed during Molotov’s meeting with Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, on 20 May. The way to overcome this mistrust, Molotov asserted, was through the establishment of a proper ‘political basis’. Schulenburg picked up the gauntlet, reminding the Russians that the 1926 treaty of neutrality, reaffirmed in 1931, had never been annulled. A week later, Astakhov was reassured by Schnurre, speaking on behalf of Hitler, that Germany harboured no aggressive intentions towards Russia. In a follow-up meeting with Weizsäcker, initiated by Astakhov on 30 May, the state secretary confirmed that ideological differences should not be an obstacle to the normalization of relations. Astakhov further gleaned from a variety of sources that if the Soviet Union were to dissociate itself from England and France, the Germans might be prepared to come to an arrangement concerning ‘a division of spheres of influence’.

In early June, as the Soviet draft treaty was being submitted to London, in a rare move Stalin sent Molotov handwritten instructions to find out whether the Germans intended to respond to the Soviet proposals, as he could ‘not accept that negotiations were again interrupted unexpectedly by the Germans and for unknown reasons’. Stalin provided guidelines for the negotiations and supplied a list of required commodities, including vital military items, which was obviously aimed at testing German intentions.

G. Roberts, in ‘The Soviet decision for a pact with Nazi Germany’, Soviet Studies, 44/1 (1992), covers the negotiations well, though mainly from the perspective of the diplomatic exchanges. He attributes the progress that was made entirely to Germany, and dates Stalin’s decision to opt for Germany, a reactive policy, to the end of July 1939. It is obvious from the material pieced together here (and Bezymenskii’s unique access to the presidential archives) that the courting was mutual and continuous and originated with the dramatic meeting in the Kremlin on 22 April.

On 19 June, Stalin received an intelligence report emanating from General Kleist’s

Paul Ewald von Kleist, field marshal, was commander of the First Panzer Group fighting in the Ukraine in 1941 and was charged with the capture of the Baku oil fields in 1942.

headquarters that Hitler was determined to solve the Polish question at all costs – even if he risked fighting on two fronts. The report further confirmed the information provided by Merekalov at the crucial Kremlin meeting in April, that Hitler was counting on Moscow to ‘conduct negotiations with us, as she had no interest whatsoever in a conflict with Germany, nor was she anxious to be defeated for the sake of England and France’. Hitler, it concluded, now believed that ‘a new Rapallo stage should be achieved in German–Russian relations’, at least for a limited period of time.

Page 571

The information was confirmed by intercepts of Schulenburg’s telegrams to Berlin.

TsAMO op.9157 d.2 ll.2, 11, 418–31, 447, 453 & 454.

Stalin also gleaned from Puˇrvan Draganov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin, that the idea of an agreement advantageous to both sides would be favourably received in the German capital.

Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, p. 892.

]

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Document Title23 June

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

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Date1939 Jun 23

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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