As was to be expected, the British and the French opted not to discuss our latest proposal (a tripartite pact excluding guarantees to small countries), but to propose a ‘new’ formula about guarantees. However, as was stated yesterday 566in a TASS communiqué, the ‘new’ formula had nothing new in it. Its essence was that while the USSR was supposed to render automatic assistance to Britain and France, should the latter two be drawn into conflict as a result of aggression against a country under their guarantee (Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania and Turkey), Britain and France were not obliged to render the same automatic assistance should the USSR be drawn into conflict because of the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia and Finland). Naturally enough, Molotov informed the British and the French today that we found the ‘new’ formula unacceptable…

In the evening, Agniya and I attended a dinner given in our honour by Sir Roderick Jones (head of Reuters). The guest-list was impressive: Samuel Hoare, Vansittart, McKenna

Reginald McKenna, chancellor of the exchequer, 1915–16.

and others, accompanied by their wives. Count von Bernstorff, the former counsellor at the German embassy in London, whom I had encountered here before, in 1932, was also present. The Nazis had subsequently kicked him out of both the embassy and the Foreign Ministry. Today, Bernstorff is head of a Jewish bank in Berlin, which is becoming more and more ‘Aryanized’ owing to the ‘natural’ disappearance of its Jewish owners.

We spoke a lot, of course, about the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, in the course of which Jones’ wife confessed that she was against a tripartite pact, while her husband was for it.

Hoare grabbed me after dinner, drew me aside and asked in a state of great agitation: what could be done to bring our negotiations to a prompt and favourable close?

I answered half in jest: ‘There is a very simple method: to accept the Soviet proposals.’

Hoare began to complain. The British government has already agreed to almost all of our demands. What was wrong with the last formula? It had everything we insisted on, except for direct mention of the Baltic States. This was out of the question since, if the Baltic States were named, Britain and France would have to add Holland and Switzerland to the list, both of whom, terrified by Germany, would renounce the tripartite bloc’s guarantees. Only embarrassment would come of it. Hoare began assuring me with uncharacteristic emotion that the British government really did wish to conclude the talks as soon as possible and to proceed at once with discussing military measures. The British government is prepared to ensure complete equality and reciprocity for the USSR under the pact.

I replied that I was pleased to hear it, but that, alas, the facts did not quite accord with Hoare’s words.

‘Allow me to cite a minor but very telling calculation,’ I continued. ‘The Anglo-Soviet negotiations in the full sense of the term (i.e. from 15 April, when the British proposals were presented to us) have been ongoing for 67 days. The Soviet government has spent 16 of these days preparing its replies to various British plans and proposals; the remaining 51 days have been taken up with delays and procrastination on the British side. Who, then, is responsible for the slow pace of the talks?’

Hoare, who’d clearly not been expecting such an incontrovertible argument, was a little confused and mumbled something about being unfamiliar with the figures I had cited. Then he hastened to change horses. Among the Conservatives, he said, there are already many who are opposed to a bloc with the USSR. Until now, they have kept silent and tacitly supported the government. But protracted negotiations that yield no concrete results are grist to the mill of the enemies of an agreement. In the last couple of days, they have been raising their heads above the parapet. If we don’t conclude the agreement within a few days, it might be broken off for good. Those who object to the pact may play a fateful role. Hoare finished his tirade with the exclamation: ‘It’s now or never!’

I laughed and replied that we couldn’t be scared so easily. I found it hard to believe in the devil which Hoare had sketched for me. Britain and France need a mutual assistance pact very much. They need it no less, and probably far more, than the USSR.

Hoare stuttered again and beat a retreat. He pressed upon me once more the British government’s sincere desire to reach an agreement. The British government bears no grudge against us. It is not going to conclude any kind of agreement with Germany behind our back. Hoare himself has been firmly in favour of an agreement with the USSR ever since the seizure of Prague, and he would consider it the greatest misfortune if mutual suspicion, which cannot be denied and has to be reckoned with, dashes the only hope of averting war.

I shrugged my shoulders and said: ‘We want an agreement now, just as we did before. But we want a genuine agreement capable of preventing war, not a halfway house. Where we end up depends on you, the English.’