Today, at 12.30 in the afternoon, Vansittart urgently summoned me to the FO. He received me not in his office, but in his secretary’s office next door. He apologized, saying that an important meeting was currently under way in his room. Indeed, during my talk with Vansittart, the door to his office opened for a split-second and I caught a glimpse of several Foreign Office officials amid clouds of tobacco smoke.

Vansittart looked highly agitated. He said that yesterday, after our lunch, he had had the chance to speak to Halifax, after which he decided to try ‘on his own initiative’ to hasten the process of finding a basis for agreement between our governments. To this end, he had drafted a formula, but before sending it to Moscow he wanted to hear what I thought about it. The formula read as follows: as soon as the declaration, stipulated by the British proposal to the USSR of 8 May, is made public, the three great powers shall embark on military negotiations, but only in respect of assistance to Poland and Rumania. Did such a formula have any chance of being favourably received in Moscow? Should it be sent at all?

I replied that there was no need to send the formula worked out by Vansittart to Seeds. It would inevitably be rejected.

Vansittart tried to defend his formula, but I said that there was no use wasting time debating it, since the Soviet government’s reaction to the proposal was already perfectly clear to me.

I added that as long as the British government failed to recognize the principle of a tripartite mutual assistance pact, no basis for further negotiations could be found.

Then I left. This evening, at seven o’clock, Vansittart invited me once again to the FO. This time he received me in his own office. He looked even more agitated than in the morning and, handing me a sheet of the bluish paper which is so often used by the FO, he asked me to treat the document he had prepared without prejudice and with an awareness of the responsibility that lay on us all in these critical days. Perhaps the document was not ideal, but it was the most he could get the Cabinet to accept at the moment. Were we to accept it, at least as a starting point for further negotiations, then he hoped he could persuade his government to make further concessions to us. The main thing was that we should not waste time. Alarming information was coming from Danzig. Hitler was planning a new ‘sally’. We had to act with the greatest speed and determination.

I skimmed Vansittart’s new formula (see attached)

Not in the diary but published in DVP, 1939, XXII/1, doc. 315.

and raised my head. Vansittart was looking at me with bated breath, waiting for my response.

I shook my head doubtfully.

‘Your new formula,’ I said, ‘is composed skilfully, but in essence it differs little from what you showed me in the morning. This fact determines my attitude towards it.’

Vansittart started objecting. The new formula effectively gives us a tripartite pact. It will be applicable not only to Poland and Rumania, but also to the Baltic States, for Vansittart is in no doubt that the consultation, stipulated in the third point, will inevitably result in the extension of guarantees to the Baltic States as well. The moment at which military operations commence will be determined jointly by the three governments. What more do we want?

I replied that even if one accepted Vansittart’s interpretation, which I did not deem entirely accurate, the tripartite pact he proposed would have as its geographic base only the states that neighbour us, while what we wanted was a pact encompassing the whole of Europe. The pact he proposed completely excluded the instance of a direct attack on our territory. Neither did it resolve the Baltic question categorically and with full clarity.

‘So you think that the new formula cannot serve as the basis for agreement?’ Vansittart asked

‘That’s right,’ I replied, ‘I don’t think the Soviet government would accept it.’

But Vansittart insisted on asking me to forward the formula to Moscow and to recommend it to the Soviet government. He also wished to receive our reply as soon as possible, preferably the following day, 18 May.

Vansittart reported to Halifax that Maisky’s reaction ‘had not been too unfriendly’ and he had undertaken to submit the formula to Moscow ‘forthwith’; TNA EP (36) 48 in FO 371 23066 C7499/3356/18. Maisky continued to exert pressure on Halifax even before he received the Soviet reply, anticipating (as he told the French ambassador in London) that the British proposals would be rejected. He further used informal channels to the Foreign Office to convey the same message, as well as his belief that, unless the British government was prepared to ‘climb down’ and conclude a triple alliance, there was ‘no chance whatever of agreement’; DDF, 2 Serie, XVI, Doc. 216; TNA FO 371 23066 C7468/3356/18, phone conversation with Ewer of the Daily Herald.

I promised to inform the Soviet government about his proposal promptly, but refused to recommend it to Moscow. Besides, tomorrow is not a working day in our country, and I am not sure I can get a reply before the 19th.