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9 May

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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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9 May

Yesterday the British government finally gave its reply to our 17 April proposals. An unsatisfactory one.

Lloyd George, who had lunch with Maisky at the embassy, found him to be ‘very depressed, and feared that his country might return to a policy of isolation’; Sylvester papers, diary, A45, 8 May 1939. The successful conclusion of a pact with Britain had become vital for Maisky’s own survival after Litvinov’s dismissal. He believed that ‘the real obstacle’ to the acceptance of the Russians remained ‘the Umbrella Man’, as he expected Halifax to go ‘much further than the P.M.’; Dalton papers, diary, I/20, 7 May 1939. Though outwardly Maisky gave the impression of being ‘rather truculently pessimistic’, he continued to exert pressure on the Foreign Office through sympathetic intermediaries, maintaining that the wide gaps could still be bridged if the British government was prepared ‘to go a long way’ and conclude a triple alliance; TNA FO 371 23066 C7108/3356/18, telephone conversation with Ewer of the Daily Herald, 10 May 1939. Ewer had been exposed in 1929 by MI5 as a Soviet agent working closely with the Soviet embassy. The fact that he retained a prominent position with both the Foreign Office and the Soviet embassy may suggest that he acted as a double agent; TNA KV 2/1016 & 1017.

Seeds handed the following formula to Comrade Molotov:

It is suggested that the Soviet government should make a public declaration on their own initiative in which, after referring to the general statement of policy recently made by Monsieur Stalin, and having regard to statements recently made by His Majesty’s Government and the French government accepting new obligations on behalf of certain Eastern European countries the Soviet government would undertake that in the event of Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfilment of these obligations, the assistance of the Soviet government would be immediately available, if desired, and would be afforded in such manner and on such terms as might be agreed.

A rather long, confusing and clumsy statement, and, above all, even worse than what Halifax told me on 6 May. I went to see him in order to find out the reason for this discrepancy, but the foreign secretary could tell me little beyond the fact that the British formula had not yet been definitively worked out at the time of our conversation. This means that the prime minister must have made changes to the formula prepared by the Foreign Office. I recalled, incidentally, that as I was leaving Halifax’s office on 6 May his secretary entered the room and informed him that the PM was expecting him at 10, Downing Street after my visit.

Later, in the interests of ‘clarification’, I started criticizing the English formula. I particularly emphasized the absence of reciprocity: we should help England and France if they are drawn into war because of Poland and Rumania, but England and France are not bound to help us if we become involved in a war resulting from aggression against any other East European states.

Halifax first argued at some length that this situation could not arise, as the USSR had not yet given anyone any guarantees; but then he started stressing that the aim of the English formula was to assure us that the British government had no intention of demanding any sacrifices from the Soviet Union before such sacrifices had been made by Western powers. However, if we dislike the British formula, we are welcome to suggest another. He will readily consider our version, provided it takes into account the two elements which the British

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government deems essential, namely (1) the issue at stake is assistance to Poland and Rumania, and (2) the guarantees will come into force only if both countries put up resistance to aggression.

Halifax further noted that the phrase ‘would be immediately available’ was initially followed by ‘for Poland and Rumania’, but these words were later removed at the request of the named countries, as they did not want to be mentioned directly in the document. As regards the words ‘in such manner and on such terms’, these refer to more specific agreements between the Anglo-French party and us, such as the mutual rejection of separate negotiations, separate peace, etc. But it followed from Halifax’s words that all such schemes relate, in his view, to events after the outbreak of hostilities.

In conclusion, Halifax assured me that the British government was eager to negotiate with us as soon as possible and reach an agreement.

I remained cool and critical throughout. Numerous indicators suggest the conclusion that Hitler’s speech on 28 April has caused a temporary recurrence of ‘appeasement’ in government circles. The Times wrote the other day that ‘one more attempt’ should be made to seek reconciliation with Germany, so this must be the view of the prime minister, or at least Sir Horace Wilson. It won’t wash! The time for ‘appeasement’ has come and gone. Whether Chamberlain wants to or not, he will have to make major concessions to our point of view. For such is the logic of the current situation.

[Molotov emphatically rejected the British formula, but he consulted Maisky about a possible response. He was particularly pugnacious because he had learnt from the Polish ambassador earlier in the day that Poland had not raised any objection to the Soviet proposals.

SPE, doc. 277.

Typically, Maisky fawned on the new master, ‘the most esteemed Vyacheslav Mikhailovich’ and painted a pessimistic picture of Chamberlain’s reversion to ‘appeasement’. Yet he stubbornly adhered to his belief that public opinion and the intensifying opposition even within bourgeois circles was bound to forestall another ‘Munich’, and that ‘appeasement hardly has any chance of enduring and the logical turn of events should compel England to resist the aggressors’. A day earlier he had cabled to Molotov that although the proposals were ‘unacceptable … the English have not yet said their last word’.

DVP, 1939, XXI/1, doc. 290; God Krizisa, I, no. 333; TNA FO 371 23066 C7327/3356/18, 10 May 1939; SPE, doc. 281.

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Document Details

Document Title9 May

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

RecipientN/A

RepositoryN/A

ID #N/A

DescriptionN/A

Date1939 May 9

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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