The British government has prepared its reply to our proposals, but before sending it to Seeds, Halifax would like to hear my response to his questions.

I laughed and said that I didn’t understand his doubts. Of course, both our policy and our proposals remain in force.

Halifax was visibly relieved on hearing my answer.

Then he set out the gist of the British reply. Far from reassuring. The British government does not deem it possible to accept our proposals concerning a tripartite pact because it believes that such a pact would only scare off other powers whose participation in the ‘peace front’ is very important. This was followed by that old chestnut about Poland and Rumania. Nor are the British willing to give guarantees to the Baltic States because, first, the Baltic States do not want them and, secondly, such guarantees would only provide Hitler with fresh cause to raise the alarm about ‘encirclement’. Consequently, the British government decided to forward to us once more its formula of 14 April, after ‘clarifying’ it in line with the explanation given to me by Halifax during our conversation on 29 April (the British government does not expect us to act unless England and France are active participants).

I expressed great disappointment. It took the British government three weeks to consider our proposals, at the end of which the mountain has given birth to a mouse. Halifax’s arguments do not hold water. To the best of my knowledge, his references to public opinion in Poland and Rumania are gross exaggerations. The Baltic States have not yet formed their opinion on guarantees, so Britain and France, should they so wish, could certainly exert a favourable influence on them if necessary. Hitler’s cries may safely be ignored, for no matter what the peace-loving powers do, he will carry on yelling about ‘encirclement’. It goes without saying that the British government has the right to send whatever formula it wishes to Moscow, but I could tell Halifax in advance that Moscow would reject this formula.

Maisky was manifestly disappointed; see his report home in DVP, 1939, XXI/1, doc. 281. On the British government’s decision to reiterate its position, see Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 225–7.