Summing up all the material at my disposal, I would describe it as follows.

The attitudes of the broad masses of the population are sharply anti-German everywhere, except for a part of Scotland. Hitler’s recent speech did not make much of an impression in the country, even though on the next day some newspapers (e.g. Beaverbrook’s) started chattering about the possibility of new negotiations between England and Germany. The need to resist aggression is fast becoming a universal conviction. Hence the country’s readiness to accept conscription. Labour’s opposition to conscription is insignificant and is already disintegrating. Hence also the colossal popularity of the idea of alliance with the USSR. Every mention of such an alliance is met with a storm of applause at rallies and gatherings all over the country. According to the latest poll by the Public Opinion Office,

Maisky is referring to the polls conducted by the British Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup).

87% are in favour of an immediate military alliance with the Soviet Union.

The situation in government is somewhat different. Of course, the public’s mood is exerting strong pressure on the government, and the majority of ministers are for resistance to aggression, but the logical conclusions have yet to be drawn. Most important, however, is the fact that Chamberlain, Simon, Kingsley Wood and other ‘appeasers’ have not yet definitively renounced their Munich policy. They are forced to retreat under pressure from the masses and events, but they do so reluctantly, trying to minimize inevitable concessions and, wherever possible, attempting to return to the methods used in the period of ‘appeasement’ (e.g. returning Nevile Henderson to Berlin).

The British government’s halfway-house policy is more and more obvious. Let me cite three examples.

Reconstruction of the government. This is considered absolutely inevitable now, and even the Beaverbrook press has started a campaign to this effect. But Chamberlain is stubbornly postponing the entry of such figures as Eden, Churchill and others into the Cabinet until the very last moment.

Conscription. This has also been considered absolutely inevitable for the past 4–5 weeks. But Chamberlain also put this off to the last minute, and when he saw that he would have to give in, he still tried to gain some revenge: conscription was applied only to one year group, not the three on which the majority of the Cabinet insisted.

Our proposals. There can be little doubt that the British government will eventually accept them. Its situation is desperate. Yet Chamberlain stubbornly resists and has kept us waiting for the English answer for over two weeks now. Moreover, at first he even tried to hush up the Soviet proposals and conceal them from the public. However, thanks to the supporters of an Anglo-Soviet military alliance in government circles, our proposals were leaked bit by bit to the press, and by the time of my arrival from Moscow their essence had become public knowledge. The opposition started exerting pressure in parliament, and a lively debate got going in the press. So the British government will have to respond to the Soviet proposals one way or another in the very nearest future. It may not wish to accept them immediately, but will have to do so sooner or later.

What is my final conclusion? Here it is. The masses – not only workers but the bourgeoisie as well – are far ahead of their government and demand a tripartite bloc of Britain, France and the USSR. The Cabinet is marking time and digging its heels in, but, urged on by the masses, it is eventually moving forward in the same direction. That is why, leaving insignificant, everyday details to one side, I am inclined to take an optimistic view of the ‘general line’ in the development of Anglo-Soviet relations.