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Table of Contents
The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 3
  • 10 January
  • 19 January
  • 20 January
  • 22 January
  • 26 January
  • 27 January
  • 30 January
  • 3 February
  • 4 February
  • 6 February
  • 11 February
  • 13 February
  • 14 February
  • 15 February
  • 17 February
  • 18 February
  • 20 February
  • 23 February
  • 25 February
  • 27 February
  • 28 February
  • 2 March
  • 7 March
  • 8 March
  • 9 March
  • 12 March
  • 14 March
  • 15 March
  • 16 March
  • 17 March
  • 19 March
  • 20 March
  • 22 March
  • 23 March
  • 25 March
  • 29 March
  • 31 March
  • 1 April
  • 6 April
  • 11 April
  • 12 April
  • 14 April
  • 15 April
  • 16 April
  • 17 April
  • 18 April
  • 28 April
  • 29 April
  • 30 April
  • 1 May
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  • 3 May
  • 4 May
  • 6 May
  • 9 May
  • 11 May
  • 15 May
  • 16 May
  • 17 May
  • 18 May
  • 19 May
  • 21 May
  • 22 May
  • 23 May
  • 25 May
  • 26 May
  • 27 May
  • 28 May
  • 30 May
  • 3 June
  • 8 June
  • 11 June
  • 12 June
  • 16 June
  • 17 June
  • 22 June
  • 23 June
  • 25 June
  • 28 June
  • 29 June
  • 30 June
  • 1 July
  • 2 July
  • 4 July
  • 5 July
  • 6 July
  • 7 July
  • 12 July
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  • 14 July
  • 15 July
  • 18 July
  • 22 July
  • 25 July
  • 28 July
  • 30 July
  • 4 August
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  • 6 August
  • 11 August
  • 20 August
  • 21 August
  • 22 August
  • 23 August
  • 24 August
  • 26 August
  • 28 August
  • 29 August
  • 30 August
  • 31 August
  • 1 September
  • 2 September
  • 3 September
  • 4 September
  • 2 September
  • 7 September
  • 8 September
  • 9 September
  • 12 September
  • 13 September
  • 14 September
  • 15 September
  • 17 September
  • 19 September
  • 20 September
  • 21 September
  • 22 September
  • 23 September
  • 27 September
  • 28 September
  • 29 September
  • 3 October
  • 4 October
  • 6 October
  • 7 October
  • 11 October
  • 12 October
  • 13 October
  • 14 October
  • 16 October
  • 17 October
  • 19 October
  • 21 October
  • 24 October
  • 26 October
  • 27 October
  • 28 October
  • 30 October
  • 31 October
  • 2 November
  • 3 November
  • 7 November
  • 9 November
  • 10 November
  • 13 November
  • 14 November
  • 15 November
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  • 18 November
  • 20 November
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  • 22 November
  • 27 November
  • 28 November
  • 29 November
  • 1 December
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  • 18 January
  • 19 January
  • 20 January
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  • 23 January
  • 25 January
  • 26 January
  • 27 January
  • 29 January
  • 30 January
  • 31 January
  • 2 February
  • 7 February
  • 8 February
  • 9 February
  • 10 February
  • 11 February
  • 15 February
  • 19 February
  • 21 February
  • 25 February
  • 8 March
  • 11 March
  • 12 March
  • 13 March
  • 16 March
  • 17 March
  • 18 March
  • Conversation with Butler on 18 March 1940
  • 19 March
  • 23 March
  • 27 March
  • Conversation with Halifax on 27 March 1940
  • 28 March
  • 29 March
  • 1 April
  • 2 April
  • 4 April
  • 5 April
  • 6 April
  • 8 April
  • 9 April
  • 10 April
  • 11 April
  • 12 April
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  • 15 April
  • 16 April
  • 17 April
  • 18 April
  • 22 April
  • 27 April
  • 28 April
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  • 26 May
  • 28 May
  • 1 June
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  • 6 June
  • 10 June
  • 11 June
  • 12 June
  • 14 June
  • 15 June
  • 16 June
  • 17 June
  • 18 June
  • 23 June
  • 25 June
  • 27 June
  • 28 June
  • 29 June
  • 30 June
  • 1 July
  • 2 July
  • 3 July
  • 4 July
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  • 8 July
  • 9 July
  • 10 July
  • 11 July
  • 12 July
  • 22 July
  • 23 July
  • 25 July
  • 26 July
  • 27 July
  • 28 July
  • 31 July
  • 5 August
  • 6 August
  • 7 August
  • 10 August
  • 14 August
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  • 17 August
  • 18 August
  • 20 August
  • 22 August
  • 30 August
  • 31 August
  • 1 September
  • 6 September
  • 7 September
  • 8 September
  • 9 September
  • 10 September
  • 13 September
  • 14 September
  • 16 September
  • 17 September
  • 4 October
  • 6 October
  • 9 October
  • 10 October
  • 12 October
  • 13 October
  • 20 October
  • 22 October
  • 2 November
  • 4 November
  • 5 November
  • 11 November
  • 12 November
  • 19 November
  • 30 November
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© 2025
31 March
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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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31 March
Poland is the centre of attention. The German press is waging a rabid campaign against Poland. German troops are concentrated on the Polish border. Hitler is expected to strike any moment now, but in which direction? That is not quite clear as yet. Most probably, Danzig or Silesia. Or maybe in both directions at once.
In view of the current situation, the British diplomatic machinery has been working at a quite uncharacteristically frenzied pace for the last seven or eight days. When it transpired that ‘the declaration of the four’ was not viable due to Poland’s objections, the British government, without breathing a word to us, stepped up its search for other means to stop aggression. As usual, the English took the path of creeping empiricism, i.e. the method of the rule of thumb. They decided: since at this precise moment it is Poland that faces acute danger, let’s think how to help Poland. And only Poland. Fighting aggression in Europe in general does not interest us. Two days ago already, Cadogan informed me of the direction which the British government’s thinking was taking. By the way, no decision was taken in the end at the Cabinet meeting on 29 March. But on the same evening and yesterday, 30 March, there was an almost unbroken flow of meetings of the Cabinet and of its Foreign Policy Committee (Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, Hoare and two or three more ministers) in attempts to find the best way of helping Poland. It was only today that the results of all this unusual activity on Downing Street became known. More on this below.
What needs mentioning now is that Labourites have been in very close contact with the prime minister over the past two days and that yesterday they met him twice. Since the Foreign Office is forever spreading rumours through the press that the British government is in close touch with the Soviet government, and since, on the other hand, the Labourites have learned from me that I have not seen Halifax for 12 days (since 19 March) and that almost the same situation obtains with Seeds in Moscow (he last saw M.M. on 22 March, when the latter handed him our reply concerning the ‘declaration of the four’), the pressure exerted by Attlee, Greenwood, Dalton and others was all aimed at achieving genuine cooperation between England and the USSR. Late yesterday evening, a Labour deputation consisting of Dalton, Alexander
Albert Victor Alexander, Labour’s first lord of the Admiralty, 1929–31 and 1940–46.
and others had a substantial conversation with Chamberlain on this matter, and the latter


Page 498

assured them that he was all for cooperating with the ‘Soviets’ right away, but those obnoxious ‘Poles’ were getting in the way.
Though prohibited by Moscow from taking any initiative, Maisky was working frenziedly behind the scenes to exert pressure on Chamberlain. On the morning of 30 March, Greenwood had learned of the guarantees from Chamberlain, who was anxious to receive at least tacit Soviet support. Quoting from Cadogan’s report on his meeting with Maisky, which was lying on the desk, Chamberlain assured Greenwood that Maisky seemed to be ‘satisfied with this formula’. Shortly afterwards, however, as he had suspected, Dalton found the ambassador seriously irritated ‘because he was out of touch’: he had not met Halifax since 19 March and felt unable to advise his government, which was pressing him for information. Likewise, Beatrice Webb, who visited Maisky at the embassy the following morning as he anxiously waited to be summoned to Whitehall, found him distrustful of the British and the French governments, which he suspected were seeking a pact with Poland ‘omitting the Soviet Union and even antagonistic to its interests’. Without delay, Dalton sought a second meeting with Chamberlain late at night. The prime minister, however, was reluctant to bring the Russians in because of the fierce opposition of other countries; Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 237–8; Webb, diary, 31 March 1939, p. 6639.
Possibly in order to prepare himself with excuses in similar situations, Chamberlain instructed Halifax to meet me. On the 29th, after lunch, I received a call from the Foreign Office asking me to visit Halifax at seven in the evening. I accepted. But at 6 p.m., Halifax’s secretary phoned me again to say that, unfortunately, the minister couldn’t receive me today and asked me to come at 4 p.m. the following day. Once again I accepted. On 30 March at 3 p.m. there was another call from the Foreign Office: it turned out that the foreign secretary couldn’t receive me on this day either and wished to postpone my visit to the following morning at 10.30. I agreed to that as well. On the 31st, at 10 a.m., yet another call came from the FO: Halifax was unable to keep his last promise. He would let me know when he could see me.
Anxious to avoid the meeting, Halifax informed Cabinet that he ‘had not been able to see M. Maisky that morning as the Ambassador was not available. He hoped to see him before 3 o’clock. If this was not possible, he intended to send a telephone message to Moscow.’ But Maisky, who met Lloyd George’s secretary that morning, complained to him that ‘[Halifax] asked me to come at 10.30 this morning. Half an hour ago he rang up again to say he could not see me now and he would communicate later;’ TNA CAB 23/98 17(39), 31 March 1939; Lloyd George papers, LG/G/130, Sylvester to Lloyd George, 31 March 1939.
Finally, at noon on the same day, 31 March, Halifax’s secretary asked me to come to the FO at 12.45. Only then did my meeting with Halifax take place.
It began with much bowing and scraping on the part of the foreign secretary. He was terribly sorry that he had had to postpone our meeting again and again, but during the past two days he had been holding endless meetings.
‘It is not so easy to edit a document that would mean a revolution in our foreign policy,’ Halifax said by way of self-justification.
He then gave me a sheet of paper with the text of the speech the prime minister was to make in parliament at 3 p.m. I quickly skimmed the document. Halifax watched my face attentively, and when I had finished reading, asked me anxiously what I thought about it. I replied that it was difficult for me to formulate a considered opinion, since I had only just seen the text of the prime minister’s statement, but my first reaction was that the document lacked precision. All of the first part repeatedly stressed the importance of ‘peaceful means’ in the settlement of international conflicts, but there was no clear indication at the end that England was prepared to help Poland with armed support. What effect would this have on Hitler? Would he believe in the seriousness of British intentions? I wasn’t sure. Perhaps not.
Halifax told Cabinet that his main concern was the impact which consultations with the Russians might have on the Poles. As for Maisky, he expected him to be ‘perfectly satisfied’ and to say that the Russians ‘were willing to help us if they were allowed to do so’; TNA CAB 23/98 17(39), 31 March 1939.
Halifax started to defend the text of the statement, though it was clear that my words had somewhat confused him. He then asked: ‘But generally speaking, the statement is in line with your aims, is it not?’
‘Perhaps,’ I said, ‘but it is not firm and consistent enough.’
Halifax was silent for an instant, before blurting out: ‘What would you think if the prime minister told parliament that the Soviet government also approves of his statement?’
And then, after a little hesitation, he added, as if forcing the words out against his will: ‘If the prime minister could say this, it would greatly alleviate


Page 499

the situation… This would prevent unnecessary arguments and discord in our midst…’
I immediately realized what was behind it: Chamberlain wanted to use us as a shield against the opposition’s attacks. Affecting great surprise, I replied: ‘I don’t quite understand you, Lord Halifax. You did not consult us while preparing your Polish action. The Soviet government has not seen the present statement. I myself had the opportunity to familiarize myself with it just a few moments ago. How could the prime minister say that the Soviet government approves of his statement under such circumstances? I think it would be rather awkward.’
Halifax was embarrassed and hastened to say: ‘You may be right.’
So, misrepresentation did not occur. In part, at least. Having failed to gain my consent, Chamberlain did not of course risk saying what he had wanted to say, but nonetheless, replying to Greenwood’s question about the Soviet government’s attitude to his statement, the PM announced that this morning the foreign secretary had had a serious conversation on the matter with the Soviet ambassador, and that he [Chamberlain] was positive that the principles of British actions met with understanding and appreciation on the part of the Soviet government.
Maisky expected the declaration to resuscitate the battered collective security. His reservations reflected the extreme caution he assumed in his communications with Moscow, having been prohibited from making any initiatives. He preferred, therefore, to describe the tough line he had taken with Halifax, discouraging Chamberlain from making any reference to Russia in the anticipated parliamentary debate. However, it emerges from Halifax’s report that he had been given the green light by Maisky after offering an assurance


Page 965

that the guarantees were only an emergency measure and would be followed up by further consultations with the Russians. ‘The Ambassador,’ Halifax concluded his report, ‘finally did not raise objection to a statement being made on the Prime Minister’s authority to the effect that His Majesty’s Government had reason to suppose that the Soviet Government would not find themselves other than in agreement with our declaration.’ Moreover, Maisky emphasized that, if implemented, the policy would dovetail with Stalin’s ‘chestnuts speech’ promising assistance to the victims of aggression, the text of which he promptly sent Halifax once the meeting was over; God Krizisa, I, no. 246, Maisky to Litvinov; TNA FO 371 23015 C4528/54/18, Halifax’s report, 31 March 1939; RAN f.1702 op.4 d.892 l.3 & d.1290 l.3, exchange between Maisky and Halifax, 31 March and 3 April. Maisky’s reserved support is also clear in TNA FO 371 23016, C4575/54/18, Halifax to Seeds, 4 April 1939. Maisky further exerted subtle pressure on Litvinov, seeking permission to maintain more frequent contact with the Foreign Office. To cover his tracks (and in order to vilify the British during the Cold War), in his memoirs Maisky chose to paint a highly dramatic narrative of his gallant stance during the meeting, which he even suggested took place with Chamberlain rather than with Halifax; VSD, p. 384 and Who Helped Hitler?, pp. 106–8.
Mere legalese: empty verbiage, which is impregnable to criticism. At the same time, there is a vague hint at something that nobody knows. This makes it possible to create in the minds of the uninitiated the impression that the Soviet government has given its blessing to the prime minister’s statement.
Chamberlain must need us very badly if he has to resort to the type of tricks I observed today…
Another curious detail. The original schedule for today was as follows: the Cabinet was to meet for the final approval of the text of the statement at 10 a.m., and at 11 a.m. the statement was to be read in parliament (since today is Friday, the House of Commons is in session from 11 to 4). However, as a result of yesterday’s visit of the Labour delegation to the PM, the schedule was changed slightly: the Cabinet meeting at 10.30, Halifax’s meeting with me between 12 and 1 to acquaint me with the text of the statement, and the reading of the statement in parliament at 3. And that’s exactly what happened.
[Rather than the Munich Agreement, Stalin’s ‘chestnuts’ speech or the dismissal of Litvinov, the guarantees given to Poland appear to have been the crucial event paving the way to the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, and the opening salvo of the Second World War. By guaranteeing Poland, Chamberlain to all intents and purposes abandoned Britain’s traditional position as arbiter in the European balance of power, and instead confronted Germany head on. The guarantees had two potential major effects. Beyond redressing the humiliation inflicted on him by Hitler’s brazen abrogation of the Munich Agreement, what was uppermost in Chamberlain’s mind was the deterrent effect: the


Page 500

guarantees (he hoped) would check Hitler and bring him back to the negotiating table. The second possible repercussion was overlooked by Chamberlain: if Hitler persevered with his territorial claims against Poland, the military axiom of avoiding war on two fronts would make it imperative for the Nazis to seek agreement with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the hitherto inaccessible German option suddenly opened up for the Soviet Union. Conversely, once it did dawn on Chamberlain that the path to a ‘second Munich’ was not plain sailing and that the possibility of war had become real, he would reluctantly be forced to secure at least a measure of Soviet military commitment, vital for the implementation of the guarantees. In this manner, and without prior design, the Soviet Union now became the pivot of the European balance of power.]
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Document Title31 March
AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)
RecipientN/A
RepositoryN/A
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DescriptionN/A
Date1939 Mar 31
AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2
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