Halifax, however, did not limit himself to publication of the ‘ultimatum’. On the same evening of 17 March, Halifax sent out urgent inquiries to Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Ankara and possibly some other capitals, asking the respective governments what their response would be to German aggression against Rumania.

Seeds presented M.M. [Litvinov] with this inquiry on the morning of 18 March. M.M. inquired in his turn about the British government’s position and added that Rumania itself had not sought assistance from us. He nonetheless promised to report Seeds’ inquiry to the Soviet government, and the same evening he communicated our proposal to Seeds: to convene immediately a conference of the six powers which were most concerned with the matter (Britain, France, USSR, Poland, Turkey and Rumania), and to discuss measures by which to confront the imminent danger. It would be advisable to hold the conference in Bucharest. But this could be negotiated.

While Seeds was paying his first visit to M.M. in Moscow, here in London I was summoned by Halifax. He first spoke about Hudson (who was about to leave London, at 2 p.m. on 18 March) and asked that he be given a warm welcome. The Cabinet had not given Hudson any strict instructions. He was free to discuss both economic and political issues. His mission was aimed, among other things, at dispelling Moscow’s suspicions about the objectives of British policy and, upon returning home, at helping to dispel certain ‘misunderstandings’ currently circulating in London with regard to the USSR. It would be most important if Hudson could have the opportunity in Moscow to learn a little about the current state of the Soviet armed forces. In this connection, Halifax began asking me about the Red Army’s strength, its armaments, etc. In reply, I supplied the data from Comrade Voroshilov’s speech at the 18th Party Congress. One could sense that Halifax had heard an earful of anti-Soviet stories about the ‘weakness’, ‘degeneration’, etc. of the Soviet armed forces.

Halifax then moved on to current events. He said that the government had recalled Henderson from Berlin for ‘consultation’, that Stanley’s and Hudson’s planned visit to Berlin had been postponed, that payment of British credit worth 10 million to Czechoslovakia was suspended, that the British government was trying to evacuate a certain number of ‘refugees’ who had got stuck in Prague, and that the Foreign Office had sent a note of protest to Berlin (‘which, of course, is absolutely meaningless’, Halifax concluded with a weary gesture).

Finally, Halifax informed me about Seeds’ démarche in Moscow and persistently asked me what the USSR would do in the event of German aggression against Rumania. Could Rumania expect help from the USSR, and in what way? Arms and ammunition? Or might assistance come in more active forms?

I replied that the general view of the Soviet government had been formulated most recently by Comrade Stalin in his statement at the 18th Party Congress: we advocate assistance to victims of aggression who are fighting for their independence. However, it is difficult to tell in advance how this general principle will be applied in each particular case. That will depend on the specific conditions of every specific case. Halifax seemed satisfied with my answer.

I met Halifax at 12.45. Earlier, at eleven in the morning, I had a conversation with Vansittart, who spoke heatedly and at length about the importance of making Hudson’s visit a ‘success’. British sentiments are rapidly changing, owing to the latest events. Leadership in foreign policy is returning from 10, Downing Street to the Foreign Office. Halifax now shares Vansittart’s view of things. A successful outcome to Hudson’s visit would definitively consolidate the triumph of the new course in British foreign policy, the course Vansittart has been upholding for many years…

At 3 p.m. today I saw Halifax, to inform him of our answer to the British inquiry (although Seeds had certainly notified him about it through his own channels, there was no harm in my repeating it just to make sure) and, most importantly, to find out what the British government thought of it. It was Sunday, but Halifax was in the Foreign Office. Moreover, he had already exchanged opinions with the PM earlier in the morning, concerning our proposal for a six-power conference. Halifax finds the proposal ‘premature’: if the conference is not prepared properly in advance, it could culminate in failure, with a negative political effect. Besides, we must act quickly, whereas the convening of a conference will take some time. So, instead of a conference, the British government suggests the prompt issuing of a ‘declaration of the four’ (Britain, France, USSR and Poland) to the effect that the said powers will respond to the threat of aggression by immediately organizing a consultation on measures of resistance. This is the first step. Then, after the four powers sign the declaration, the remaining peace-loving countries will be invited to join, and a conference of the respective countries may be convened, where the methods and forms of fighting aggression will be discussed. Of course, agreement must be reached primarily by the big boys, i.e. the ‘big four’.

I began to object. I said that the conference could be convened in a few days if there was a desire to do so, that an announcement of the date and venue could be published tomorrow, that this alone would have a far-reaching political effect and that if Britain really means business, the risk of the conference failing was very small. But Halifax stuck to his guns. He informed me that the text of the declaration was being worked on. It will be adopted by the Cabinet tomorrow morning and immediately sent to the capitals concerned…

It is clear that Chamberlain does not want a genuine struggle against aggression. He is still working for ‘appeasement’.