Tilea told us that he had just met Halifax. He had handed him an SOS on behalf of his government. The Rumanian government wanted to alert the British government to the fact that the complete complacency of the West following Hitler’s seizure of Prague had created the impression in Bucharest that Hitler was omnipotent in C[entral] and S[outh]-E[ast] Europe. In the light of this, the Rumanian government must decide on the course of its future conduct. Before making a definitive choice, however, the Rumanian government would like to receive a clear answer from the British government to the following question: can Rumania count on British support in the struggle for its independence and, if she can, what kind of support could Rumania expect from Britain?

To substantiate his démarche, Tilea decided on his own initiative to inform Halifax of the demands made of the Rumanian government by Wohlthat,

Helmut Wohlthat, director of Göring’s Four Year Plan.

adviser to Germany’s Ministry of Economics, who is presently in Bucharest. In general, these amounted to the demand that Rumania must, in agreement with Germany, gradually dispense with its entire industry, give up trade with all other countries, ship 100% of its exports to Germany, and receive from Germany 100% of its imports.

According to Tilea, this information made a strong impression on Halifax, who promised to reply to the question posed by the Rumanian government in two to three days. Halifax, incidentally, showed interest in the current state of Rumanian–Soviet relations and asked Tilea what the Soviet stand would be in the event of an act of German aggression against Rumania.

Today, Vansittart invited me to the Foreign Office ‘for a purely private conversation’ and had a talk with me which was anything but private.

The annexation of Czechoslovakia, he said, had made a quite shocking impression on England. The policy of ‘appeasement’ is dead and will never be resurrected. The rats are already deserting the sinking ship. Just look at Lady Astor: yesterday she demanded in parliament that the prime minister convey to Hitler ‘the feeling of outrage felt throughout the country at his actions in C[entral] E[urope]’. Incredible! Look at Beverley Buxton, an orthodox ‘appeaser’ on the staff of the Sunday Times (he runs the ‘Men, Women and Memoirs’ section). Two days ago he came out with a speech in London full of indignation against the ‘treachery’ of Germany. Lastly, just look at the press: even The Times has abruptly changed its course. No, the situation today is definitely not the same as it was. There can be no return to the past.

Vansittart spoke with great animation and emotion.

But I was unconvinced. I started expressing my doubts. How many times over the past two years have I heard assurances that the ‘situation has changed’, that ‘Chamberlain has finally understood’, that the policy of ‘appeasement’ has come to an end, etc. – but what do we see in reality? Neither Austria, nor Czechoslovakia, nor Spain has had a sobering effect on British policy. I fear the same might happen again. There will be a great hue and cry in England for the next few weeks, both inside and outside parliament, but then feelings will subside, and if Hitler and Mussolini make no new forays, everything will gradually return to its habitual, ‘appeasing’ routine.

Vansittart would not agree. He began arguing afresh and with even greater excitement that my fears were unfounded. The seizure of Prague does not resemble the seizure of Austria. England really has seen the light. All Vansittart’s predictions have come to pass. His time, for which he has been preparing for years, has finally come – the time for setting up a mighty anti-German bloc! But all advocates of resistance to aggression now face a very serious challenge: to exploit to the full the favourable current situation. We must strike while the iron is hot. Hitler will not wait. Where will he throw himself now, after Prague? What’s next in line? Memel? Danzig? Rumania? Yugoslavia?… No one can say for sure. But it is absolutely clear that an alliance of Britain, France and the USSR, with the possible participation of Poland, Rumania and Scandinavia, is the only way of stopping German aggression. We must work at frantic speed to achieve this. Beck is coming to London in early April – that’s good. Vansittart pins great hopes on Beck’s visit, even though he has no illusions about the personal qualities of the Polish foreign minister. Hudson is leaving for Moscow tomorrow, and that is also very good. Everything possible must be done to ensure the success of Hudson’s mission. Vansittart is aware that relations between Moscow and Paris have been rather frosty of late – that’s bad. Can anything be done to improve Franco-Soviet relations? Could we not take the initiative ourselves in this respect?

I said that, considering the experience of the past year, particularly the September crisis and Munich, the Soviet government would hardly find it possible to take the first step.

Vansittart then displayed interest in our relations with Poland and Rumania. In particular, could Rumania count on our aid if it fell victim to German aggression? In what form?

I conveyed to Vansittart the relevant information, emphasizing the progress made towards the improvement of our relations with Poland and Rumania in the past six months, but I warned him against overestimating the degree of improvement. Concerning aid to Rumania in the event of a German attack, I had nothing concrete to tell him for the time being. I quoted Comrade Stalin’s famous statement at the 18th Party Congress about support for the victims of aggression who struggled for their independence, but added that the concrete application of this principle depended on the particular circumstances of each individual case.

Vansittart seemed pleased with my explanations and began insisting once again that all peace-loving powers must urgently make up their mind. It is time for Britain, France and the USSR to decide what they are going to do regarding the tripartite bloc. Britain and France must decide now what they would do in the event of German aggression against the Netherlands and Switzerland. The Soviet Union must decide now what it would do in the event of German aggression against Poland and Rumania. The year 1938 was defined by the way Hitler unleashed his blows against a disunited and unprepared Europe. If we wish to avert war, the year 1939 should be marked by the powerful unification of all peace-loving states to repulse the aggressors. The primary prerequisite for this is the formation of a London–Paris–Moscow ‘axis’.

I laughed and observed that Vansittart’s thoughts struck me as entirely fair, but that he was preaching to the wrong party. He knows better than anyone else that the USSR has always been an advocate of collective resistance against aggressors and of a bloc of peace-loving states in the struggle against international ‘gangsters’. But who kept sabotaging the efforts of the USSR? Who systematically inflicted one blow after another on the League of Nations? Who thwarted the creation of a peace front? England and France. Let Vansittart first worry about setting the governments of these two countries on the path of virtue. We won’t be the stumbling block.

Vansittart agreed with my reasoning, but added at the end: ‘I assure you that from now on we will be singing a different tune.’

‘Let’s wait and see,’ I replied.

The gap between Litvinov’s and Maisky’s expectations was widening. Litvinov rightly assumed that Hudson had not been authorized to make any concrete proposals. He discouraged Maisky from making any initiatives, the more so as all the Soviet proposals for collective security had been ignored; DVP, 1939, XXII/1, docs. 146 & 155.