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9 March

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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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9 March

Beaverbrook told me that Chamberlain had a talk with Churchill the other day and was forced to admit that the policy of ‘appeasement’ had failed. Chamberlain will, of course, make every effort to defer conflict and alleviate the tension through various manoeuvres, but the PM can see now that lasting peace and genuine friendship between Britain and Germany are impossible. This, in Beaverbrook’s opinion, explains the prime minister’s marked turn towards the USSR, which he demonstrated by attending our reception. In this connection, Beaverbrook inundated me with a stream of rather heavy compliments:

‘Stay here for another two or three years and you’ll be able to reap the rich harvest in the sphere of Anglo-Soviet relations which your work will have prepared over preceding years.’

Beaverbrook also told me that Germanophobia was spreading rapidly among the general public, and that, in the contrary direction, sympathy towards the USSR was clearly on the rise. By way of an example, he cited Rothermere,

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whose Germanophilia cost the Daily Mail more than a third of its readership (1,200,000 instead of the former 1,800,000 or more). Rothermere left the paper and, with his morale shattered and finances battered, set out on a six-month voyage round the world.

Sympathy towards the USSR really is on the increase. Sinclair told me that mention of the USSR and of the urgent need for a joint struggle for peace had been met with stormy applause at every meeting he had spoken at up and down the country.

Butler, who invited Agniya and myself to lunch today, also spoke at length about friendship between our countries and the need to strengthen Anglo-Soviet relations. Butler described the situation as follows: ‘The field of relations with the USSR has been neglected until now, but the PM has arrived at the conclusion that we should cultivate this field and see what fruit it will bear.’

[Attached to the entry is a private letter written to Litvinov on 10 March.]

London, 10 March 1939 To People’s Commissar Comrade Litvinov Dear Maksim Maksimovich, I would like to add a few more thoughts further to the record of my talk with Hudson on 8 March which I am sending with this post. As you already know from my telegrams, Hudson gave greatest prominence to political matters in our talk, and only secondary importance to matters of trade. I think the reverse will be true in Moscow. Of course, he probably will talk about international political affairs with you, but I find it hard to see what might come of this in concrete terms unless you, on your part, put forward some practical suggestions. Nonetheless, it seems to me that it would be helpful if you had a serious talk with Hudson and, above all, let him know – since he is obviously unsure about this matter – that we do not exclude cooperation with Britain (provided appropriate conditions are observed). This would enable him and like-minded people in the Cabinet and in parliament to counteract the propaganda spread in government circles by elements hostile to us. It would also be very important (although I cannot conceive exactly how this should be done) to make Hudson feel our military might. On matters of trade, the talks will obviously be more definite and practical. I do have faith in Hudson’s sincere desire to expand Anglo-Soviet trade, but we shall probably have to argue a great deal with him about the ways, methods and conditions by which this goal can be accomplished.

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He certainly has a tendency to centralize trade with us on the British side, and on this occasion it will probably be more difficult for us to counter this tendency, since we have adopted a clearing system in our latest agreements with Poland and Italy. Still more manifest is Hudson’s sincere wish to modify the structure of Soviet imports from England through an increase in the share of British-made goods, and this point will probably be the main battleground. Hudson will be very persistent in this respect both because of the very strong pressure exerted by business circles on the government and out of purely careerist considerations. Hudson must return from Moscow with some sort of ‘achievement’ in this area, otherwise his mission will be regarded as a failure. It must be kept in mind that, as I have written to you before, Hudson’s visit represents an alternative to the renunciation of the trade agreement, an alternative put forward to the government by the minister of foreign affairs. In general, according to my survey of the situation here, it would be inadvisable to turn down flatly Hudson’s solicitations for a change in the structure of Soviet imports from Britain. This could awaken strong feelings in British business and government circles that are undesirable and would merely lead to the deterioration of relations. It would be more productive to find some sort of compromise which would at least go some way to meeting the British wishes. I suppose that such a compromise could be paid for by British credits (providing, of course, that we want credits). Our current position regarding the purchase of consumer goods abroad, which Hudson will surely raise, is not entirely clear to me. If the newspaper reports concerning our agreement to buy textiles in Poland are true (unfortunately, I have had no information on this matter from the NKID), this would seem to indicate a certain modification of our former practice. Judging by what I hear and see here, I do not exclude the possibility of various credit combinations if we were to agree to buy, say, textiles or footwear in Britain. But this will all become clearer during the talks in Moscow. No matter how the issue of consumer goods is to be settled, I would deem it highly significant if Hudson could bring good news from Moscow for the Scottish herring dealers. As you certainly know, by virtue of a number of circumstances herring is a political commodity in Britain. A hundred thousand pounds spent on herring has a greater political effect than a million pounds spent on capital goods. Herring is an issue on which all parties concur. I am constantly being reminded about this by such various people as Colville, the minister for Scotland, the Tory MP Boothby, the Liberal leader Sinclair, and the

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Labourite MacLean.

Neil MacLean, member of the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1931–36.

If it were possible to come to an agreement on spending a fixed sum of money (say, 200,000–250,000 pounds annually) on herring for several years, this would have a most favourable political effect for us. I end with a very important question: to what extent does Hudson represent the British government? My impression is that in matters of the economy, he does represent the government and Chamberlain 100%, whereas in matters of politics he is hardly a typical representative of the British government, and especially of the views of the prime minister. Rather, Hudson represents those Cabinet members who have little or no faith in the policy of appeasement and the idea of a London–Paris–Moscow axis. Please keep me informed during Hudson’s stay in Moscow.

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Document Details

Document Title9 March

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

RecipientN/A

RepositoryN/A

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DescriptionN/A

Date1939 Mar 9

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 2

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