(2) Hudson directly posed the following question: does ‘Moscow’ seriously want to talk about a meaningful improvement of relations with Britain? He has heard more than once in London that this is very doubtful. He was told that after Munich, Moscow had decided to retreat into its borders, to break with the West and pursue a policy of isolation, and that for this reason it was useless to seek a common language with Moscow. The main objective of Hudson’s visit – and this is much more important than the trade talks themselves – is to gauge Moscow’s frame of mind in this respect through contact with the leading figures of the Soviet Union. Very much will depend on this because, as Hudson sees it, the next six to twelve months will be crucial in determining British foreign policy for many years, if not for a whole generation. Indeed, he said, a most serious change has occurred in the mood of the country (viz. England, viz. the Conservative Party) in the past two or three months, as I too must have had occasion to observe. We have firmly resolved on preserving our Empire and our position as a great world power. What is needed for this? First, armaments, and here things have taken a turn for the better. As an individual nation, we shall soon be strong as never before in our history. Secondly, to achieve this goal we need to maintain friendly contacts with all the powers that are on the same path at this moment in time. We believe the USSR to be one of these powers. The prejudice against communism that hampered cooperation between our countries has been almost entirely overcome. However, doubts exist in London as to whether or not we desire such cooperation. Hudson’s key task is to clarify this point and report to the Cabinet. If we do desire it, Anglo-Soviet political and economic relations could become very close, because the main danger for the British Empire and the Soviet Union comes from the same country, Germany. If we do not desire it, Britain, in order to defend its interests, will have to engage in other international manoeuvres which might not meet with our approval but which Britain will find unavoidable. Hudson is of the view that Britain and the Soviet Union are two countries which complement one another and which, together with France, could establish a genuine guarantee of peace.

As concerns this part of Hudson’s pronouncement (the significance of his talks in Moscow), Maisky reported to NKID on 8 March 1939 that Hudson’s visit ‘could play a great role in defining the British foreign policy orientation for the next years. Hudson himself would like it to be along the London–Paris–Moscow line… There are subjective elements in Hudson’s pronouncement of course, for he, unlike the premier, disfavours Germany, but he definitely could not have taken up the general line he developed in today’s conversation without Chamberlain’s sanction’; DVP, 1939, XXII/1, doc. 126. One should take Hudson’s anti-German sentiments cum grano salis, for later on, in the summer of 1939, he was active in pursuing secret negotiations with Helmut Wohlthat, Göring’s envoy.

Hudson leaves for Moscow with his hands untied. The Cabinet has given him no binding instructions. He is prepared to discuss all subjects, whether political or economic. His report to Cabinet (at this point, one could sense a note of ‘dizziness with success’ in Hudson’s words, and of gentle blackmail) will be of decisive significance. His November speeches (Hudson had in mind his attack on Inskip and Hore-Belisha for their poor performance in the rearmament sphere, resulting in Inskip’s removal from the Ministry for Coordination of Defence to the Dominions Office, major difficulties for Hore-Belisha, and strict instructions to Anderson

John Anderson (1st Viscount Waverley), lord privy seal, 1938–39; home secretary and minister of home security, 1939–40; lord president of the council, 1940–43; chancellor of the exchequer, 1943–45.

to deal with air-raid precautions) were a great success. The country stands by him. He can push whatever he wishes to push through parliament. That is why he attaches great importance to his visit to Moscow and would be very glad if I could tell him, albeit provisionally, what reception he can expect in the USSR.

(3) I told him that he could of course expect a very friendly reception in Moscow and that representatives of the Soviet government would indeed be willing to talk with him about the matters that concerned him. In particular, I told Hudson that if he arrived in Moscow on the morning of 23 March (as he planned to do), he would be able to see Comrade Litvinov and perhaps also Comrade Mikoyan on the same day. Hudson was very pleased. Discussing more general matters touched on by Hudson, I stressed that the USSR has always been an advocate of collective security and the cooperation of all peace-loving powers, and that it was not we who had undermined these principles. Munich, needless to say, could not but cause an adverse reaction in ‘Moscow’, giving rise to isolationist trends in some sections of Soviet public opinion, but the Soviet government had taken no decisions of this nature and prefers to wait and see, to watch and study the processes currently taking place in the West. If England, as Hudson asserts, wishes to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, so much the better. Hudson can rest assured that the Soviet government is always ready to support any step leading to such an improvement. I deem it my duty, however, to forewarn Hudson that in view of recent experience, ‘Moscow’ has become distrustful, and that today, as never before, it will judge the seriousness of intentions not by words but by deeds.

(4) Hudson responded to my considerations with fresh statements to the effect that the British government was absolutely sincere in its desire for closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and that further developments would to a large extent depend on our conduct. Further, as if to prove the seriousness of the British government’s intentions, he touched on his wishes in the sphere of Anglo-Soviet trade. What do they amount to? The ‘maximum programme’ amounts to a major increase in the volume of trade. Why can’t we double trade turnover in the next five or perhaps ten years? The economic resources and structure of both countries are such that this seems quite possible. The ‘minimum programme’ amounts to the settling of the problems that have arisen in connection with the current trade agreement – more specifically, stepping up Soviet purchases of goods produced in England. One does not contradict the other. When I asked Hudson how he was going to settle the trade issues that concerned him, he answered that, once again, this would depend to a great extent on us. The Cabinet has given him a free hand here as well. He is under no binding instructions. Hudson will pose the problem of trade expansion and a certain restructuring. He is ready to hear out and discuss with utmost goodwill any proposal of ours or any project that might emerge in the course of joint discussions… At the end, Hudson began to insist anew on the urgency of settling the issue of the structure of Soviet imports from Britain and warned me (with a hint of blackmail once again) that he was a ‘tough negotiator’, that Britain’s economic position in respect to the USSR was much stronger now than in 1933 and 1934, and that he hoped to persuade us in Moscow to buy not only capital goods, but consumer goods as well. I remarked half-jokingly that we also knew how to bargain and that I looked forward with great interest to the outcome of his talks in Moscow.

(5) Of the other subjects covered during lunch, mention should be made of Hudson’s great optimism about the forthcoming Anglo-German business talks. He assured me that the Germans had already realized the weakness of their position, that government subsidies to German exporters would be discontinued, that the Anglo-German cartels would establish an acceptable distribution of markets, and that, in general, peace between British and German industrialists would be concluded on British terms. Hudson, incidentally, was explicit about Britain’s continued economic presence in South-East Europe, saying that Britain’s economic position in the Balkans and other places would be maintained and strengthened. Somewhat contradicting the first part of our conversation, Hudson contended that in a year’s time the military might of Britain and France would reach dimensions enabling the two countries to defend their interests in any part of the world, including the Far East. I tactfully voiced my doubts about that.

(6) In the course of our conversation, Hudson revealed the following information about himself. He is 53; from 1912 to 1914 he was an attaché and secretary at the British embassy in St Petersburg (where he became acquainted with the Russian language); and in 1913, together with the British ambassador, he attended the festivities in Moscow on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Romanovs. He spent the war at the front and afterwards returned to the diplomatic service, occupying various posts in Washington, Athens and Paris. His last diplomatic post was as first secretary in Paris. He left the foreign service in 1923 and went into politics. He held the posts of deputy minister of health and of labour, and was also minister of pensions. I should add that Hudson is very rich: his father made a fortune out of soap and left it to his son. At present, Hudson is engaged solely in politics. He is distinguished by his very energetic and independent character, enjoys great influence in the Conservative Party, and is regarded as one of its ‘strong’ men, with a brilliant career ahead of him. He is somewhat too sure of himself. He has never displayed any marked anti-Soviet tendencies. On the contrary, he stressed with pride that he was the only Tory candidate in 1924 who did not make use of ‘the Zinoviev letter’ in his election campaign.