Then Halifax moved on to an account of the circumstances under which the Munich Conference originated. In his desperate attempts to avert war, the prime minister made a final appeal to Hitler and Mussolini on the morning of 28 September. At 4 p.m., while speaking in parliament, Chamberlain received Hitler’s invitation to come to Munich on the 29th for a conference that would be attended by Mussolini and Daladier as well. Chamberlain gave his consent without consulting the French, as the matter seemed absolutely clear to him. Daladier also gave his consent to come to Munich without consulting the British. The British government did not raise the question of sending an invitation to the USSR because, first, time was terribly short, with not a minute to spare and, secondly and most importantly, it knew beforehand the reply that it would get to such a proposal from Hitler. The last chance to preserve peace could not be wasted because of an argument about the composition of the conference. But the prime minister did wire Beneš, asking him to send his representative to Munich either for participation in the conference or, if this proved impossible, for consultation in the course of the conference.

After hearing all this, I asked about the programme of the conference. Halifax threw out his hands and said they had had no time to work out a programme and that the agenda would depend to a great extent on the intentions and mood of the ‘Führer’. In any case, Halifax does not rule out the possibility that questions may be raised in Munich regarding not only Czechoslovakia, but also other problems, such as Spain, general European ‘appeasement’, and so on. Halifax made the following remark in this connection: ‘I still have in my mind the idea of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet consultation which was put forward during Mr Litvinov’s talk with Lord De La Warr in Geneva.’

Since Halifax had mentioned the guarantees which should be given to Czechoslovakia, I asked him to clarify the British government’s understanding of the guarantees. Halifax replied that so far they had conceived them as follows: Germany and Czechoslovakia sign a non-aggression pact, while Britain, France and the USSR (‘if it so wished, of course’) shall guarantee the borders. The question of Italy and the limitrophes being drawn into the guarantees is very problematic and remains open for now.

Maisky was at pains to convince Narkomindel that Halifax still displayed an interest in the proposal made by Litvinov to De La Warr in Geneva, entertaining the rather fanciful idea that Czechoslovakia would sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, while Britain, France and the Soviet Union would guarantee her borders. Moreover, Churchill, whom he met on the same day, not only praised the Soviet stand during the crisis, but elaborated on the growing opposition to Chamberlain’s policies within the Cabinet. Likewise, the Labour leaders seemed to be united in their opposition to a settlement. A few days later, Maisky highlighted the press’s criticism of the Munich Agreement. After being briefed by Cadogan about the Munich Agreement, he had to concede, though, that when it came to the guarantees ‘there was no mention of the USSR’; DVP, 1938, XXI, doc. 391; and Russian Foreign Ministry, God Krizisa: 1938–1939: dokumenty i materialy (Moscow, 1990) (hereafter God Krizisa), I, nos. 13 & 14, 29 & 30 Sept. 1938, respectively. He did little to convey the exuberant welcome

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which awaited Chamberlain on his way from Heston aerodrome to Buckingham Palace. D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945 (London, 1971), pp. 110–11.

In the circumstances it would have been wrong to speak out against Chamberlain’s visit to Munich. It was necessary to wish him success, if only for the sake of appearances. After all, this was a matter of war or peace, of the life or death of millions of people. If the Labourites had acted differently, their party would have been accused of being a party of war. Moreover, Attlee ended his speech by saying that principles should not be sacrificed in Munich!

‘And which “principles” do you think will triumph?’ I asked.

Both Attlee and Greenwood shook their heads dejectedly. They are certain that Chamberlain will capitulate once again in Munich.

But the mood of the masses is wonderful! The two thousand meetings arranged across the country last weekend went terrifically well. The trades unions are holding firm. Even Citrine is all right.

Marvellous! But the capitulation and the sale of Czechoslovakia are still inevitable! So what is there to be happy about?