Before the French ministers’ departure from Paris, the French government held a special meeting which resolved that the Godesberg ultimatum was unacceptable. That’s good. The hands of Daladier and Bonnet are now tied and they won’t get too far in London. The British and French ministers spent the whole of yesterday afternoon in meetings. Gamelin

Maurice Gustave Gamelin, chief of the French general staff, 1931–40.

also arrived in London this morning.

A propos, I heard the following story. Bonnet, whose role throughout the crisis has been of the most sinister kind, insisted in his talks in London on the need to avert a war whatever the cost. In the main, Daladier supported him. It goes without saying that the French ministers met with Chamberlain’s full ‘understanding’ and ‘sympathy’. As an argument in favour of capitulation, Bonnet cited the unpreparedness of the French army, particularly its air force for a large-scale war. Gamelin found out about this and immediately decided to go to London personally in order to renounce Bonnet’s slander and restore the honour of the French army. When Daladier learned about the forthcoming arrival of the chief of the general staff, he deemed it best to legalize his appearance in London and sent Gamelin an official invitation to the conferences. In London, Gamelin admitted to certain flaws in the French armed forces (especially in aviation), but he declared categorically that, although he was against preventive war, France would emerge victorious if war were to break out now. According to Gamelin, the Siegfried line does not yet pose an insurmountable obstacle. The Germans have not had sufficient time to reinforce it properly. Gamelin is said to have used the following expression: ‘The Siegfried line is just a wall of marmalade.’

Gamelin did not think much of the Maginot Line either, warning Hore-Belisha that it might still take quite a while to complete the fortification of its northern and southern sections; R.J. Minney (ed.), The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (New York, 1961), p. 168.

Chamberlain began with lengthy deliberations on the theme that Hitler is ‘an honest man’, and that, having received the Sudetenland, he would be appeased. The speech bored Greenwood, who interrupted the prime minister and asked him: ‘Have you read Hitler’s Mein Kampf?’

Chamberlain got angry and answered irritably: ‘Yes, I have, but I have conversed with Hitler and you have not!’

The Labour leaders wanted to know whether the Godesberg memorandum was forwarded to Czechoslovakia with or without a recommendation that it be accepted. The prime minister replied that no recommendations had been made from his side.

‘What will happen,’ the Labourites went on, ‘if Czechoslovakia rejects Hitler’s demands?’

‘That will depend on the behaviour of France,’ responded the prime minister.

‘And what if France supports Czechoslovakia? What stand will the British government take in that case?’

Chamberlain avoided answering this question directly, but said that ‘a new situation would be created’ which the Cabinet had not yet discussed. Neither could the prime minister give a clear and definite answer to the question about the guarantees of Czechoslovakia’s new borders. Concluding the conversation, the Labour leaders returned once more to their initial point: What foundations were there for assuming the Sudetenland to be the Führer’s last demand? Chamberlain exclaimed once again with renewed annoyance: ‘I saw Hitler and I believe him!’