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23 September

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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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23 September

Vague rumours have been spreading since the morning that the second meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler is not running as smoothly as the first. A Foreign Office functionary assigned to the British delegation told me in a corridor of the League of Nations that the first meeting between the British PM and the Führer took place last night, but that the talks did not continue today because Chamberlain found it more expedient to address Hitler with a letter – he is currently waiting for a reply.

What’s the matter? It is obvious that some unforeseen difficulties stand in the way of an agreement. What are they? Some time later I met Butler in the League corridors, but apart from confirming the very fact of a break in the talks, he also had little more to add. Tension and alarm grew by the hour. The League building and the lobbies of the Geneva hotels swarmed with new information and new rumours. Nobody was making much sense, but the general impression was unanimous: matters in Godesberg were not running smoothly and had probably already reached a deadlock… So is a break inevitable? This gave rise to the most heated speculations and to the most reckless wagers.

I went for a lunch given by Avenol.

Joseph Louis Avenol, deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations, 1923–33; secretary-general, 1933–40; French foreign minister, 1933–34, 1936 and 1938.

I was accompanied by A.M [Kollontay]. There were about 15 guests at the table, including the Spaniards (del Vayo

Julio Alvarez del Vayo, foreign minister of the Spanish Republic, 1936–39.

and Azcárate with wives) and Kayser,

Jacques Kayser, journalist and general secretary of the Radical Socialist Party.

one of the leaders of the French Radicals. The latter asserted categorically that the Anglo-French plan represented an absolute limit, beyond which the French would not go. I had a rather unpleasant

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talk with Avenol: at M.M.’s request I voiced a protest against the appointment of Munters

Vilhelms Munters, foreign minister of Latvia, 1936–40; chairman of the September 1938 session of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva.

as spokesman for Article 16, since the man had a very clearly defined position on this issue. Avenol argued that Munters was the best of the possible spokesmen. We failed to reach an agreement but at least Avenol has been notified of our attitude on this matter.

From three o’clock onwards, I attended the 6th Commission, where the discussion of Article 16 continued. M.M. was not there (he was at home, preparing his speech). I spoke with Munters and told him frankly that we object to his appointment as spokesman but that this was not a personal matter. We would simply prefer a spokesman who was not following a party line on Article 16.

Many people spoke at the Commission, including Paul-Boncour. His speech was unclear and vague, and he either could not or would not divorce himself from the capitulatory stance of the French government. M.M. arrived towards the end of the session and asked for the floor. His speech was very sharp and cut many to the quick, but the audience still applauded him vigorously. Paul-Boncour was openly quivering when M.M. mentioned the ‘German–Anglo-French’ ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Butler started tittering in embarrassment when M.M. declared that only the USSR had a ‘clear conscience’ and ‘clean hands’ in the matter of meeting self-imposed obligations. Our arrow found its target.

Just before the meeting came to a close, a secretary of the British delegation approached M.M. and said that De La Warr and Butler would like to have a talk with him and me right away. A quarter of an hour later, we all gathered in the office of the British sous-secretaire. It was about eight in the evening, and a somewhat romantic semi-darkness filled the room.

De La Warr spoke first. He had just received instructions from London to see Litvinov and me as soon as possible. Things are bad in Godesberg.

At their second meeting at Bad Godesberg, on 22 September, Hitler ruled out further negotiations and threatened an invasion of the Sudetenland on 28 September.

The collapse of negotiations can be expected any hour. The British and the French governments have already informed Czechoslovakia that they no longer believe they have the right to prevent her from mobilizing. Prague will probably declare mobilization tonight. Germany will certainly not tolerate such a situation. So we can expect an armed move by Hitler against Czechoslovakia. What then? What would be the position of the USSR in these circumstances?

M.M. answered that he would like to know the facts first. What is happening in Godesberg? What are they talking about there? What difficulties have they met?

De La Warr and Butler, however, didn’t know much (or pretended not to know). They explained this by saying that the Godesberg–London telephone

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line was tapped by the Germans, so the British delegation in Godesberg had to be very careful. Sheer nonsense! But I certainly do not rule out the possibility that London is deliberately keeping De La Warr and Butler in the dark about what is really happening. Such are the methods of foreign-policy work introduced by Chamberlain. But the two Englishmen did say that Hitler had put forward a series of new and unacceptable claims and that the PM was returning to Britain tomorrow. Most likely, a new meeting of British and French ministers will be immediately convened in London. But what do we think of the situation?

M.M. answered that our position was stated with sufficient clarity in his speeches at the League of Nations on 21 September and today. We are sincerely prepared to meet our obligations under the Soviet–Czechoslovak pact. It’s up to France. England’s position is also important.

De La Warr tried to find out whether the Soviet government has already taken some military measures. Has the army been mobilized, at least partially? Have the troops been moved to the border?

M.M. avoided answering these questions directly, saying that he had been abroad for almost three weeks.

De La Warr made another attempt to discuss military affairs, asking how many air divisions we could send to help Czechoslovakia and whether Rumania would let them through.

M.M. replied that he was not a military man and could not satisfy De La Warr’s curiosity. That was why, in his talk with the French chargé d’affaires on 2 September, he had recommended urgent talks between the general staffs of the three armies. As for Rumania, M.M. thought that if Britain and France supported Czechoslovakia, Rumania would follow suit.

Soviet troops were indeed deployed on the border and the French gleaned through their own sources the information on the preventive measures undertaken by the Red Army general staff; see V.Ya. Sipols, Vneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza 1936–1939 (Moscow, 1987), pp. 187–9 and O.A. Rzheshevsky (ed.), 1939. Uroki istorii (Moscow, 1990), pp. 105–6.

De La Warr interjected that, according to his information, the Rumanians would not impede the passage of Soviet troops sent to assist Czechoslovakia.

Butler, for his part, said he would like to clarify the question of when and under what conditions the USSR would be ready to move. Only after France moves? Or earlier?

M.M. replied with absolute clarity that this was the case: only after France. Those were the obligations undertaken by the USSR under the Czechoslovak–Soviet pact.

‘What then should be the next practical step?’ asked De La Warr.

‘If the British government has seriously decided to intervene in the developing conflict,’ M.M. answered, ‘then the next step, to my mind, should be an immediate conference of Britain, France and the USSR with the aim of working out a general plan of action.’

De La Warr agreed with this and asked M.M. where this conference might be held.

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M.M. observed that the choice of place was of secondary importance, with one reservation. The conference should not be held in Geneva. Hitler is so accustomed to identifying Geneva with irresponsible talk that any conference convened there would fail to make an adequate impression on him. And this impression is now more important than anything.

De La Warr and Butler conceded the truth of this observation, and De La Warr asked M.M. whether he had any objections to holding the conference in London. M.M. replied that he did not.

‘Who could represent the USSR at the conference?’ continued De La Warr. ‘Would you be able to attend yourself?’

M.M. replied: ‘If the ministers of other countries are present at the conference, then I am ready to come to London.’

De La Warr expressed his full satisfaction with today’s talk and promised to inform the Foreign Office about it immediately. Further details could be discussed the following day once he had received a reply from London. Then we took our leave. On parting, De La Warr and Butler said a few times, with emphasis: ‘Let us consider today’s meeting as the first “informal step” on the way to establishing contact between the two governments. “Informal”, of course! Only “informal”!’

On the way home, M.M. and I exchanged views about our meeting with the British. M.M., as usual, was most sceptical. I am also not in a very optimistic mood, but one thing is clear to me: if London is so eager to seek at least informal contacts with the Soviet government, then Chamberlain must be having a very hard time of it.

Typically, in his programmatic memoirs Maisky somewhat misleads the reader by continuing the narrative, giving the reader the impression that he was still quoting from his diary, while reinforcing the prevailing Soviet historiography: ‘As the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs and I were returning to the Hotel Richmond, I said: “What you have just proposed to the British means war … Back in Moscow, has all that been well considered and decided in all seriousness?” Maksim Litvinov said firmly: “Yes, it has been decided in all seriousness … When I was leaving Moscow for Geneva Soviet troops were concentrating on the borders with Rumania and Poland.” … I asked: “And if France lets us down and does not act? What then?” Litvinov waved his hand in irritation and snapped: “That’s of secondary importance!” He was silent for a moment and then said: “The most important thing is how the Czechs will behave … If they are going to fight we shall help them with armed force”’; VSD, pp. 351–2.

Late in the evening, De Valera,

Eamon (Edward) De Valera, president of the Sinn Fein Party in 1917; prime minister of Ireland, 1932–48, 1951–54 and 1957–59; president, 1959–73.

president of the Assembly, gave a big reception in the hotel Les Bergues.

Up to a thousand people gathered, of every appearance and rank. It was hot, stuffy and crowded, but nobody seemed to notice. Everyone’s thoughts were elsewhere. News of mobilization in Czechoslovakia had arrived late in the afternoon. Godesberg was being spoken of as a complete failure. The rumour was passed around that tomorrow the French government was also going to announce mobilization. A leaden cloud hangs over the world. The spectre of war rose in all its horror before those gathered at the reception… A war very close at hand – tomorrow, the day after…

All evening I myself could not get rid of the thought that there was no longer a way out, and that war was inevitable. Here is the logical line of my reasoning. The ‘Anglo-French plan’ is the absolute limit. If Hitler has demanded any more from Chamberlain, then neither London nor Paris can accept it. At any rate,

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they cannot exert pressure on Prague to accept Germany’s new demands. So Czechoslovakia will reject the demands. Hitler, of course, will use force. Czechoslovakia will respond by resorting to force as well. War will break out and France will have to come to Prague’s aid. We shall follow France. And then events will run their inevitable course. As if all this were right and logical… As if there were no other way out of the current situation…

But who can tell? Life is often far more complicated than logic. Besides, the English, who are destined to play a major part in this whole story, love to call themselves an ‘illogical people’. Well, we’ll see.

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Document Details

Document Title23 September

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

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Date1938 Sep 23

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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