I asked him about the meaning of Runciman’s mission. Oliphant gave me a caustic glance, pulled at his long red moustache and said with a tone of barely perceptible irony: ‘What is Runciman doing in Prague? He is taking in the atmosphere.’

I couldn’t help laughing. According to Oliphant, Runciman will spend four to six weeks in Czechoslovakia. He has no fixed plan, just a few ideas. Of course, regardless of all the denials, Runciman is in essence a representative of the British government. But, in the end, what’s wrong with that? If Runciman succeeds in reconciling the Czechs with the Germans, then wonderful. If he fails, that’s also no reason to cry: at least we’ll have gained some time.

‘Are you displeased? I can see by your face that you resent our policy in Czechoslovakia. Why?’

‘Yes, we are dissatisfied with your policy,’ I agreed, ‘for you are constantly striving to restrain not the aggressor, but the victim of aggression. Runciman’s mission serves the same end.’

Oliphant tried to argue but eventually realized that such an impression could indeed have been formed on the continent.

Maisky told Oliphant that ‘His Majesty’s Government were bludgeoning M. Benes and Co. and were not being sufficiently firm with Germany’; TNA FO 371 21731 C8218/1941/18. The Soviet government’s disillusionment with the West is also discernible in Surits’s failed efforts to draw a more active French response to the events in Czechoslovakia; see Carley, 1939, pp. 48–9.

In his turn, Oliphant asked me about the events in Manchuria. He was eager to know whether we provoked the conflict deliberately to render support to China. I had to disappoint him and later he himself admitted that, according to British sources as well, the aggressors in this case were the Japanese. To my question about the British response to the events in Manchuria, Oliphant replied: ‘The Japanese have sown the wind, now they are reaping the whirlwind. They deserve it. This is the average British attitude to the conflict over Zhanggufeng.’

Maisky is referring to the Battle of Lake Khasan, which took place between 29 July and 11 August 1938, when Soviet troops encountered an attempted military incursion by Manzhouguo (the puppet Japanese government) into a territory claimed by the Soviet Union.

Then Oliphant asked me if the conflict in Manchuria could grow into a big war.

‘It entirely depends on the Japanese,’ I answered. ‘The USSR doesn’t want a war, but we are determined to protect our rights and our territory.’

‘So there is no question of mediation?’ Oliphant went on.

‘That’s correct.’

True world brokers! Mad about mediation!

In the end, Oliphant complained about Craigie’s difficult position in Tokyo. Over the last year he has effectively turned into a solicitor defending British interests in China (customs, trade, navigation, etc.). He’s had few successes.

‘The time will come,’ Oliphant concluded, ‘when we shall be able to get even with Japan, but the moment has not yet arrived.’