Sun Fo has spent six weeks in Moscow, seeking an agreement with the Soviet government on aid to China. He left content and he expressed his gratitude for our thorough implementation of the agreements reached in Moscow. Initially, however, Sun Fo was not quite so pleased with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his rather foggy explanations (he usually speaks clearly, precisely and frankly), he had hoped to convince the Soviet government of the necessity of a joint military action with China against Japan. The Soviet government declined the proposal, but it did promise active assistance to China by sending arms, aircraft, etc. The results have been obvious in military operations in China. There is no doubt that the Chinese successes of the past three weeks have been due in no small measure to the arrival of our planes, tanks, artillery, etc. No wonder Sun Fo feels almost triumphant.

The details of his crucial meeting with Stalin are interesting. ‘I was told the date of my meeting with your leader,’ Sun Fo said, ‘but not the time of day. I got ready. I sat at the embassy and waited. Evening came: eight o’clock, nine o’clock, ten o’clock, eleven o’clock… Nothing! Somewhat disappointed, I decided to call it a day. I got undressed and went to bed. Then all of a sudden, at a quarter to midnight, people came for me: “Please, you are expected.” I jumped up, got dressed, and set off. Molotov and Voroshilov were with Stalin. Towards the end of the meeting Mikoyan

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Politburo member, 1935–52; people’s commissar for external trade, 1938–49; member of the State Defence Committee, 1939–45.

and Ezhov

Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov, people’s commissar for interior affairs (NKVD) and general commissar of state security, 1936–38, who oversaw the ‘Great Terror’. He was demoted to the position of people’s commissar for water transport, 1938–39. Arrested in April 1939, he was charged with conspiracy and espionage, convicted and shot in February 1940.

also arrived. The conversation lasted from midnight until 5.30 in the morning. That’s when it was all decided.’

According to Sun Fo, it was during that conversation that the Soviet government dismissed the idea of direct military involvement in the war against Japan. The reasons given by Stalin to justify this line of behaviour boiled down, in Sun Fo’s account, to the following: (1) Military action by the USSR would immediately rally the entire Japanese nation, which at present is far from unified in its support of Japan’s aggression in China. (2) Military action by the USSR, on the other hand, might well frighten right-wing elements in China and thereby split the United National Front which has recently emerged there. (3) Military action by the USSR, with its prospect of victory, would alarm Great Britain and the USA and might transform their current sympathy towards China into its direct opposite. (4) Military action by the USSR, and this is particularly important, would be exploited by Germany for an attack on our country in Europe, and that would unleash a world war. For all these reasons, Stalin considers open military action against Japan by the USSR to be inexpedient. But he is quite prepared to render assistance to China by providing it with arms and so on.

Stalin’s position is further elaborated in DVP, 1938, XXI, doc. 311.

This assistance, according to Sun Fo, is being rendered in smooth and regular fashion. The motor road to Lanzhou via Xinjiang is satisfactory. Transportation from the Soviet borders to Lanzhou takes two to three weeks on average. During winter, those living along the road have been voluntarily removing snowdrifts, and as a result traffic along the route has not been interrupted even for one day. Planes reach China in summer time. The Soviet aircraft are first-class. They were so fast that at first the Chinese pilots could not fly them properly. Now they are gradually mastering them. Soviet experts are rendering the Chinese great assistance in the training of pilots. The majority of German instructors in the Chinese armies were recalled by Hitler. Only 30 or 40 men were left who refused to leave for Germany and took an oath of allegiance to the Chinese government. Germany also terminated arms deliveries to China. The Italian instructors left China long ago. The Chinese government has as many as 600 foreigners (mainly Americans, Englishmen, Dutchmen and others) serving in the air force. It now numbers 500 to 600 aircraft. Some arms come from the USA, some are delivered from Great Britain (about 60 planes as of today), Belgium, France and Czechoslovakia (the Bren machine-gun), but not much on the whole. But then the British government keeps Hong Kong open for arms transit, which is very important, and keeps the motor road in good nick between Burma and Yunnan on the Burmese side. The Chinese government, for its part, is hurriedly completing the same road on the Yunnan side, where as many as 170,000 workers are employed. The road will be opened in June, and then, besides Hong Kong, there will be a new and absolutely safe route to deliver all essential imports to China from the Indian Ocean.

Speaking about communication routes, Sun Fo suddenly remembered the following: ‘During my conversation with your leaders I advanced the idea that it would be helpful if a railway connecting Alma-Ata, Xinjiang and Lanzhou was laid to facilitate Soviet deliveries to China. Stalin took an interest in my idea. He took out a map and we studied it to see where exactly the railway could be laid. We calculated that the length of the line would be about 3,000 kilometres and that, under the most favourable conditions, three years would be needed for its construction. When this had become clear, Stalin noted: “A railway there is not of primary significance today, at least as far as the current war is concerned. This is a peace-time task.” To which I replied: “Why do you think the line we are talking about is not of immediate military importance? China is prepared to wage war for five years.” Stalin laughed, but he was obviously pleased and said that in that case my idea should be taken more seriously.’

I asked Sun Fo about his negotiations in England. His objective was to raise 20 million pounds in the form of a loan or credits for Chinese tungsten and antimony. He had made scant progress. Halifax was full of amicable sentiment towards China in his conversation with Sun Fo but vague in matters of supply and finance. Simon sympathized, too, but thought that the City would not grant a loan without the government’s guarantee, which would be difficult to push through the House (sheer nonsense!).

As a result, Leith-Ross was assigned to draft a project for a group of British companies that need tungsten and antimony and might provide the Chinese government with an advance in exchange for future supplies. This is patently a lousy scheme! The higher echelons of the Tory Party have decayed to such an extent that they have lost their ability to defend their own interests, even with the help of the gold they are still rolling in.

Sun Fo seemed flattered by the big lunch I arranged in his honour on 8 April. On 6 April I had attended lunch in his honour at the Chinese embassy, and on the 7th I attended the reception there which was held on the occasion of his arrival.