(1) Randolph Churchill

Randolph Churchill, Conservative MP, 1940–45.

rang me up and said that his father wanted very much to see me. We agreed to meet at Randolph Churchill’s apartment for lunch. I found Winston Churchill greatly agitated. He took the bull by the horns and addressed me with the following speech:

Churchill’s look, tone and gestures left no doubt of his sincerity. I had to take the floor and lecture my interlocutor at some length on elementary politics, providing him with the clarifications of recent events that he had requested. Churchill listened to me most attentively, occasionally interrupting me with brief remarks and questions. When I had finished, Churchill seemed to brighten up a bit, gave a sigh of relief, and exclaimed: ‘Well, thank God. You’ve reassured me a little.’ Then he continued with a crafty grin: ‘Of course, you are ambassador and your words have to be taken cum grano salis; yet much is becoming a great deal clearer to me and I’m beginning to grasp what is going on in your country.’ Then, after a minute’s pause, Churchill went on: ‘I hate Trotsky! I’ve kept an eye on his activities for some time. He is Russia’s evil genius, and it is a very good thing that Stalin has got even with him.’ Another minute’s pause and Churchill, as if answering his own thoughts, exclaimed: ‘I am definitely in favour of Stalin’s policy. Stalin is creating a strong Russia. We need a strong Russia and I wish Stalin every success.’

The full entry contains a far more detailed and colourful account of the meeting than the report sent to Narkomindel, in which Maisky, rather cunningly and with great circumspection, exploited Churchill in order to convey to the Kremlin the damage inflicted by the trials on Soviet interests, while at the same time praising Stalin’s leadership; DVP, 1938, XXI, doc. 103, 23 March 1938. Maisky succeeded in swaying other politicians towards a benign view of Stalin. He widely distributed Alexei Tolstoy’s Peter the Great, which had just been published, drawing from Lloyd George the comment: ‘it gives me the historical background of Russia which explains better than any book I know on the subject the why, the wherefore and the whither of the great Revolution. Peter was a great fellow, but he would not have won through without adopting ruthless methods’; Sylvester papers, copy of letter to Maisky, A45, 4 Feb. 1938; and response in the same vein by Maisky in Lloyd George papers, LG/G/14/1/4, 10 Feb. 1938. Likewise, Trevelyan praised the book ‘giving a vivid picture of the society which Peter tried, with his titanic energy, to bring into some sort of order’; RAN f.1702 op.4 d.1616 l.5 & d.1132 l.1, exchange of letters with Trevelyan, 1 & 13 Jan. 1938.

Then Churchill, returning for a moment to the slanderous propaganda about the USSR, added: ‘In order to put an immediate end to all these fairy tales about the USSR’s weakness, which I assure you many people here and in Paris take in good faith and which damage the prestige of your country, it would be most helpful if Russia could show the rest of the world the falsehood of the rumours being spread about it through some major action. This would have enormous significance not only for you, but also for us, France, Czechoslovakia, and for the consolidation of peace.’

I asked Churchill what sort of action he had in mind, before adding in good humour: ‘Surely you don’t want the USSR to suddenly annex a foreign state, do you? We, the Soviet people, are a peaceful nation and we don’t go around plundering foreign territories.’ Churchill retorted in a fitting tone: ‘Oh, no! I wouldn’t sit down with a gangster. I mean something quite different. Why, for example, don’t you make a declaration, couched in a particularly impressive form, that you will render substantial military assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack by Germany? That would really make an impression. All the more so as you are quite entitled to do this in accordance with the Czechoslovak–Soviet pact.’ I told Churchill that I did not quite understand his idea. It is well known that the Soviet Union respects its commitments. In twenty years of foreign trading, there has been not a single instance of our failing to meet our obligations on time. Churchill nodded in agreement and said: ‘Yes, it is well known that you pay punctually.’ ‘We pay our political debts just as punctually,’ I went on, ‘and this is also well known to all.’ So what would be the point in making the declaration proposed by Churchill? But Churchill would not accept my reasoning. ‘I know,’ he said, ‘that Stalin is a solid and reliable man; he will do what he says, and he is able to keep his promises. Yet it would still be useful if the USSR declared once again now for the whole world to hear: we will help Czechoslovakia in earnest! I assure you it would be of great importance for both the USSR’s prestige and the cause of peace.’

(2) When we had finished discussing the USSR’s domestic situation, I decided to pay Churchill back in his own coin, and asked him: what was happening now in England? In the course of my professional duties, I have been keeping close track of foreign and domestic policy in my country of residence throughout the last five years, and I have to say that with every year I have been growing increasingly pessimistic about everything connected with British foreign policy. These five years have been marked by England’s continuous retreat in the face of aggressors – Germany, Italy and Japan – in all parts of the world. Manchuria, Abyssinia, the Rhineland, Spain, Eden’s resignation, Austria – these are the major landmarks on the backward journey taken by Great Britain right before my eyes. And the retreat seems to be far from over, for Chamberlain is clearly pursuing a course towards a deal with Italy and Germany. Instead of collective security and fighting aggressors, he is trying to construct a four-power pact which would require major concessions to the aggressors on the part of England and France. And it is not known yet whether the four-power pact is the last concession Chamberlain is prepared to make. I cannot conceal it from Churchill that sometimes I find myself asking: is there anything in the world that people like Chamberlain might fight for? Will they take up the sword if only to protect the British Empire? I may be wrong, or perhaps I do not understand the English spirit well enough, but when I am following parliamentary debates from the top of the diplomats’ gallery, it often seems to me that the leading Conservative circles have completely lost their courage, the courage displayed by their predecessors, without which the Empire cannot be held together. I am hardly about to make any utopian demands on these Tories. I am fully aware that they cannot be the crusaders of socialism; but I am quite astonished to find that they are such exceptionally poor imperialists, even though they swear allegiance to the Empire every step of the way. Strange as it may seem, the only opinions one hears in parliament about the paths that should be taken to secure the Empire come not from the government, but from the benches of the Labour–Liberal opposition. How is all this to be explained? Would it be fair to assume that the ruling classes of Great Britain are too far gone in their decadence to be able to protect the British Empire?

Whatever the explanation, there is no doubt that this phenomenon echoes loudly across the globe. The feebleness and indecision of the British government and its continuous yielding to the aggressor greatly diminish Great Britain’s prestige and raise the stock of Germano-Italian fascism. What is more, all this is very damaging to the cause of peace and gives rise to isolationist sentiments in other countries, including the USSR. I do not mean that the Soviet government is embracing a policy of isolationism. It certainly is not. The Soviet government adheres, as before, to the principles of collective security and to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The best evidence of this are the statements made by Litvinov a few days ago in Moscow. (Churchill broke in at this point: ‘I fully agree with Mr Litvinov’s proposals.’) Yet I have to say that more and more people in the USSR have begun asking themselves the question: are the ‘Western’ democracies capable of any kind of energetic response against the aggressors? Soviet public opinion has been particularly affected by the example of Spain.

Many people in our country say: ‘If Britain and France did not find it possible to do their duty as members of the League of Nations with respect to Republican Spain, a country which is virtually on their doorstep and which is linked to them by great military strategic interests, what can the USSR expect of them at a time of danger? Wouldn’t it be better in this case to give up all illusions about the likelihood of assistance on their part and rely solely on our own resources? The USSR is a big, rich and mighty country, and it can survive on its own if the worst comes to the worst.’ Let me repeat: this is not the policy of the Soviet government, but the mood of a considerable and growing number of Soviet citizens.

(3) My critique of Great Britain’s ruling classes was deliberately emphatic, being designed to arouse Churchill’s patriotism and to galvanize him in the struggle against the tendencies represented by Chamberlain in British politics. I had anticipated protests and objections from my interlocutor, but I was mistaken. He responded quite differently. Churchill admitted that there was much truth in my critique of the Tories, and his face reflected his bitterness. Over the last five or six years, the leading group of the party had indeed displayed cowardice and short-sightedness on a scale with few, if any, precedents in history. Churchill was particularly spiteful and outspoken when he turned his anger on the Cliveden Gang: Nancy Astor and her American husband, Garvin (editor of the Observer), Dawson (editor of The Times), Hoare, Simon and others. Churchill snatched a fresh issue of the Evening Standard (23 March) from the table and triumphantly showed me a very malicious caricature by David Low, devoted precisely to this ‘gang of quivering sisters’.

Reference to David Low’s caricature ‘Shiver Sisters Celebrate’, in which he implied that Astor, Garvin and Dawson were in fact susceptible to Nazi propaganda.

Churchill had to admit that in matters of foreign policy and of the Empire’s rational protection, the voice of reason and courage was much more audible from the opposition’s benches than from those of his own party. On these matters, Churchill is much closer to Attlee and Sinclair than he is to Chamberlain.

But all is not yet lost. There are healthy elements in the Conservative Party. They are often suppressed by the party machinery, but they are tenacious and will show their worth when the occasion arises. Last week, even Chamberlain told Churchill that he agreed in principle with his idea of a ‘grand alliance’ and admitted that the course of events might bring him to the point where the formation of such an ‘alliance’ became inevitable. But the PM thinks that the time has not yet come for this, and that political manoeuvring and other approaches need to be tried out first – who knows if they might not help. Should the situation become truly unbearable, they will have to turn toward the grand alliance. What’s more, Chamberlain is one of the ‘oldies’! Younger Tories are more sensitive. If the party were to suffer several defeats at by-elections, the effect would be considerable and the government line could be radically altered.

Replying to my question, Churchill noted that a week ago the Cabinet’s situation had been rather difficult and a reshuffle had appeared possible, but Chamberlain’s position was now somewhat stronger, as he had finally agreed to make an official statement in parliament concerning the course of his foreign policy (something he had previously avoided) and this statement might represent some kind of progress. (He, Churchill, will certainly criticize the government tomorrow, because he will certainly not be satisfied with what Chamberlain proposes. But some progress is nevertheless visible and further advances are possible.)

Via a series of cautious leading questions, I learned that Churchill had received some assurances from Chamberlain and that this seemed to be the main reason why Churchill had given up his trip to Paris, planned for last weekend. Then I asked Churchill whether he thought a restructuring of the government was possible in the immediate future. Churchill replied that it was not only possible, but highly probable. For, in the light of the rapid deterioration in international relations, it is becoming imperative to hasten the fulfilment of rearmament programmes and to introduce various forms of ‘civil conscription’ to strengthen the country’s defence capacity. These measures cannot be carried out without the consent of the opposition, and of the trade unions in particular. When the government comes face to face with the necessity of carrying out these measures (negotiations with the trade unions concerning labour mobilization have already begun), it will be forced into a reorganization. At that point, one cannot even rule out the possibility of a coalition government being formed, with the participation of the opposition. Should the opposition not be included in the Cabinet for whatever reason, the present composition of the Cabinet would still have to be radically restructured.

I asked who could become prime minister in a reorganized Cabinet. Chamberlain? Churchill shrugged his shoulders and replied: ‘Things become very complicated at this point. The Conservative Party won’t let anyone tell it who should be its leader. On the other hand, the opposition simply cannot accept Chamberlain. The idea has been floated of bringing Baldwin back in so that he, as a member of the House of Lords, could serve, in essence, as a merely nominal head, while the government would actually be led by somebody else. However, it is too early to judge.’

I should note in passing that I had already heard about this suggestion a few days ago, and that the supporters of this alternative named Churchill as the real head of the government, representing the Cabinet in the House of Commons. As if reading my thoughts, Churchill began to ponder aloud about how much he enjoyed his position as a ‘freelance Tory’ who could afford to criticize the government, and said he would not exchange it for a Cabinet post.

‘It is far more pleasant,’ Churchill remarked venomously, ‘to read books or write articles than to try to convince ministerial nonentities that twice two is four.’ But it was clear that he was merely showing off and being coy. I inquired about Eden’s intentions. Churchill replied that it was too early to tell. He has the impression that Eden won’t want to clash with the Conservative Party. Quarrels like that are always unpleasant. It causes the ‘rebel’ no end of difficulties. Besides, Eden has already grown used to power and his high standing. This can spoil a man. Therefore, in Churchill’s opinion, Eden will sit this out. When the time comes for the anticipated restructuring, Eden will undoubtedly return to the Cabinet and take up a major post. Then I asked about Vansittart’s standing. Churchill answered that Vansittart was going through a difficult period, but he hoped that his position would be strengthened in the near future. Vansittart currently has influence but lacks power.

(4) Our conversation moved on to international questions. Churchill sees the general situation in a menacing light. Where is Hitler headed? Churchill is in no doubt that Hitler’s dream is a ‘Central Europe’ extending from the North Sea [sic – Maisky possibly means the Baltic Sea] to the Black and Mediterranean Seas, possibly as far as Baghdad. He has an excellent chance, unless he meets proper resistance from the other great powers. Hitler will require only a modest period of time to carry out his plans, some four or five years at most. In this he will be aided by Italy’s rapid transformation into Germany’s appendage, particularly following the appearance of German troops at the Brenner Pass.

However, Churchill is not inclined to think that Hitler will attack Czechoslovakia in the nearest future. What good would it do him? Open aggression against Czechoslovakia might bring France and the USSR onto the scene, which would be undesirable, since Hitler is not yet ready for a full-scale war. Far simpler for Hitler to act in a different way. The next stage of his expansion, according to Churchill, will be Hungary, which Hitler will be able to assimilate with no great difficulty. Via Hungary he can push his way into Rumania, exploiting the latter’s sizeable Hungarian minority.

Meanwhile, Hitler will use Henlein’s

Konrad Henlein, leader of the fascist Sudeten-German Home Front Party in Czechoslovakia, 1933–38; Gauleiter of Bohemia and Moravia, 1939–45.

party to cause internal difficulties for Czechoslovakia and undertake various economic initiatives (exploiting, in particular, the importance of Vienna as the crucial transit junction of Central and South-East Europe) to strangle her economically. When Czechoslovakia becomes isolated from the outside and shattered from the inside, it will lose its nerve and fall without a fight into Hitler’s hands, like a ripe fruit. Such are the calculations of the German fascists. And Churchill believes many of these calculations to be correct.

I observed that unexpected developments can easily arise in ploys of this sort (separatist actions by Henlein, for example), which may wreck Hitler’s cunning plans, if he has any. Churchill agreed with me, but insisted that the pattern of events he had outlined was the most probable. Should it materialize, a ‘Mitteleuropa’ would present a most serious danger to the world at large, and specifically to Britain, France and the USSR. In particular, Churchill would like to draw our attention to the fact that we would find ourselves in a very difficult situation, should Hitler succeed in realizing his dream. Certainly, it is beyond doubt that eastward expansion exerts a strong pull on Hitler: in the direction of grain-rich Ukraine, the oil-rich Caucasus, and Asia Minor, Arabia, and so on. Making Rumania his own, Hitler would not only get his hands on the Rumanian oil which he needs so badly, but he would also build up a fairly powerful fleet in the Black Sea (submarines, in particular) that would endanger Soviet shores and Soviet navigation. Using his advantages, Hitler could start putting pressure on the USSR, demanding a supply of raw materials, provisions, etc. In view of these considerations, Churchill finds the isolationist sentiments which, by my account, can be observed in certain quarters of Soviet public opinion to be rather dangerous. For Churchill thinks it nearly inevitable that Hitler’s next step after setting up a ‘Mitteleuropa’ would be an eastward attack against the USSR, with its vast territories and immeasurable resources.

(5) I objected by saying that I had a rather different picture of the prospects for the more distant future. Even if we assume that Hitler will succeed in creating a ‘Mitteleuropa’, I do not believe that he would then focus his aggression on the east. Taking into account my interlocutor’s psychology and habits of thought, I put forward three major arguments to substantiate my way of thinking. First, it is a well-known historical fact that Russia, a great power, can be neither conquered nor crushed (Churchill nodded his assent). At best, Hitler could count on grabbing some Soviet provinces, which would bring him more headaches than benefits. In return, he would reap the deadly hatred of his eastern neighbour which, even after a military operation of this sort, would remain a great power possessing immense human and natural resources. Second, a huge proportion of the population in ‘Mitteleuropa’ would be Slavs. Under these conditions, it would be highly risky for Hitler to wage war against the USSR, the majority of whose population is Slavic. The experience of employing Czechoslovakians against Russia during the last war is very indicative in that respect. The third argument is particularly important: if Churchill is correct in his calculation that Hitler would need four or five years to set up ‘Mitteleuropa’ (provided he meets with no resistance from other great powers), it means that peace for the USSR would be guaranteed during this period. In turn, this means we would manage to fulfil our third five-year plan.

This fact is of the utmost importance. We already feel that we are quite capable of successfully resisting any simultaneous attack on our western and eastern fronts. (Churchill grinned at this point and remarked with obvious satisfaction: ‘Oh, yes. You scared the living daylights out of the Japanese. They treat you with greater respect now because they understand perfectly well that in the space of a few hours your air force can turn Tokyo and Osaka into piles of ash.’) The fulfilment of the third five-year plan, I went on, should result in a boom in the military and economic power of the USSR as compared to the present day. An assault on us by Hitler thus becomes all the more questionable. In view of all these considerations, it seems more probable to me that German aggression would take a westward, rather than an eastward, course following the creation of a ‘Mitteleuropa’. It is in the west that Germany can gain the wealthy colonial kingdom that its fascist leaders currently yearn for.

(6) My reasoning seemed to impress Churchill because he replied: ‘Let’s assume that a “Mitteleuropa” is equally dangerous to both of us. Doesn’t this suggest that we should join forces in the struggle against Hitler’s Germany?’ I answered that we had always been and remained active supporters of the collective struggle against aggression, wherever it might be committed, and that we had joined the League of Nations for this very purpose. It’s up to his country now, not ours. As far as I can judge, Chamberlain intends not to fight aggression, but to make a deal with the aggressors in the form of a ‘four-power pact’ at the expense of Central and South-East Europe, and also of the USSR, which would be isolated. Churchill would do better to address his arguments first and foremost to his own prime minister.

Churchill gestured in annoyance and replied contemptuously: ‘A four-power pact? What nonsense! What sort of four-power pact could there be? Poland already has an agreement with Germany and Italy that in the event of the four-power pact becoming reality, it would become the fifth member. And if Poland becomes a member of the “four-power pact”, then how could the Little Entente be excluded? Indeed, how could the USSR be excluded? Chamberlain is a complete ignoramus in matters of foreign policy and that is why he can talk in all seriousness about a four-power pact.’ Churchill began to elaborate his idea. At present he advocates the idea of a ‘grand alliance’ within the frame of the League of Nations. It would be intended, first and foremost, to unite Great Britain, France, the Little Entente and the USSR.

Churchill stresses the particular importance of establishing a Danube federation as a counterweight to German expansion in Central and South-East Europe. It would be excellent if the USSR could actively support the idea of such a federation. But in the event of these designs failing to materialize, of the ‘grand alliance’ falling through and ‘Mitteleuropa’ becoming a reality, Churchill conceives a close, heavily armed alliance of Great Britain and France as a last resort. With its backs to the ocean and commanding world sea routes, the alliance would be capable, temporarily at least, of securing crucial positions of both ‘Western democracies’. It could rely, at any rate, on the tacit indirect support of the USA and the USSR, which, without being bound to the alliance by any formal obligations, would, by the very fact of their existence, serve to some extent as a counterbalance to the might of the aggressors – the fascist states. ‘It would be not the policy of isolation advocated by Beaverbrook, but the policy of bisolation, as I like to call it.’

(7) ‘But this,’ Churchill continued, ‘is of course only the very worst, the very last solution. Less a solution, in fact, than a dire necessity. I still haven’t given up the hope of something better. I believe that the time of the grand alliance will come. I believe that, through their joint efforts, England, France and the USSR will be able to put global affairs in order on the basis of collective security. Twenty years ago I put my every last ounce of energy into the struggle against communism, since at that time I believed communism, with its idea of world revolution, to be the greatest menace to the British Empire. Today, communism does not represent such a danger to the Empire. Today, the greatest menace to the British Empire is German Nazism, with its idea of Berlin’s global hegemony. That is why, at the present time, I spare no effort in the struggle against Hitler. If, one fine day, the German fascist threat to the Empire disappears and the communist menace rears its head again, then – I tell you frankly – I would raise the banner of struggle against you once more. However, I don’t anticipate the possibility of this happening in the near future, or at least within my lifetime (Churchill is 63). In the meantime, we are walking the same path. That is why I am advocating the idea of a “grand alliance” and perhaps of closer cooperation between London, Paris and Moscow.’

Finishing his speech, Churchill asked me with a subtle grin: ‘Tell me, what do you, the USSR, demand from us?’ I answered: ‘We do not demand anything; but we would just like you, Great Britain, to be a good member of the League of Nations.’ Churchill exclaimed: ‘That’s my wish too. And it’s the wish of many of my friends.’ I replied: ‘It will be a great deal easier for our countries to agree on matters pertaining to the struggle for peace if the ideas inspiring you and your friends become the dominant principles of British foreign policy.’