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Table of Contents
The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1
  • 27 October 1937
  • 12 July
  • 18 July
  • 9 August
  • 30 October
  • 31 October
  • 1 November
  • 4 November
  • 5 November
  • 6 November
  • 7 November
  • 9 November
  • 10 November
  • 12 November
  • 15 November
  • 16 November
  • 17 November
  • 18 November
  • 23 November
  • 24 November
  • 25 November
  • 27 November
  • 28 November
  • 29 November
  • 1 December
  • 5 December
  • 6 December
  • 11 December
  • 13 December
  • 16 December
  • 17 December
  • 18 December
  • 19 December
  • 20 December
  • 24 December
  • 27 December
  • 31 December
  • 8 January
  • 9 January
  • 15 January
  • 18 January
  • 25 January
  • 26 January
  • 28 January
  • 1 February
  • 4 February
  • 6 February
  • 10 February
  • 12 February
  • 14 February
  • 15 February
  • 20 February
  • 21 February
  • 22 February
  • 28 February
  • 1 March (1)
  • 1 March (2)
  • 2 March
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  • 8 March
  • 9 March
  • 11 March
  • 12 March
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  • 18 March
  • 19 March
  • 20 March
  • 21 March
  • 22 March
  • 23 March
  • 3 June
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  • 12 June
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  • 19 June
  • 27 June
  • 2 July
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  • 9 July
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  • 4 November
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  • 1 July
  • 27 July
  • 29 July
  • 29 July
  • 1 August
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  • 25 August
  • 12 September
  • 14 September
  • 19 September
  • 27 October
  • 6 November
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  • 17 November
  • 18 November
  • 24 November
  • 1 December
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  • 12 December
  • 14 December
  • 4 January
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  • 20 January
  • 25 January
  • 27 January
  • 28 January
  • 7 February
  • 11 February
  • 25 February
  • 1 March
  • 8 March
  • 11 March
  • 22 March
  • 23 March
  • 29 March
  • 31 March
  • 12 April
  • 14 April
  • 10 May
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  • PS 1 October
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  • 20 September
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  • 22 September
  • 23 September
  • 24 September
  • 25 September
  • 26 September
  • 27 September
  • 28 September
  • 29 September
  • 30 September
  • 1 October
  • 6 October
  • 11 October
  • 13 October
  • 15 October
  • 17 October
  • 19 October
  • 20 October
  • 22 October
  • 25 October
  • 26 October
  • 27 October
  • 28 October
  • 30 October
  • 31 October
  • 1 November
  • 3 November
  • 9 November
  • 15 November
  • 16 November
  • 17 November
  • 25 November
  • 27 November
  • 7 December
  • 11 December
  • 13 December
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  • 19 December
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© 2025
11 February
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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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Page 258

11 February
The entry evolved into Maisky’s report to Narkomindel, DVP, 1938, XXI, doc. 41.
Went to see Eden. The immediate reason for my visit was the ‘consular conflict’.
In an attempt to further curtail the power of Narkomindel, as well as the flow of Westerners to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin reduced the number of Soviet consulates abroad and forced European consulates to withdraw from Russia; DVP, 1938, XXI, fn. 59.
On 11 January, Potemkin notified Chilston of the Soviet government’s decision to ask Britain to close down its consulate in Leningrad for reasons of parity, retaining only the consular department at the embassy in Moscow. The proud Brits took offence. Chilston had a few sour conservations with M.M. and then submitted two notes. The British decided to resort to punitive measures. They closed down the consular department in Moscow and announced that parity was thereby observed, as they had only one consulate in the USSR, in Leningrad. They suggested that we should now receive all ordinary visas in Leningrad (they agreed to issue only diplomatic and business visas in Moscow). I was instructed to meet Eden in order to resolve the conflict in some way. He knew nothing about it and promised to ask me over next week after he had familiarized himself with the essence of the dispute…
But this is all by the by. For, quite to my surprise, today’s meeting with the foreign secretary ended up dealing with much more serious matters.
I had hardly crossed the threshold when Eden began firing questions at me: what do I think about the German developments? What will be the effect of Goga’s
Octavian Goga, Rumanian prime minister, 1937–38.
resignation? Is Mussolini really going to withdraw from Spain? etc. Eden was in such an animated, even excited state that I had to ask him what he was so pleased about.
Eden confessed that he had not been so happy for quite a while and that there were three main reasons for this. First, Goga’s cabinet had resigned. This was excellent, and Eden was very pleased that he would no longer have to deal with Micescu
Istrate Micescu, Rumanian foreign minister, 1937–38.
(the Rumanian foreign minister), whom he had disliked since meeting him in Geneva. ‘He seems to have made an unfavourable impression on Mr Litvinov, too,’ Eden added with a grin. He also said that in recent weeks he had been putting pressure on Carol [the Rumanian king], particularly in connection with the Jewish problem – this circumstance had evidently contributed to the fall of the Cabinet.
Second, Germany is bound to become weaker for a while due to the latest events. True, the party had won out over the ‘moderate’ elements, but the newly created ‘balance’ is by no means fixed and various unexpected things may happen. Eden then listed the various branches of government activity in Germany and, after indicating the changes in personnel since 4 February in the army, economy, Foreign Ministry and so on, concluded that smaller, less experienced men had replaced figures of greater weight. This cannot but affect the efficiency of the machinery of state. When Eden mentioned the Foreign


Page 259

Ministry, he made a startled comic gesture, as if he were fending off a ghost that had suddenly appeared before him, and exclaimed with a laugh: ‘For reasons of diplomatic etiquette I must be silent, but you know what I think!’ I laughed out loud. Ribbentrop’s shade was hovering over us at that moment. I sharply refuted Eden’s optimism and said that, on the contrary, I was now expecting an intensification of German aggression in various directions. Specifically, what would happen to Austria and Czechoslovakia? Eden tried to defend his case, but he was not particularly successful. Eventually, he said that Germany would probably behave more scandalously than ever, but that it would actually become less dangerous. I shook my head distrustfully. Eden expressed the hope that Czechoslovakia would not be endangered immediately, but he could not conceal his concern for Austria. It is in that direction, in his view, that Germany would be most likely to strike.
Third, the time has almost come when Italy will have to ‘put the brakes on’. Mussolini, in Eden’s opinion, has a highly stretched front – Abyssinia, Spain and Austria – as well as major financial and economic difficulties in Italy itself. He will have to narrow the front one day soon, but where exactly? Everywhere! Eden thinks this will happen in Spain. In any case, we must do our best for this to happen in Spain.
Eden does what he can. Last week, after announcing Italy’s consent to step up the struggle against piracy in the Mediterranean, Grandi added that Italy would be prepared to engage in the settling of all issues disputed by the two countries.
Eden made the conclusion of a treaty conditional on Mussolini’s withdrawal from Spain. However, the evacuation of foreign ‘volunteers’ remained a thorny issue. On 4 November 1937, the Non-Intervention Committee adopted a resolution which stipulated that both parties in the Spanish conflict could be granted belligerent rights, provided substantial progress was achieved in the evacuation of volunteers. However, the members of the Committee failed to agree on what ‘substantial evacuation’ constituted. Negotiations dragged on until 16 April 1938 (by then Eden had been replaced by Halifax).
Grandi insisted, however, that the Spanish question should be excluded from the forthcoming talks. Eden replied by saying that Spain was the main obstacle and that a constructive discussion of all other issues was precluded without a satisfactory solution to this problem. He also added, quite deliberately, that the Cabinet shared his view. A few days later, Grandi informed Eden that the Italians were ready to discuss the Spanish question as well. Moreover, the Italian government was inclined (‘as it had always been inclined’) to seek ways of speeding up the evacuation of ‘volunteers’. Yesterday, Eden handed over Plymouth’s latest formula to Grandi to define ‘substantial evacuation’ and is now waiting for an answer from Rome. Grandi’s response was rather curious: ‘Just a few days ago I would have turned down this formula without further deliberation, but today I am ready to send it to my government for consideration.’ Eden believes that Mussolini’s answer regarding the formula will also represent a reply to the question: is Mussolini just blackmailing or does he really intend to withdraw from Spain? Eden thinks he is going to withdraw.
I criticized Eden once again for his complacency. I would like him to be right, but I do not see sufficient grounds for that to be the case. Mussolini’s front is indeed overstretched, but I rather think that he will shorten it at the cost of Austria, not Spain. If one takes a sober view, the game is up for Mussolini


Page 260

in Austria: if not now, then in six months, a year or two years, Hitler will seize it and Mussolini will be in no position to avert it. Mussolini has probably reconciled himself mentally to the loss of Austria and just wants to ‘sell’ it to his partner at a high price. For what price? Most likely, Spain. That is why I fear that in the near future we shall witness another desperate attempt by Italy to win the war for Franco, with Germany rendering aid more energetically than before. And that is why I think that Mussolini is just double-dealing with Britain about the pull-out of volunteers and that he has no intention of honouring his promises. It would be no surprise if the British government were made a fool of once more, as has happened on more than one occasion in the past. Eden listened to me very attentively, and my words evidently made some impression on him because he replied in precisely the following manner: ‘Italy’s words and promises are not enough for me. I am ready to enter into general negotiations with Rome only once the issue of the withdrawal of volunteers has been favourably settled. And Italy will receive not one single concession until all the volunteers actually leave Spanish territory. But if this will be accomplished, won’t it be worth paying something for Spain?’
Eden added, with a particular tone: ‘I hope there will be no objections to this line on the part of Mr Litvinov.’
Eden is definitely competing with M.M.! Or, more precisely, at every political turn he wants to remain in contact with the USSR. This is very reassuring. It is this new quality which I have been observing in him recently and which was expressed so vividly during our meeting just before the New Year.
But relations between Eden and Chamberlain are not improving at all. I’ve learned from various sources that Eden regards settling the Spanish question as a basic prerequisite for an agreement with Italy, while Chamberlain is prepared to give up Spain as a last resort. So far, Eden has evidently succeeded in convincing the Cabinet to back his point of view, but there is no guarantee that tomorrow Chamberlain might not get his revenge.
[Two threads intertwine when it comes to ‘appeasement’: retrospective attempts by the main actors to portray themselves as having been conscious of the German danger, and the common dismissal of the alarmists by contemporaries as oddities or warmongers. It should be noted, though (as the diary entry above attests), that just a week before his resignation Eden appeared to be rather complacent, convinced that the German danger to England had receded.
This emerges as well in Cadogan’s comments on Eden’s draft autobiography; see Cadogan papers, ACAD 4/5, 25 Jan. 1962. On Eden’s subsequent exaggeration of his rift with Chamberlain on matters of principle, see A.R. Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931–1938 (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 338–9.
It was Chamberlain’s decision to pursue negotiations with Mussolini behind Eden’s back which led to the latter’s resignation on 20 February.
R. Mallett, ‘Fascist foreign policy and official Italian views of Anthony Eden in the 1930s’, The Historical Journal, 43/1 (2000). An admission of that is in Cadogan papers, ACAD 4/5, letter to Eden, 22 Nov. 1961.
Chamberlain confided to his sister that he had gradually reached the conclusion that ‘at bottom Anthony did not want to talk either with Hitler or Mussolini, and as I did he was right to go’.
Self, Chamberlain Diary Letters, IV, p. 303.
Seen from Chamberlain’s perspective, both Halifax and Cadogan were pliant, whereas Vansittart had been openly hostile and Eden difficult to manage, particularly when it came to Mussolini. Halifax was an ideal choice for the post of foreign


Page 261

secretary. He found Eden’s ‘preconceived prejudices’ against the dictators ‘too strong … in as much as you have got to live with the devils whether you like them or not’. Presumably that should have rendered him more amenable to Stalin than Chamberlain was, but class bias, historical legacy (reinforced by his experience as viceroy in India) and his High Church leanings coloured his views of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he doubted his own competence for the position of foreign secretary, and finally accepted it reluctantly and only after receiving assurances that he could continue to spend the weekends hunting on his estate and would be exposed to a reduced load of material, which could be consulted ‘on train or at home’. His laidback demeanour enabled Chamberlain to bypass the Foreign Office and to call on his own advisers, particularly Horace Wilson.
Maisky, who penned a portrait of Halifax following his appointment, described him as ‘a typical representative of the old generation of Conservatives’. While praising his intellectual and administrative abilities (he had been a prize fellow at All Souls College, Oxford), Maisky dismissed his outlook on foreign policy, which was geared towards achieving a ‘balance of power and Western security … an indifference to Anglo-French cooperation and a proclivity towards a rapprochement with Germany and Italy. His attitude to the Soviet Union is hostile but so far he has made no anti-Soviet appearance.’
P. Neville, ‘Sir Alexander Cadogan and Lord Halifax’s “Damascus Road” conversion over the Godesberg Terms 1938’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11/3 (2000), pp. 81–2; M.J. Carley, 1939: The alliance that never was and the coming of World War II (Chicago, 1999), p. 88. Maisky’s portrait of Halifax is in RAN f.1702 op.9 d.110 l.1, 25 Jan. 1938.
Maisky was, however, particularly concerned lest the appointment of Lord Halifax meant that foreign policy in the Commons would be personally handled by Chamberlain (who was dismissed by Churchill as ‘that provincial undertaker taking an interest in foreign affairs’).
DVP, 1938, XXI, doc. 48, Maisky to Litvinov, 20 Feb. 1938; Sylvester papers, diary, A45, 21 Feb. 1938.
Once in office, Halifax, who was ‘particularly averse to conversations with Russians and Japanese’, tended to delegate such meetings to Butler,
Richard Austen Butler (Baron Butler of Saffron Walden), Conservative MP, 1929–65; undersecretary of state, India Office, 1932–37; undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1938–41; minister of education, 1941–45.
his parliamentary undersecretary of state.
Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, 1970), p. 75.
]
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Document Details
Document Title11 February
AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)
RecipientN/A
RepositoryN/A
ID #N/A
DescriptionN/A
Date1938 Feb 11
AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1
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