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27 January

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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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27 January

I visited Vansittart and inquired about his new position and duties.

Judging by what V. told me, matters stand as follows. He remains in the Foreign Office, keeps his old office and reads all the correspondence, but is no longer involved in administrative affairs (appointments, staff, finance, and so on) and takes no part in the daily management of FO staff in London or elsewhere. The two latter tasks are to be assumed by Cadogan, the new permanent undersecretary. V. will focus wholly on drawing up and giving advice on the main issues of foreign policy.

What will the relations between V. and Cadogan in the sphere of ‘advice’ be like, given the fact that, according to the FO constitution, the permanent undersecretary must also counsel the foreign secretary?

V. could not clarify this issue at all. The problem evidently persists both for him and for Cadogan. Friction and conflicts are possible. But V. does not intend to surrender. He told me with a laugh: ‘I have always given advice, both when I was asked and when I wasn’t but thought it necessary. I intend to do the same in the future, too.’

Since V. is a much sturdier and bigger man than Cadogan, he will probably remain in charge, provided, of course, that there are no unexpected changes at the top and, in particular, at the head of the FO.

The dismissal of Vansittart and the unrelated resignation of Eden a month later, against the backdrop of Chamberlain’s personal handling of foreign policy, were a tremendous blow to Maisky’s networking in the Foreign Office. His wishful thinking that Vansittart might emerge as the more influential was short-lived. Cadogan accepted the appointment on the condition that Vansittart would ‘not come between’ him and Eden in the conduct of foreign affairs. The long and degrading process of Vansittart’s demotion is unfolded in detail in Cadogan papers, ACAD 4/5, Cadogan to Eden, 25 Jan. 1962.

I asked V. about the rumours that he would be spending most of his time on trips abroad. He gave a sarcastic response: ‘I knew that the “Cliveden FO”, after

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suffering a defeat in their plans to pack me off to Washington, were now hoping that I would at least be in London as little as possible. Lady Astor is in for a great disappointment: I’ll be spending at least three-quarters of my time here (V. pointed to his desk), because all major foreign-policy decisions are taken in London and not in foreign capitals.’

We talked about Spain, Germany and Italy. V. believes that now, after Teruel, the widespread belief in the inevitability of Franco’s immediate victory has to be reviewed. The Republicans have displayed great vitality and fortitude. Even taking into account foreign intervention on its current scale, Franco will hardly be able to overthrow the Republic on his own. I voiced my fear that Italy and Germany could expand the scope of intervention. But V. expressed his doubts about this.

As regards talks with Germany and Italy, V. thinks that rapid developments are most unlikely. Britain and France are still ‘studying’ Hitler’s colonial claims. Any loan to Germany in the terms of Van Zeeland’s report is out of the question.

Van Zeeland was entrusted by the French and British governments with a mission to investigate possible measures to alleviate obstacles to international trade. The report is in World Affairs, 101/1 (1938).

Furthermore, any agreement with Germany must be part of an ‘all-European settlement’. Practical decisions will be long in coming (if they ever do!). The British government is now pursuing a wise policy of wait-and-see towards Italy: following the events in Abyssinia, Spain and Austria, Mussolini’s position is growing weaker with every passing month. So what cause can there be to hurry with the talks in Rome? The longer Britain keeps its composure, the easier it will eventually be to come to an agreement with Italy.

Finally, V. began probing me on the Far East issue, inquiring about our intentions in this part of the world and the possibilities for cooperation there between London and Moscow. I answered in the same spirit as I answered all other Englishmen who asked me this question. In particular, I emphasized the inviolability of our position in the Far East. V. was somewhat disappointed and argued at length that even on the strength of its purely selfish national interests, the Soviet Union could in no way reconcile itself to Japan’s victory in China; after all, peace is indivisible. I remained adamant. V. was very evasive when I asked him what he thought about engaging the League of Nations against Japan.

[On 24 January, Maisky begged Litvinov confidentially to allow him to proceed to Geneva within days, ostensibly for consultations over pressing issues concerning Anglo-Soviet relations. But ‘above all’, Maisky impetuously got to the point, ‘I have a highly important personal question which I would like to discuss with you’. If it could not be justified as a business trip, he was even prepared to make the journey as ‘a private one’.

RAN f.1702 op.4 d.143 l.63 & d.111 ll.15–16, letter to Kollontay, 6 Feb. 1938.

Though there is an absence of any reports on what transpired in Geneva, corroborative evidence seems to confirm Maisky’s growing concern about the future of Litvinov, his guardian and mentor, no less than about his own continued stay in London. Life had become unbearable, with rumours of his imminent withdrawal circulating widely in the press

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and with the intrusion of the NKVD into the embassy and an attempt to recall Kagan, his loyal first secretary, from an embassy that was already seriously understaffed.

In a personal letter to Litvinov, Maisky wrote that Kagan ‘himself told me a few days ago that if he goes away on holiday then he will never return to London. All the more reason

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to complete his recall in the normal way. It is important for London, for all those many connections and colleagues that he formed or made over the years of his work in England.’ RAN f.1702 op.4 d.143 ll.64–5, 26 April 1938.

The circumstances surrounding the hastily arranged encounter between Maisky and Litvinov are reminiscent of Maisky’s similar approaches at the outset of his career, prompted by Agniya, who was determined to return to the homeland.

On Agniya’s influence, see the ‘Introduction’ and on the impact of the purges on her see the commentary following the diary entry for 16 November 1937 and the commentary following 10 May 1938.

]

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Document Details

Document Title27 January

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

RecipientN/A

RepositoryN/A

ID #N/A

DescriptionN/A

Date1938 Jan 27

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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