In October, the ‘Cliveden Set’ proved especially lively and active. It is grouped around Lady Astor’s salon and it has The Times and the Observer as its mouthpieces. The key figures in this clique are Lady Astor, Garvin, Geoffrey Dawson

Geoffrey George Dawson, elected fellow of All Souls College, 1898; editor of The Times, 1912–19 and 1923–41; a proponent of appeasement.

(editor of The Times) and Lothian. The latter appears to have been wavering recently, but he has not yet broken with the Cliveden Set. Dawson is particularly energetic.

Lady Astor’s group has a powerful representation in Cabinet: the majority of the ‘old men’, including Hoare, Simon, Halifax, Kingsley Wood

Sir Howard Kingsley Wood, minister of health, 1935–38; secretary of state for air, 1938–40; lord privy seal, April–May 1940; chancellor of the exchequer in Winston Churchill’s Cabinet, 1940–43.

and Hailsham. Hoare plays the most active role among the ‘Cliveden’ ministers. He hates Eden and wants to take his place. Chamberlain, as PM, tries to be neutral, but he basically shares the attitudes and views of the ‘old men’.

The ‘old men’s’ programme roughly boils down to the following.

A deal with Germany and Italy (at least in the form of a four-power pact), even at the cost of great sacrifices: Germany will be given a free hand in Central, South-East and Eastern Europe; Spain will lose out; certain colonial compensations will be granted to Hitler.

Political ‘realism’, acknowledgement of the collapse of the League of Nations, abandonment of any ‘League of Nations prejudices’ and of ‘sentimental’ lamentations in regard to collective security and universal peace.

Turning France into an appendage of Whitehall, the liquidation or at any rate ‘freezing’ of France’s eastern pacts and above all of the French–Soviet pact.

In essence, this is pure Germanophilia and a complete capitulation to the aggressor.

This group of ‘defeatists’ is opposed by another group led by Eden and comprising mostly ‘young’ members of the government and the Conservative Party, among them Elliot, Ormsby-Gore, Stanley, Hore-Belisha, De La Warr, MacDonald Jr.

Malcolm John MacDonald, son of the former prime minister; secretary of state for the colonies, 1938–40.

and others. Duff Cooper ought also to be numbered in this group, but he recently ‘kicked the bucket’ and became an Italophile. Eden is supported in parliament by Churchill, the duchess of Atholl, Adams

Vyvyan Trerice Adams, Conservative MP, 1931–45, opposed to appeasement.

and other Conservatives of the same ilk.

The programme of the ‘young’ can be summed up as follows.

Alliance with France as the cornerstone of British foreign policy.

Cooperation with the USSR. (This group presently prefers ‘for tactical reasons’ not to talk about cooperation with the USSR, but thinks intensely about it while foregrounding the Anglo-French alliance, which is more acceptable to public opinion.)

Maintenance of the League of Nations as a useful instrument in the struggle for peace and a convenient form of closer cooperation with the USSR (an Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, etc. is ruled out).

Activation of British policy in Spain and Central Europe, but without any definite commitments undertaken in advance in respect of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

In summary: Francophilia, the League of Nations, and a not entirely confident attempt to take on the aggressor.

The first group, the group of ‘old men’, relies on mass Conservative support. The second group, the group of the ‘young’, counts on the support of the Labour–Liberal opposition and of that part of the Conservatives which is led by Churchill. These groups do not represent clearly defined, closed corporations: each has many individual shades and nuances, and defections from one group to the other are not infrequent. But the existence of these two fundamental trends in British foreign policy is not in doubt.

Such was the balance of forces at the beginning of October.

Next comes that which many call, with a smile, the Cliveden Conspiracy.

Here are the stages of the ‘conspiracy’.

The ‘conspirators’ gather in Lady Astor’s country estate in Cliveden throughout October. They work out a ‘plan’ of major action in order to change the general line of British policy in a decisive manner, shifting it towards a four-power pact and rapprochement with Germany. Hoare plays the leading role. Halifax and Kingsley Wood are active participants.

The Field journal sends Halifax an invitation to attend the world hunting fair in Berlin that will be held in November. The ‘conspirators’ decide to seize the opportunity and organize a ‘private meeting’ between Halifax and Hitler. Simon and Hailsham are all for it. Chamberlain gives his blessing without himself getting involved. Nevile Henderson (the ambassador in Berlin) tests the ground in Hitler’s company. Hitler agrees to meet Halifax. Eden and Vansittart are bluntly against the venture from the very beginning, but cannot prevent it.

In early November, prior to the signing of the tripartite anti-communist pact in Rome (6 November) a preliminary platform for the discussions, evidently drawn up by Göring, arrives from Berlin via Henderson. The main points of the ‘platform’ are as follows.

Eden and Vansittart once again categorically object to Halifax’s trip, especially in the light of the ‘platform’. Chamberlain finds that German demands ‘go too far’, but thinks that Halifax should still go: why not talk to Hitler all the same? No harm can come of it. A lengthy struggle ensues in Cabinet. Eden, who left for the Brussels conference

Page 428

The Brussels conference was held on 3–24 November, following a decision by the League of Nations to examine the conflict between Japan and China. The USSR proposed to apply Article 16 of the Covenant and impose collective sanctions against the Japanese, but the Western powers objected. Litvinov ascribed the adverse outcome of the conference to the British desire to act as an intermediary between Japan and China; DVP, 1937, XX, doc. 421.

on 1 November, returns on the 5th for the weekend and tries once again to hinder Halifax’s visit. He goes back out to Brussels on the 8th. The question of Halifax’s visit remains undecided.

On 10 November, in the absence of Eden, the ‘big four’ (Chamberlain, Halifax, Hoare and Simon) rush the decision on Halifax’s visit through Cabinet and Halifax goes to Germany on 16 November. Eden protests and threatens his resignation (but he does not resign). The Manchester Guardian uses its channels in the Foreign Office to bring Göring’s preliminary ‘platform’ to the notice of the opposition and the diplomatic corps.

Hitler and Halifax meet in Berchtesgaden. Hitler lectures Halifax and Halifax listens, only occasionally asking questions or making a remark. Hitler speaks in general and relatively modest terms. He asks for the recognition in principle of Germany’s right to have colonies without any compensation and the right to adjust relations with Central European countries bilaterally, and intimates that he would be ready to return to a ‘reformed’ League of Nations under certain conditions. Halifax states that the British government is not antagonistically disposed to Germany and that it admits the possibility of certain changes in Central Europe, but only by peaceful means and with the consent of France. Practically no mention is made in the conversation of the USSR and communism.

Hitler’s entourage – Göring, Hess,

Rudolf Hess, deputy Nazi Party leader, 1933–41. Flew to Scotland on 10 May, on his own initiative, with a peace offer.

Neurath and others – dots the i’s and crosses the t’s. In concrete terms (1) Germany gives up its former colonies in the Pacific, but demands an ‘African Empire’ comprising Togo, Cameroon, Angola and the greater part of the Belgian Congo. Germany is prepared to receive Angola and Congo in the form of mandates (while joining the ‘reformed’ League of Nations) or in the form of a right to exploitation through ‘trade campaigns’. The entourage does not mention Tanganyika, Kenya and South-West Africa – neither giving them up nor even raising the issue. Evidently, they are putting the problem aside for the time being. (2) As to Central Europe, Germany demands that Britain and France should stop interfering in her affairs and give Hitler freedom of action. (3) At the same time, they intimate that Germany might agree to postpone the matter of colonies for a few years in exchange for a free hand in Central Europe.

Halifax returns to London on 22 November, rather disheartened. Chamberlain is also disappointed. But Eden rejoices and puts on a feast for a few of his friends in a restaurant on the evening of the 22nd (as Masaryk told me). Mrs Eden is delighted and joyfully announces that the dark clouds looming over her husband have dispersed. In our conversation of 26 November, Harold Nicolson confirms that the outcome of Halifax’s visit strengthened Eden’s position. However, the danger has not passed, since Chamberlain will certainly try again to come to an understanding with Germany. All the more so as Chamberlain’s attitudes are quite widespread among the Conservatives (Nicolson was able to verify this at the meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet on 25 November). Vansittart, in his turn, states in his conversation with me on the same day, 26 November, that Halifax had promised nothing to Hitler and that there is no reason for Czechoslovakia and Austria to panic, since the British government ‘does not sell countries either in the direct or metaphorical sense of the word’.

The peripeteia of the Cliveden Conspiracy ends at this point, and the counteraction of Eden’s group begins.

On 24 November Voyt, diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, publishes a sensational article disclosing the preliminary ‘platform’ cited above. Similar information appears, in slightly modified form, in the Yorkshire Post (Mrs Eden’s paper). The press kicks up a storm. In parliament, Chamberlain hurls invective at the ‘irresponsible reports’ of the press in connection with Halifax’s visit. The Germans are ranting and raving and declare that it is impossible ‘to do any business’ with the British: everything always has to be made public in the end. Voyt’s article has a tremendous effect.

By way of compensation and to prevent false rumours, Eden demands that Chautemps and Delbos should be invited to London right away in order to demonstrate the inviolability of Anglo-French closeness. The Cabinet accepts his request, all the more so as a visit by the French ministers had already been planned. The visit has now been brought forward: the Anglo-French meeting will be held on 29 and 30 November.

On 28 November, on the eve of the arrival of the French, Eden himself receives the English press and states that the aim of the Anglo-French meeting is not to conclude some agreement with Germany and Italy at the expense of third countries, and that the British government is not going to exert pressure on France in connection with its eastern pacts (especially the Franco-Soviet pact), but it will try to find ways of easing tension in Central Europe. A serious discussion of Germany’s colonial demands is also possible.

The Anglo-French meeting was held on the 29th and 30th. Unlike Baldwin, who would usually keep silent at meetings of this sort, granting an active role to the foreign secretary, Chamberlain kept a tight rein on the talks from the very beginning. Eden was pushed to the background a little, but Chamberlain repeatedly emphasized that there were no differences between himself and his foreign secretary. Corbin, who was present at the meeting, asserted that the prime minister was generally objective and showed much less Germanophilia than Halifax. Chamberlain demonstrated a strikingly practical, business-like approach to all the problems discussed.

A pleasant disappointment was in store for the French. Leaving for London, they had feared that the British government would insist on ‘freezing’ the pacts and ask France to exchange agents with Franco, as England had done. Their expectations did not materialize. The PM said in his opening speech that the British government was far removed from the idea of influencing the foreign policy of France, while Eden, in his conversation with Delbos, pronounced that any weakening of the Franco-Soviet pact would be undesirable. The talks on Spain were short: both governments reaffirmed the policy of non-intervention. The matter of agents was not even mentioned by the British. The PM had clearly learned some lessons over the previous weeks.

No wonder that under these circumstances the atmosphere at the meeting was most cordial (much better than at the meeting at the end of January 1935, when France was represented by Flandin and Laval), and that all decisions were taken quickly and easily. The French left London elated.

The decisions themselves boiled down to the following. (1) The British and the French are ready to discuss Germany’s colonial claims, but only as part of a ‘general European settlement’. The English were firmer in this matter than the French. (2) As far as Central Europe is concerned, the British declared that they adhered to the positions formulated during Barthou’s visit to London in 1934, i.e. they would not make any definite commitments in advance, but would continue to be interested in the state of affairs in this part of the globe and would formulate their position when necessary, depending on the circumstances. (3) Delbos announced his forthcoming tour of Central and Eastern Europe and gained approval for it. (4) The two governments agreed to follow a common line in Far Eastern matters. Here, too, the British were more energetic than the French. One minor episode is worthy of attention. The French drew the attention of the British to an editorial in The Times of 29 November that defended the idea of giving Germany a free hand in the east and asked anxiously what this meant. The British explained to them that The Times does not express the government’s line, and the French sighed with relief.

On the afternoon of 30 November, Chamberlain summoned the Labour leaders, Attlee and Greenwood, and communicated the results of the Anglo-French meeting to them. He especially emphasized that the British government had not exerted any pressure whatsoever on the French government (particularly in regard to the Franco-Soviet pact), that it had adhered to a platform of ‘general European settlement’, and that the attempt to achieve this settlement was still at a very early stage and would take a great deal of time. On the whole, the PM showed little optimism and the Labour leaders even had the impression that Chamberlain was concerned more about buying time – through further negotiations – to complete Britain’s rearming. Attlee stated on behalf of the Labour Party that the British Labour movement would not tolerate the division of Europe into ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ and allowing Germany freedom of action in the east. Chamberlain promised to take this into consideration.

I saw Corbin and Vansittart after the meeting. Corbin said somewhat cynically that a ‘general European settlement’ was rather like a square peg in a round hole and that the Anglo-French decision on the colonial question was essentially an irrelevance. First the British and French will collect material on this matter, then they will study it, then they will formulate points of view, then they will negotiate with other colonial powers, etc. Months will pass before things get moving, if they ever do. When I asked him what he understands by the phrase ‘general European settlement’, Vansittart answered that there is no sense racking one’s brains over its interpretation now, for this is all the music of the rather distant future and nobody knows whether a discussion of the ‘settlement’ will ever take place at all. When I mentioned The Times, Vansittart became highly agitated and exclaimed with manifest fury: ‘Fortunately, it’s not Geoffrey Dawson (the editor of The Times) who directs British foreign policy, but Anthony Eden!’

This is how this exciting month ended.

What are my conclusions? Here they are.

The ‘Cliveden Conspiracy’ has evidently suffered defeat. The attempt to change the course of British foreign policy failed. The policy remains as it was before: that is, weak, vacillating, zigzagging, retreating before the aggressor; but not, at least, a policy of alliance with the aggressor at the expense of third countries.

Chamberlain was taught a good lesson. Eden’s position has been greatly strengthened. The PM will clearly have to ‘straighten’ his line in the near future.

What are the causes of the failure? They are very complicated and diverse. The resultant force, in my view, was formed from the following basic elements: Hitler’s uncompromising formulation of the colonial question; growing fears in British ruling circles in connection with the conclusion of the tripartite ‘anti-communist pact’; the opposition of France and the Little Entente to a deal with Germany; the unfavourable response of the USA to Halifax’s visit; fear of spoiling relations with the USSR; the hostile attitude of the Labour and Liberal opposition to the idea of giving Berlin a free hand in the east; the resistance of the Francophile group in Conservative circles, especially of the Foreign Office with Eden and Vansittart at its head; and, finally, Eden’s personal popularity among both the ‘young’ Conservatives and the opposition parties, which understand that Eden is the best possible British foreign secretary in the present government. Consequently, the Germanophile attack was rebuffed.

So can we put our minds at rest about the future? We can’t, by any means. The Cliveden Set will undoubtedly continue its conspiracies and will resume its attack at the first opportunity. The line of attack is predictable: the Germanophiles will insist on rejecting a ‘general European settlement’ and on resolving its constituent problems one by one. Chamberlain could easily be tempted by the idea, as he has the psychology of a typical businessman. In addition, the Germanophiles have circulated an absurd theory: the appeasement of Europe is necessary to obtain freedom of action in the Far East. Any serious change in the correlation of forces in Spain and any new fascist adventure in some other part of Europe could exert a very strong influence on the conduct of the British government.

The final conclusion: we must be on the alert!

Maisky by no means shared the view that isolation was being imposed on the Soviet Union. He pleaded with Litvinov to seek compromise.

DVP, 1937, XX, docs. 380, 381 & 385, 26 & 27 Oct. 1937.

Whether intimidated by Stalin

Dullin, Men of Influence, pp. 150–1.

or, more likely, following his own convictions,

One might think, Litvinov lamented on reading the French newspapers, that ‘France has a mutual assistance pact, not with the Soviet Union, but with Germany or Italy’; quoted in Carley, ‘Caught in a cleft stick’, p. 169.

the defiant Litvinov waved away Maisky’s appeals, arguing that: ‘We sometimes prefer to be isolated rather than go along with the bad actions of others, and that is why isolation does not scare us.’ However, when Maisky resorted to the ‘isolation’ card to raise concern in London over the plans for a four-power pact, he was severely reprimanded for causing ‘unnecessary nervousness and distress’.

DVP, 1937, XX, doc. 390, 29 Oct. 1937. Maisky leaked information in the same vein to the press; see Time Magazine, 8 November 1937.

In fact, Maisky persevered in his efforts to seek collaboration with Eden, and even obtained Stalin’s personal approval. In December, he went out of his way to expose the futility of Halifax’s trip to Germany, referring to Eden’s opposition to Chamberlain’s policy and the frailty of the ‘Cliveden Set’ in exerting influence on the prime minister. His report to Narkomindel concluded that ‘all attempts by the Germanophiles to bring about a change in the course of English foreign policy have proved unsuccessful’. British policy, he insisted, could not be ‘characterized as a direct association with the aggressors’. He believed that Chamberlain, confronted by Eden, had finally understood that the road to a ‘four-power pact’ was far from smooth.

DVP, 1937, XX, doc. 427, 3 Dec. 1937.

Following the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the League of Nations, Maisky contemplated countermeasures to reinstate the League as the genuine framework for collective security. ‘The USSR,’ he explained to Noel-Baker

Philip John Noel-Baker, Labour MP, 1929–31 and 1936–70.

in an attempt to mobilize Labour’s support, ‘would co-operate to the full in any such joint action based on the Covenant and worked through the League. But it cannot take isolated action.’

Noel-Baker papers, NBKR 4/639, 23 Dec. 1937. At the Foreign Office, the head of the northern department, Laurence Collier, indeed gained the impression that Soviet policy might become ‘increasingly passive’, but hardly believed it would lead to ‘an open declaration of “isolationism” or a departure from the League of Nations’; Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, p. 232.

He further contested Potemkin’s judgement that the British were bent on discrediting the Soviet Union’s pacts with both France and Czechoslovakia. He referred to Chamberlain’s disclosure to Attlee that he harboured little hope of reaching an agreement with Germany, but regarded the move as a necessary breathing space in which to rearm Britain. However, it could hardly escape the Kremlin’s attention that the soothing words were only a response to Attlee’s warnings that the Labour movement objected to ‘a free hand’ being given to Hitler in Central and Eastern Europe.

DVP, 1937, XX, doc. 230, Potemkin to Maisky, 7 July 1937; RGASPI, Stalin papers, f.558 op.11 d.214 ll.115–16, Maisky to Narkomindel, 1 Dec. 1937. A similar comment was made by Eden to the French ambassador in London; DDF, 2 Serie, VII, Doc. 299.

]