I met Vansittart at the dinner in honour of King Leopold of Belgium in the palace. He takes a sour view of Halifax’s visit and is evidently displeased. He said that there had been no diplomatic preparation for Halifax’s visit and that no programme of talks had been established. V. does not expect any good to come of the trip and fears that Germany may regard it as a sign of weakness that Cabinet came to a decision about the visit four days after the signing of the Rome pact.

The protocol on Italy’s joining the anti-Comintern pact of 6 November 1937.

(1) Just over two weeks have passed since the tripartite anti-communist pact (Germany, Japan and Italy) was signed in Rome, and it is now possible to make a preliminary appraisal of the reaction elicited by the pact in Great Britain. This reaction is most certainly negative. With the exception of a small group of English fascists and associated elements, the anti-communist pact has found no supporters at all – either among Labour and the Liberals, or among the Conservatives. One only has to look through the editorials devoted to the pact in the most important British papers to convince oneself of this beyond any doubt. I hardly need quote the left-wing papers (Daily Herald, News Chronicle and Manchester Guardian), for their position was clear in advance. The response of the Conservative press is far more revealing. The Times, wishing to soften the impression produced by the pact in England, tries to belittle its importance in every way in its editorial of 9 November. However, even this paper, known for its tendency to conspire with the fascist powers, is forced to acknowledge that the pact ‘cannot guarantee peace’ and that ‘its future depends on the course of events’. The evaluation of the pact in the Daily Telegraph is far more striking.

The Daily Telegraph suggested that the overt hostility to Soviet Russia may assume the form of challenging not only the Bolsheviks, but also France, Britain and the United States, encroaching on their vital interests in the Baltic, the North and the Mediterranean seas and in the Pacific Ocean.

(2) Meetings and conversations with political and public figures corroborate the impression gained from reading the papers. I have already sent a telegram to you about my talks with Churchill and Lothian. Both are greatly alarmed and think that the pact is aimed not so much at the USSR as at England and France. I heard similar judgements from Elliot (secretary for the affairs of Scotland) and Lord De La Warr

Herbrand Edward Dundonald Brassey Sackville (9th Earl De La Warr), parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies, 1936–37; lord privy seal, 1937–38; president of the Board of Education, 1938–40; chairman of the National Labour Party, 1931–43.

(the lord privy seal). Inskip, minister for the coordination of defence, thinks the same. I sat next to him at the lord mayor’s banquet on 9 November, and in the course of our conversation, when we touched upon the anti-communist pact, he said with obvious envy: ‘Well, your geographical and strategic position is such that nobody can really hurt you. Our situation is quite different: our Empire is vulnerable from every direction.’ You will hear similar opinions and statements wherever you go here. One can confidently state, then, that the anti-communist façade of the pact has deluded fewer people in the British Isles than it did a year ago. All authoritative politicians, public figures and journalists have clearly understood that the anti-communist pact pursues purely practical, and not ‘ideological’, objectives: it is intended to formalize and organize the brotherhood of aggressors who aim to refashion the world, primarily at the expense of Britain and France, along with their appendages Holland and Belgium. Given all this, can one really be surprised that the anti-communist pact has been met with firm disapproval and even hostility in the British Isles? And can one be surprised that one of the by-products of this pact should be a growing hostility toward Ribbentrop, Hitler’s chief commissioner in the anti-communist crusade? This hostility has become so acute that it may be hard for Ribbentrop to remain in London for long. If he leaves, I’ll be sincerely sorry. I have written to you before that Ribbentrop, owing to his phenomenal tactlessness and his rare ability to rub the English up the wrong way, has been my best ally in the struggle against the growth of German influence in Great Britain over the past year.

(3) Although the reaction to the anti-communist pact in England has been sharply negative, this does not mean that the immediate practical conclusions drawn by the ruling elite of the Conservative Party follow a course close to that of our policy. I have informed you more than once about Chamberlain’s foreign-policy plans: he wants to reach an agreement at all costs with Germany and Italy over some form of ‘western security’ and then go to the polls in the role of ‘appeaser of Europe’ so as to consolidate the power of his party for the next five years. Eden is against this policy, finding it short-sighted and an affront to all the principles of the League of Nations. That discord exists between the PM and the foreign secretary about the general line of British policy is beyond doubt. However, Eden is not a sufficiently major, independent and resolute figure to be in a position to defeat Chamberlain’s line. He is supported by ‘young’ Conservatives such as Duff Cooper, Elliot and Stanley, who are promising but not yet very influential, and by a few National Liberals (like Hore-Belisha) and National Labourites (such as Lord De La Warr). Chamberlain, in turn, finds support among the more influential ‘old men’, like Halifax, Simon and Hoare. As regards the latter two, their political considerations are mixed with considerations of personal animosity towards Eden. As a result, Chamberlain’s line prevails, but its practical implementation is held back to a certain extent by the opposition provided by Eden’s group. I take the rumour that Chamberlain is going to replace Eden, possibly with Halifax, with a grain of salt.

However, that is precisely what happened a couple of months later.

It is hard to believe that Chamberlain would part with Eden in the capacity of foreign secretary, since Eden is very popular in England and is held in respect by the opposition. Besides, the London diplomatic corps treats him very well, and he has an excellent reputation among the French. To throw Eden out would be to deliver a blow to the Cabinet’s prestige and to make it appear utterly reactionary, which would increase the chances of the opposition. And what would be the point? In spite of his disagreements with the foreign secretary, the PM knows full well that Eden wants a career for himself and that, in the final analysis, it is possible to ‘get on’ with him. Eden is not made of iron, but rather of soft clay which yields easily to the fingers of a skilful artisan.

(4) Now, to turn back to Chamberlain’s plans, I am more and more convinced that he is ready to go a long way to implement them. He is ready, for instance, to sacrifice Spain. He is ready to accept German hegemony in Central and South-East Europe, provided the forms it takes are not too odious. It goes without saying that he would not move a finger to help the USSR in the event of an attack on it by the fascist bloc. In general, Chamberlain would be glad to pay a very high price in Europe for the organization of ‘western security’. Only two issues, it seems to me, might check Chamberlain’s retreat before the aggressors and provoke his retaliation: the colonies and England’s rule of the seas; but even in the matter of the colonies he would be prepared, it seems, to seek a compromise with Hitler. (I have not mentioned a direct attack on Great Britain (including the problem of Belgium and Holland) since the attitude of any British statesman to a menace like this is obvious enough.) Chamberlain’s position also affected the response of the British government to the anti-communist pact. Instead of taking a cool, expectant stance, if not a stance of active opposition, the Cabinet in London decided to send Halifax to Berlin merely four days after the signing of the Rome protocol. True, Vansittart assured me that the date of Halifax’s visit had been set long before, when nobody knew that the pact would be signed on 6 November, and that afterwards it would have been awkward to make changes to the plans. But of course this is a mere excuse. As far as I know, there was talk quite a while ago among Chamberlain’s entourage about Halifax going to Berlin for a hunting fair, but nothing was fixed and nothing was published before 6 November. It was after the signing of the Rome protocol that Chamberlain, contrary to Eden’s opinion and taking advantage of the latter’s absence from London (Eden was in Brussels), pushed the decision on Halifax’s visit through Cabinet. As you know from my telegram, this was done without notifying the French government and struck the general public like a bolt from the blue. Chamberlain was obviously in a hurry: the first news about Halifax’s visit appeared on 10 November. Simon made an official announcement about the government’s decision in parliament on the 12th, and the visit was scheduled for 17 November, but the date of departure was changed at the last moment, and Halifax actually left London on the afternoon of the 16th.

(5) I don’t think that Halifax had any far-reaching plans when he left for Berlin. Vansittart was probably telling the truth when he assured me there had been no serious diplomatic preparation for Halifax’s meeting with Hitler and no definite programme of talks had been envisaged. Judging by abundant evidence, Chamberlain’s aim was to size Hitler up, to clarify his present mood, and, should these signs prove at all encouraging (from the point of view of the prime minister), to pave the way for more official negotiations. As I write these lines, Halifax is still in Germany and it is too early to judge the outcome of his visit. It should be noted, however, that Chamberlain’s undertaking was somewhat damaged at the very beginning by a clever move on the part of Augur (Polyakov), a person well known to you. Now a diplomatic correspondent of Beaverbrook’s Evening Standard, he published a sensational report on the evening of 13 November claiming that Hitler would propose the following compromise during his talks with Halifax: Germany’s freedom of action in Central Europe by ‘peaceful means’ in exchange for Germany steering clear of the colonial question for the next ten years. Freedom of action ‘by peaceful means’ is to be understood as England’s agreement to a plebiscite in Austria and to Germany’s demand for autonomy for the Sudeten Germans. The Yorkshire Post corroborated Augur’s information on 15 November, and the Manchester Guardian on 17 November. The German press angrily rebuffed Augur’s article, stating categorically that Germany would not bargain about such issues as its fundamental right to possess colonies. As a result, ‘the atmosphere of the visit’ was somewhat poisoned and although the press of both countries hastened to affirm by the time Halifax arrived in Berlin that the incident was closed, there is no doubt that Augur’s sensational report nevertheless had an effect. What guided Augur in his conduct? His anti-German sentiments undoubtedly played a part, but I think that Mussolini’s gold played the most important role. Augur is currently in the pocket of the Italians, and they, for quite understandable reasons, would not mind spoiling the atmosphere of the Anglo-German attempt at rapprochement.

(6) How to explain the ‘general line’ of Chamberlain’s foreign policy, and in particular the sending of Halifax to Berlin in reply to the Rome protocol? There are two major points: (1) his fear of communism (Chamberlain is a prominent spokesperson for this tendency among the English bourgeoisie); and (2) his desire to buy time to conclude the British rearmament programme and for various political schemes and manoeuvres in the international arena. The second point has even more immediate significance than the first. Inskip, for one, told me in the conversation I mentioned that the preparation work on the programme took much more time than the government had envisaged. Actually, British industry has only just started full-scale implementation of the programme. According to Inskip’s estimate, the programme will be fully completed in the middle of 1940, but by the middle of 1939 will have already reached the stage at which England will be able to ‘breathe easily’. I’m inclined to think, therefore, that Chamberlain’s reasoning, in sending Halifax to Berlin, was as follows: ‘In the best scenario, we set in train negotiations that will give rise to the organization of western security; in the worst, having once again kindled the hope in Hitler’s heart that an agreement with England is possible, we will have gained a few extra months to make further progress in rearming – why not try it?’ It is difficult to say for sure at the moment which of the two alternatives will come true, but I would not set great store by the chances of a serious agreement between England and Germany in the near future. There are so many obstacles on the path to an agreement that, even in the best case, it would take a very considerable amount of time to clear them …