As soon as the Japanese launched an offensive near Beijing in mid-July, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow asked what we were planning to do. He was particularly interested to know whether we were ready to interpose separately or together with other powers. M.M. [Litvinov] answered that we would not interpose separately, but that if a joint démarche were proposed to us, we would discuss it.

The Chinese ambassadors in London, Paris

Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo), former premier and president of China; Chinese ambassador to France, 1936–41; to Great Britain, 1941–46.

and Washington

Shi Zhaoji (Dr Sao-ke Alfred Sze), first Chinese ambassador to the United States, 1933–37.

took similar steps. In addition, Nanjing sent a memorandum regarding the conflict to the members of the Nine-Power Pact.

The English became very concerned. Eden told me (on 17 and 27 July) that the British government was greatly alarmed and wanted to organize a joint London–Paris–Washington démarche in Tokyo, insisting on peaceful settlement of the conflict. But the Americans refused to take part in a joint démarche and were only prepared to take ‘parallel’ actions with Great Britain – a far weaker alternative. Consequently, Britain and France made identical statements in Tokyo and Nanjing calling for the cessation of arms and offering their mediation. The USA made an identical démarche separately. But Eden has little faith in the effectiveness of such actions. He has good grounds for his scepticism.

Chinese Minister of Finance Kong,

Kong Xiangxi (Hsiang-his K’ung), Chinese minister of finance, 1933–44; governor of the Bank of China, 1933–45.

who recently arrived in England from the USA, visited me on 23 July, accompanied by Guo Taiqi. Kong, a thickset vigorous man of about 50 with sharp gestures and rough manners, lost no time in demanding our aid to China, stressing rather clumsily that the seizure of Beijing by the Japanese would be merely a prelude to an attack on the USSR. In concrete terms, he suggested that we organize a military demonstration on the Manchurian border. Of course I refrained from giving Kong any reassurances along the lines he had in mind. Kong told me, among other things, that he had met Roosevelt not long ago and that the latter favoured a Pacific pact but considered a non-aggression pact insufficient (what are platonic promises worth today?) and wanted something more effective, although he did not refer to a pact of mutual assistance as such. But – and this is very important – Roosevelt does not consider it possible to engage seriously with the issue of the pact until the US naval programme is fulfilled! Kong also said that in Germany, before his visit to the USA, he spoke with the leaders of the regime and found Göring

Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Nazi president of the Reichstag in 1932; Prussian minister of the interior, 1933–34; founder and head of the Gestapo, 1933–36; Reichsminister for air and commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, 1933–45.

to be utterly anti-Soviet and Schacht, on the contrary, to be a ‘Sovietophile’, while Hitler, allegedly as the result of a two-hour talk with Kong, began to yield to the thought that the normalization of relations between Germany and the USSR was perhaps possible.

Guo Taiqi invited my wife and me to lunch on 27 July, after which Kong, Guo and Gu Weijun, who had come from Paris, took me to an adjoining room and Kong again began to impress upon me rather clumsily that no matter how Britain and the USA conducted themselves, China and the USSR must come out in a united front against Japanese aggression, since they are the countries most threatened by the militarists of Tokyo. As I was very unforthcoming on the subject, Kong hastened to move onto practical matters. He no longer insisted on a military demonstration on the Manchurian border and only raised the question of the supply of arms to China from the USSR. I promised to communicate with Moscow on this matter.

Guo Taiqi visited me today. He told me that he had seen Eden twice and had insisted on the USSR being brought into a joint action in the Far East. Eden declined his request, however, arguing that this would only have complicated the situation. Guo is of the impression that Eden is simply afraid of Germany and Italy. In this connection he told me that the German and Italian ambassadors in Moscow have notified the Chinese ambassador in Moscow that as long as the USSR stands aside from the conflict between Japan and China, Rome and Berlin will occupy a neutral position. But if the USSR is drawn into the settlement of the Far Eastern conflict, Germany and Italy will support Japan.

Guo also informed me that Germany is continuing to send arms to China on the strength of the credit of 100 million marks given to Kong and in exchange for Chinese raw materials. Meanwhile, Italy has responded favourably to the recent Chinese request for certain types of weapons and ammunition. Such is the force of the contradictions rending the capitalist world today! But I am inclined to think that if the conflagration in the Far East intensifies, Rome and Berlin will finally show their ideological colours.

One more detail, but from a different sphere. According to Guo, the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, is trying to talk Dodd,

William Edward Dodd, American ambassador in Germany, 1933–37.

the American ambassador in Germany, into raising a joint Anglo-American loan for Hitler. Also, in his talks with the Nazi leaders, he expressed the opinion that Britain would easily be reconciled to the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Germany on ‘federal terms’. Son of a bitch!