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Table of Contents
The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1
  • 27 October 1937
  • 12 July
  • 18 July
  • 9 August
  • 30 October
  • 31 October
  • 1 November
  • 4 November
  • 5 November
  • 6 November
  • 7 November
  • 9 November
  • 10 November
  • 12 November
  • 15 November
  • 16 November
  • 17 November
  • 18 November
  • 23 November
  • 24 November
  • 25 November
  • 27 November
  • 28 November
  • 29 November
  • 1 December
  • 5 December
  • 6 December
  • 11 December
  • 13 December
  • 16 December
  • 17 December
  • 18 December
  • 19 December
  • 20 December
  • 24 December
  • 27 December
  • 31 December
  • 8 January
  • 9 January
  • 15 January
  • 18 January
  • 25 January
  • 26 January
  • 28 January
  • 1 February
  • 4 February
  • 6 February
  • 10 February
  • 12 February
  • 14 February
  • 15 February
  • 20 February
  • 21 February
  • 22 February
  • 28 February
  • 1 March (1)
  • 1 March (2)
  • 2 March
  • 4 March
  • 5 March
  • 6 March
  • 7 March
  • 8 March
  • 9 March
  • 11 March
  • 12 March
  • 13 March
  • 14 March
  • 15 March
  • 16 March
  • 17 March
  • 18 March
  • 19 March
  • 20 March
  • 21 March
  • 22 March
  • 23 March
  • 3 June
  • 5 June
  • 6 June
  • 12 June
  • 15 June
  • 16 June
  • 17 June
  • 19 June
  • 27 June
  • 2 July
  • 8 July
  • 9 July
  • 7 September
  • 4 November
  • 6 November
  • 8 November
  • 13 November
  • 14 November
  • 15 November
  • 14 December
  • 16 December
  • 20 January
  • 21 January
  • 26 January
  • 28 January
  • 29 January
  • 30 January
  • 31 January
  • 10 February
  • 8 March
  • 9 March
  • 10 March
  • 28 March
  • 2 April
  • 3 April
  • 8 April
  • 3 May
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  • 22 May
  • 26 May
  • 28 May
  • 12 July
  • 1 December
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  • 16 January
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  • 17 April
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  • 24 May
  • 9 June
  • 15 June
  • 16 June
  • 28 June
  • 1 July
  • 27 July
  • 29 July
  • 29 July
  • 1 August
  • 10 August
  • 23 August
  • 25 August
  • 12 September
  • 14 September
  • 19 September
  • 27 October
  • 6 November
  • 16 November
  • 17 November
  • 18 November
  • 24 November
  • 1 December
  • 4 December
  • 12 December
  • 14 December
  • 4 January
  • 15 January
  • 20 January
  • 25 January
  • 27 January
  • 28 January
  • 7 February
  • 11 February
  • 25 February
  • 1 March
  • 8 March
  • 11 March
  • 22 March
  • 23 March
  • 29 March
  • 31 March
  • 12 April
  • 14 April
  • 10 May
  • 4 August
  • 6 August
  • 7 August
  • 10 August
  • 11 August
  • 15 August
  • 16 August
  • 17 August
  • 20 August
  • 24 August
  • 26 August
  • 27 August
  • 28 August
  • 29 August
  • 30 August
  • 31 August
  • 1 September
  • 2 September
  • 3 September
  • 4 September
  • 5 September
  • 7 September
  • 8 September
  • 11 September
  • PS 1 October
  • 12 September
  • 13 September
  • 14 September
  • 15 September
  • 16 September
  • 18 September
  • 19 September
  • 20 September
  • 21 September
  • 22 September
  • 23 September
  • 24 September
  • 25 September
  • 26 September
  • 27 September
  • 28 September
  • 29 September
  • 30 September
  • 1 October
  • 6 October
  • 11 October
  • 13 October
  • 15 October
  • 17 October
  • 19 October
  • 20 October
  • 22 October
  • 25 October
  • 26 October
  • 27 October
  • 28 October
  • 30 October
  • 31 October
  • 1 November
  • 3 November
  • 9 November
  • 15 November
  • 16 November
  • 17 November
  • 25 November
  • 27 November
  • 7 December
  • 11 December
  • 13 December
  • 18 December
  • 19 December
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© 2025
29 July
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By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

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29 July
Conversation with Chamberlain
(1) Following the English custom, I had long been planning to pay an official visit to the new PM. Other ambassadors in London had the same intentions. Chamberlain, however, postponed the visits week after week until the end of the parliamentary session. To tie up loose ends before leaving for holidays, the PM began to receive representatives of the great powers one after the other: the American, Bingham, the Italian, Grandi, and others. He received me in his


Page 214

office in the House of Commons on 29 July. Knowing that he was very busy, I decided not to waste time and to take the bull by the horns. I already had information before visiting Chamberlain that the conclusion of a four-power pact and especially the improvement of relations between Britain and Germany represented the general line of his foreign policy. I wanted to check whether this was true and asked him straightaway: which in his view are the best methods to achieve the ‘appeasement of Europe’?
(2) Chamberlain, who clearly hadn’t been expecting a question of this sort, hesitated and looked at me either in surprise or embarrassment. Then he began his reply, articulating his words slowly and occasionally faltering. ‘I cannot suggest a shortcut to achieving this result. The appeasement of Europe is a complicated and lengthy business. It demands great patience. Any means and any methods that might prove effective are good. Any available opportunity should be exploited.’ The PM paused for a moment, pondered, and continued: ‘I think that a successful settlement of the Spanish question could be the first direct step towards the appeasement of Europe. Spain is now the focus of attention. Events there generate many complications and conflicts in Europe. If the Spanish war does not end soon or is not at least fully localized, we can expect more serious perturbations in Europe in the near future. Spain needs to be dealt with – this is a prerequisite for the appeasement of Europe.’ I asked Chamberlain what he meant by the expression, ‘the settlement of the Spanish question’. Chamberlain paused again, pondered, and replied: ‘In my view, to settle the Spanish question means to turn the Spanish struggle into one that is purely Spanish. We hope we shall eventually be able to achieve this – with your help, may I assume?’ I accepted the challenge and said that the same idea prevails in the Soviet government’s policy towards Spain. But how is this goal to be achieved? It is an open secret that a large Italian army and numerous detachments of German specialists – pilots, artillerymen, tank men and others – are fighting on Franco’s side. Does Chamberlain think that the Italians and the Germans are really ready to withdraw their so-called ‘volunteers’ from Spain? I doubt it. The work carried out in the Non-Intervention Committee over 11 months makes me sceptical. Meanwhile, it is the evacuation of ‘volunteers’ that is currently at the heart of the entire problem of non-intervention today.
(3) Chamberlain did not answer at once. He first looked out the window, then at the ceiling, before beginning slowly: ‘There is no doubt that Mussolini is very keen to see a fascist Spain. Just two days ago, Grandi communicated a personal message to me from Mussolini, assuring me that Italy had no territorial ambitions in respect of Spain, while also arguing that Franco has to win. In Mussolini’s opinion, Franco’s victory is needed to avoid Spain turning into a “Bolshevik state”. If Franco fails, the triumph of communism in Spain is, he says, inevitable, and that is something Italy cannot accept. I don’t agree


Page 215

with Mussolini’s appraisal. I don’t think that communists can win in Spain now, whatever the conditions. But this is what Mussolini thinks. Nevertheless, I am not too despondent. I don’t think that the head of the Italian state has said his last word. We must act with restraint and with patience. He will retreat from his present positions and then it will be possible to persuade him to withdraw the Italian legionaries from Spain.’ I said: ‘If only you were right. My government would be only too glad if your forecast came true. Unfortunately, I am yet to see any encouraging signs in this direction.’ Chamberlain stuck to his guns, however, and repeated that we must be restrained and patient.
(4) Then the PM inquired what we think about the Spanish conflict and what position the USSR holds in the matter. I provided the requisite explanations and underlined our desire to eliminate intervention and turn the Spanish conflict into a purely Spanish affair. True to our common principles, we, too, are striving to secure ‘the right to national self-determination’ for the Spanish people. We do not aim to establish a communist or any other system in Spain. The Spanish people themselves should decide on their form of government. But we are trying, as best as we can, to prevent any kind of foreign intervention in Spain’s domestic affairs. In our struggle to secure Spain’s right to decide its fate independently, we have always tried to coordinate our actions with those of Britain and France. We happened to disagree on some practical matters relating to the Spanish problem over the past 11 months, and we may have disagreements in future. I hope, however, that the differences will not be exaggerated on both sides and that they will not hinder the joint efforts of the USSR and Great Britain in the cause of the strengthening of peace. Chamberlain listened to my account with great attention and evident sympathy, but afterwards it immediately became clear that he had understood it in his own way. The PM said: ‘Mussolini wants to establish a fascist state in Spain, and you do not want this to happen. We are facing two extremes. Britain tries to hold an intermediate position between you and Mussolini.’ I objected that he was giving a false picture of the actual state of affairs. In fact, Mussolini wants to establish a very definite regime in Spain – a fascist one – while the USSR is not striving to establish some particular regime there, whether socialist, communist or other. The USSR wishes only that all other powers should leave Spain alone and give it the opportunity to establish independently such a regime as is desired by the popular masses of Spain. There is a very great difference between the positions of Italy and the USSR. At this point Chamberlain had to acknowledge that there was indeed a difference, and that it was a serious difference. He expressed approval of our position and added that in principle it was very close to that of Great Britain. ‘Unfortunately,’ Chamberlain added, ‘I fear that we shall not be able to resolve the Spanish problem very soon, and without that it is difficult to conceive of the possibility of any serious measures towards the real appeasement of Europe.’


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(5) The PM paused again and turned to another subject:
I am constantly troubled by one particular thought: today’s Europe is full of fear and suspicion. Countries and states do not trust each other. As soon as one power begins to arm, another instantly begins to suspect that these arms are set against it and also starts to arm to parry the real or imaginary threat. One thing leads to another, and as a result we are all spending a colossal amount of money unproductively on weapons of death and destruction – money that could be spent with far greater benefit on improving the lot of broad strata of the population. In saying this, I do not mean to reproach your country – we are arming, too, after all. I firmly believe that your country does not want war and is not a threat to its neighbours, and we would like to cooperate with you in the task of defending the world. Your country faces great problems to do with internal restructuring and the exploitation of its natural resources. I’ve heard and read a little about your magnificent country, and I know that its natural riches are truly immeasurable. Domestic work will occupy you for a good number of years and decades, and it would of course be disadvantageous and undesirable for you to interrupt its peaceful course because of external complications. But other countries in the world have a different attitude. Take Germany, for instance. The Germans keep going on about ‘have’ and ‘have not’ states. I don’t know which category they place you in, but they refer Great Britain to the ‘have’ category and themselves to the ‘have not’. There is a great deal of propaganda about this in Germany and very dangerous passions are being stoked. As a result, fears and tension are on the rise in Europe. This must be stopped. I understand that this cannot be achieved instantly. Years and years will be needed to appease Europe. But at least the first step could be taken towards creating a more benevolent atmosphere in our part of the globe, could it not?
I asked Chamberlain what exactly he had in mind. The PM answered:
Alongside the Spanish question, there is a second, very important and urgent question – the German one. I consider it very important to make the Germans move from general phrases about the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, the true meaning of which nobody understands, to a practical and business-like discussion of their wishes. If we could bring the Germans to the negotiating table and, with pencil in hand, run through all their complaints, claims and wishes, this would greatly help clear the air, or at least clarify the current situation. We would then know what the


Page 217

Germans wanted and we would also know whether it would be possible to satisfy their demands. If it were possible, we would go as far as we could to meet them; if not, we would take other decisions. This, it seems to me, is what the current moment most urgently demands. Germany, of course, is not Europe’s only problem, but she is the most important. I would like the European powers to take resolute and consistent strides towards resolving this problem, without being distracted by questions of secondary importance and without being held back by trivialities. It is clear that the appeasement of Europe does not depend solely on the solving of the German problem. There are other matters that need to be settled. We should aim for a general agreement in Europe – that is our goal, but we must in any case begin by resolving the German problem.
In reply, I briefly outlined my doubts concerning the effectiveness of this route to the ‘appeasement of Europe’ charted by Chamberlain. The PM was obviously not too happy about this, but as he did not want to enter into further argument, he hastened to say that we were discussing a very complicated issue and that naturally there could be entirely honest differences of opinion. Chamberlain said that in any event he was ready to listen to the views of those who thought differently.
(6) That was the end of the business part of our conversation. The rest was pure protocol and not worth recording. The conversation left me with the general impression that Chamberlain is seriously entertaining the idea of a four-power pact and of organizing western security, and is prepared to make considerable concessions to Germany and Italy in order to attain his goal. However, if it were to transpire in the course of events that an agreement with those two countries was impossible or that the price England had to pay for the agreement was unacceptable, he would take a far firmer stand towards the fascist powers than was taken by Baldwin.
Repeated in DVP, 1937, XX, doc. 269. In a typical retrospective attempt to prove that the Munich Agreement had been foreordained, Maisky presented a crude picture (as he did throughout his memoirs). Writing to The Times, 8 June 1971, he did quote Chamberlain as saying ‘Oh, if we could sit down with Hitler at the same table with pencils in our hands and go over all the differences between us, I am sure that the atmosphere would clear up immensely!’ This was a deliberate retrospective distortion, which is also evident in Maisky, The Munich Drama (Moscow, 1972), p. 13, and in Who Helped Hitler?, pp. 68–9. As is obvious from the conclusion of the talk, Maisky saw fit to stress the qualifying and, as it turned out, misleading comments made by Chamberlain that failure to reach an agreement would lead him to seek an alternative solution. A few months later, however, Maisky grasped, as he told the Webbs, that ‘that hard grained but frank reactionary’ was set on a renewal of the four-power pact for peace in the west, while the Soviet Union ‘was to be left outside to mind her own business’; Webb, diary, 27 Oct. 1937, p. 6393.
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Document Title29 July
AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)
RecipientN/A
RepositoryN/A
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DescriptionN/A
Date1937 Jul 29
AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1
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