(1) Eden invited me to come to see him in the House of Commons. He told me that he was about to take a three-week vacation (but without leaving the country). Lord Halifax would act for him while he was absent. Eden wanted to discuss two issues with me: (1) the Far East and (2) Spain.

(2) Eden began with the Far East. Just this morning he received alarming news from Beijing.

An incident between Japanese and Chinese troops, provoked by Japan on 7 July 1937, served as a pretext for the Japanese to mount a major offensive against China.

His initial optimism, it seems, has proved unjustified. The events in China are taking a very serious turn and the Japanese may enter Beijing any day now. This would be highly undesirable, as there are many British citizens and various British agencies in Beijing. Besides, the British have major interests linked to the regions of Beijing and Tianjin. (All this is highly regrettable.) The Guandong Army rather than Tokyo is the driving force of recent events. But this doesn’t change the essence of the matter. In the morning, immediately after receiving the message from Beijing, Eden sent a telegram to Tokyo asking it to be brought to the attention of the Japanese government once again that Britain was following events in northern China with great concern and that it was firmly of the hope that war between Japan and China would be prevented. But it is hard to say how effective this démarche will prove.

(3) Then Eden asked for our evaluation of the events in China. I replied that their true nature was hardly in doubt any longer. Japan is trying to repeat the ‘Manchurian incident’ that happened six years ago. In other words, Japan is aiming to establish a second Manzhouguo in northern China. Her technique is identical to that employed in 1931. In her attempts to expand, Japan, like any aggressor, will be guided primarily by empirical, opportunistic considerations. She will probe how far she can go with impunity. Therefore the success or failure of the new Japanese venture will depend greatly on two factors: (1) the strength of Chinese resistance and (2) the behaviour of the great powers with interests in the Far East. Eden agreed that our analysis of the situation was more than credible, but added that China today was no longer the China of 1931 and that this time Japan will meet with much stiffer resistance. Jiang Jieshi

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), former commander-in-chief of the army of the Chinese Revolutionary National Party (Guomindang); president of China, 1928–38 and 1943–49.

cannot retreat beyond a certain limit, and in Eden’s opinion the limit has been reached. So there is every reason to expect that major military actions may break out in the Far East soon.

(4) I asked Eden how other great powers planned to react to this prospect. Eden shrugged his shoulders and said: ‘I don’t know.’ He told me that he had tried twice to draw the USA into a united front of three powers (Britain, the United States and France) against Japanese aggression, but without success. The Americans stubbornly reject this idea. They are willing to engage only in ‘parallel action’. Unfortunately, ‘parallel action’ is far weaker than joint action. The USA has even undertaken a sort of ‘parallel action’ in Tokyo. The British and French governments have also made declarations to the Japanese government with the aim of preventing the worst scenario. But all this is not enough. Without the USA, Britain can do little more than make platonic démarches to the Japanese government.

(5) Then Eden asked me casually what sort of démarche was made by the Chinese ambassador

Jiang Tingfu (Ts’ang Ting-fu), Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936–38.

in Moscow. Has the Nanjing government made any proposals to us? He had heard something about this from the Chinese ambassador in London, but he would be very grateful if I could supply some details. I replied that the Chinese ambassador in Moscow had indeed had a talk with Comrade Litvinov and had asked him about the Soviet attitude towards a possible ‘joint action’ by the powers connected with the Far East. Comrade Litvinov replied to this: If a proposal was put to the Soviet government about a joint action, it would discuss it. Eden listened to this information with great attention and hastened to say that he found it very interesting. He would not go any further, however (the Chinese ambassador in London, Guo Taiqi, later told me that Eden had been careful not to draw the USSR into a joint démarche so as not to provoke irritation in Germany and Italy). Then Eden asked me to keep in touch with Cadogan, the undersecretary for Far Eastern affairs, during his absence from London.

(6) Then Eden moved on to Spain. Saying that he in no way wanted to thrust his advice on the USSR, Eden nevertheless announced that he would like to set out his views concerning the last session of the Subcommittee (26 July). During this session, I had stated categorically that the Soviet government found it impossible to recognize Franco’s belligerent rights. Eden understands our motives perfectly well, as he does the fact that all non-intervention now hangs by a thread. Plymouth, for one, fell into deep pessimism after yesterday’s session and scarcely seems to believe that any agreement is possible. The breakdown of non-intervention is highly probable. Eden finds, however, that it would be better from all points of view for the breakdown to happen as a result of Italy’s and Germany’s refusal to evacuate the ‘volunteers’, rather than as a result of a flat refusal by the USSR to grant belligerent rights to General Franco. Indeed, Ribbentrop and Grandi declared yesterday that they were ready in principle to discuss the evacuation of ‘volunteers’. We declared that we could not, as a matter of principle, recognize Franco’s belligerent rights. If non-intervention collapses, it is we who will be blamed, not the Germans and the Italians, although Eden is not at all sure that the Germans and the Italians are really ready to withdraw their ‘volunteers’ from Spain. He does not quite understand why we should wish to make things easy for Italy and Germany. Would not it be better for us, the British and the French if the Soviet government agreed to second the British formula? And if we are not too pleased with the British formula, why could we not at least say: evacuate all volunteers first and then we shall see? If the Italians and the Germans, as we firmly believe, are not going to remove their troops from Spain anyway, then what are we risking? The matter won’t progress as far as the issue of belligerent rights. On the other hand, if the issue of ‘volunteers’ falls through, responsibility for this will lie not with the USSR, but with Germany and Italy, who are in fact to blame for the present difficulties.

(7) Eden spoke with his usual air of great sincerity, but his zealous concern for our good name seemed somewhat suspicious to me. So I began to argue vigorously. I unfolded our principled stand on the matter of belligerent rights and explained our unwillingness to grant such rights to Franco. I stressed that for the past ten months we have constantly been trying to coordinate our actions on non-intervention with those of Britain and France. This was not always easy for us, but we were ready to make certain sacrifices both in view of the Spanish situation and out of general political considerations. But everything has its limit, and in this case the Soviet government has approached a boundary it cannot cross. Eden listened to me very attentively and said that he understood our position perfectly well, but asked me all the same to convey the content of our conversation to Comrade Litvinov. I promised to do that.

(8) While making my case to Eden, I mentioned that 100,000 foreigners at the minimum are fighting on Franco’s side, including up to 80,000 Italians and 10–15,000 Germans, plus no fewer than 30–40,000 Moroccans. Eden affected surprise at these figures. To his knowledge, there were 50,000 Italians in early March, of which 10–15,000 have been sent home wounded or ill. Therefore, according to Eden’s estimates, the number of Italians does not currently exceed 35–40,000. This is not a decisive sum for Franco, and Eden reasons that if the Italians were pressed a little, they might agree to withdraw the ‘volunteers’. In reply, I made some ironic remarks about the sources of his information. Are not these the same sources that have failed to establish the calibre of the guns currently threatening Gibraltar? (The day before, Churchill, Lloyd George and others had criticized Eden sharply in connection with the fact that the Germans and Italians had brought 12-inch batteries up close to Gibraltar, dominating both the fortress and the Strait. In reply to their charges, Lord Cranborne asserted that the said batteries were not dangerous for Gibraltar, and that the exact calibre of the weapons was not known.) I repeated more than once that I had supplied the minimum figures and that I had heard other estimates, according to which the number of ‘volunteers’ on Franco’s side was much greater. Eden seemed rather confused and said he would ask for his figures to be checked once again for accuracy. He added at the end: ‘If your figures are correct, much of what has been unclear will become clear to me. In that case I agree with you that the Italians and the Germans will certainly not withdraw their “volunteers” from Spain.’

(9) Having concluded our conversation about the last meeting of the subcommittee, I, in turn, asked Eden what Britain would do if non-intervention collapsed. Eden hesitated at first, but regained his composure and answered that in this case, as he saw it (he underlined that it was his personal opinion), the British government would have three choices. (1) To maintain the policy of non-intervention irrespective of what other countries might do. This would mean that Britain would not sell arms either to the Spanish government or to Franco. This choice would have its pros and cons. Its advantage would be that it would draw England closer to the United States in the matter of arms exports, and this would go down very well in the country. Its downside would be disagreement with France, and he, Eden, wishes least of all to jeopardize the present excellent relations between London and Paris. He values these relations very highly and considers them a priority. Furthermore, this choice would certainly entail internal difficulties for the government, too, since the prolongation of non-intervention would be better for Franco than for the Spanish government. Therefore, the opposition’s attacks would continue and possibly intensify. (2) The British government restores free trade in arms and sells them solely to the Spanish government as the legitimate government in Spain. The opposition would be happy, but the Conservatives would not accept this, as in this case the British navy would have to use convoys to protect British ships heading for Republican ports. Such actions would look very much like intervention on the side of the Spanish government. (3) The British government resumes free trade in arms and sells them to both sides. Both sides are granted belligerent rights.

Eden did not say it in so many words, but it was evident from his intonation, gestures and so on, that he found the third option the most practical and desirable. I asked Eden why it was essential to tie the resumption of free trade in arms with the granting of belligerent rights to the Spanish government and the insurgents. Eden referred to various historical precedents, but it was clear that the main reason lay elsewhere. The main reason was that the British government did not want to make a move that would favour Valencia alone. Should circumstances force the government to permit arms exports to the Republicans, Franco must be compensated for this with belligerent rights. Eden tried to sweeten the pill by arguing that eventually the third choice would be good for the Spanish government: Franco has no money and is not in a position to buy arms from England, but the Spanish government has money and it can buy what it needs. True, having obtained belligerent rights, Franco could press Valencia at sea more than he can now, but this would not be of great significance because, with the collapse of non-intervention, the Franco-Spanish border would be open and the delivery of arms to the Republicans would come from or through France.

On 5 June, Maisky, who had been laid low by a severe bout of malaria, belatedly congratulated Chamberlain, concluding with the unheeded advice that ‘the quality of Anglo-Soviet relations would profoundly affect the international situation as a whole and can influence decisively the issue of peace or war in Europe’.

RAN f.1702 op.4 d.1168 l.2.

It was, however, only on 29 July that Maisky first met Chamberlain in person. The contrast between Chamberlain’s attitude to the Italian ambassador, Grandi, and Maisky – both of whom he met on the same day – set out in a letter to his sister, is most telling: ‘My interview with Grandi seems to have made a very good impression in Italy and I see they have now “revealed” that I sent a personal letter to Mussolini … My interview with Maisky was at his request and no doubt was intended by him to be a counter demonstration. But he hadn’t really anything to say.’

R. Self, The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Downing Street Years, 1934–40 (London, 2005), IV, p. 264. Thirty years of revisionism introduced the notion of economic and military constraints as a justification for Chamberlain’s appeasement, but overlooked his ideological bias concerning Russia. Recently, however, many of the early charges against Chamberlain in what turned out to be the iconic Guilty Men, published in 1940 under the pseudonym of ‘Cato’, have been resurrected. Sidney Aster, who has examined the year 1939 in depth using Chamberlain’s papers, has launched a devastating criticism of Chamberlain’s ‘misplaced trust, unwarranted optimism and erroneous judgements’. Chamberlain showed, he argues, ‘a blind conviction that there was no alternative to the policy he had decided upon’; quoted in D. Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London, 2001), p. 184. His analysis dovetails with Margesson’s observation in 1939 that ‘Chamberlain had never met anybody in Birmingham who in the least resembled Adolf Hitler. He had always found that people he had met … were reasonable and honest and it had always proved possible, with a certain amount of give and take, to make a deal with them that should prove satisfactory to both sides … He has as little chance in a Europe dominated by Stalin and Hitler as Little Lord

Page 425

Fauntleroy would have of concluding a satisfactory deal with Al Capone’; Margesson papers, MRGN, 1/5.

]