The first period, extending roughly over the second half of 1936, was marked by earnest attempts by both parties to bring relations back to normal. There were clear reasons for this. Italy was interested in the ‘recognition’ of its African conquests by Great Britain, in securing the City’s financial aid (a hope it still retains), and in concluding an agreement with Great Britain on the restriction of the latter’s armed forces in the Mediterranean. London, in its turn, was interested in gaining time for rearmament, relieving its position in the Mediterranean, driving a wedge into the emerging German–Italian axis and, finally, exerting some pressure on Italy with respect to the Spanish question.

As a result, the Italian press changed its tone considerably towards Great Britain after the Abyssinian war, while Mussolini found it possible to declare solemnly on 18 June 1936 that ‘no contentious issues remain between Italy and Great Britain’. Italian policy stuck to that line throughout the second half of last year, including Grandi’s conduct in the Non-Intervention Committee. He was always sharp and quick-tempered towards the USSR, but mild and considerate towards England.

Simultaneously, British government circles energetically promoted a policy of appeasement with respect to Italy (in so far as the circumstances, and especially the opposition’s hostility to Mussolini, permitted them). The British government encountered many internal difficulties, but Vansittart was very active, while the traditional English habit of accepting faits accomplis facilitated the Cabinet’s move toward the ‘normalization’ of relations.

The two sides’ tendencies and efforts resulted in a gentlemen’s agreement signed on 2 January 1937.

However, the next three months, which may be regarded as the second period, brought bitter disappointment to the supporters of Anglo-Italian rapprochement. There were several reasons for this. First, concurrently with the signing of the gentlemen’s agreement, the Italians disembarked their ‘volunteer corps’ in Cadiz, whose strength reached 80–100 thousand by the end of March. Although the agreement did not mention the war in Spain directly, the Italian initiative was perceived in England as a swindle. That immediately undermined the precarious basis for ‘normalization’. Second, an attempt on the life of General Graziani

Rodolfo Graziani (marquess di Neghelli), Italian viceroy of Ethiopia, 1936–37, chief of staff of the Italian armed forces, 1939; governor of Libya, 1940.

was made in Addis Ababa on 19 February. Driven by fear and the desire for revenge, the Italians slaughtered as many as 6,000 civilians, regardless of sex or age. This prompted a furious anti-Italian campaign in England, joined even by the archbishop of Canterbury (his speech of 16 March). Third, in response to the British campaign the Italians resumed their anti-British campaign in the east, and Grandi refused to discuss the withdrawal of ‘volunteers’ from Spain – an issue to which the British government attached great importance – at a meeting of a subcommittee of the Non-Intervention Committee held on 23 March. At the same time, Mussolini made a theatrical trip to Libya, where he proclaimed himself ‘defender of Islam’ and shook his fist at the British Empire. Fourth, the British government reacted to the Italians’ actions by inviting the Ethiopian emperor to the forthcoming coronation; Italy responded by refusing to send its own delegation.

Fifth, the British press reacted vociferously and rapturously to the Italians’ defeat at Guadalajara.

The Republican army defeated the Italian and Nationalist forces which were seeking to encircle Madrid on 23 March.

Some newspapers even wrote that ‘Basque fisherwomen’ were throwing Italian soldiers (all armed to the teeth) out of the windows of their houses. This infuriated the Italian government and the Italian press. Sixth, Mussolini perceived the English rearmament programme, announced in March, as an arrow aimed at Italy, and quite lost his head.

In the final analysis, Anglo-Italian relations are so strained now that merely to speak of ‘normalization’ would be a joke in bad taste. In the past month, the Italian government protested on four occasions to the British government in connection with the conduct of the British press.

On the whole, considering Britain’s relations with Germany and Italy, current British foreign policy is closer to our line than ever before. But will this last long? It’s difficult to say. Of course, Eden is prepared to go even further in this direction, but will he have the chance to do so? I’m not sure. I’m not even sure that Eden will be able to retain his present position for long, since Baldwin and Chamberlain are hardly allies in the resolute struggle against fascism and aggression.