The essence of the matter was, of course, quite different. Yoshida had evidently come to provide some reassurance about the impact of the German–Japanese pact and, while he was about it, to demonstrate that he did not belong to the aggressive school of Japanese political thought. Certainly, Y. was very candid. He was sharply critical of the actions taken by the army and navy of his country and said that the Japanese people had to pay heavily for their ‘stupidities’. By way of an example, Y. cited Japan’s refusal to sign the agreement on the limitation of naval armament. He referred to the German–Japanese pact as another example. ‘I can only hope,’ the Japanese ambassador added, ‘that this will be the last stupidity committed by my government.’ In saying that, he hoped to gain my assurance that Japan would not have to pay too high a price for the German–Japanese pact. Naturally, I refrained from reassuring Y.; on the contrary, I gave him a bit of a fright.

Y. expressed his conviction that an excessively inflated budget and the drastically increased tax burden would quickly sober up Japan’s leading circles, and that they would have to switch to a more reasonable foreign policy. I replied: ‘Would that you were right! Let’s wait and see. So far I see no signs of any sobering up.’

Y. also told me that trade complications between Japan and the British colonies were becoming increasingly aggravated, that the trade agreement with India was expected to be extended, and that economic talks between London and Tokyo were possible in the near future. Y. also intimated that the Japanese–Chinese talks could be resumed soon.