Today the mood was vague and alarmed. Lord Lothian’s Germanophilia has faded, owing especially to Hitler’s colonial demands. ‘I emphatically warned my German friends against raising this issue, for it can sow discord between Germany and England, but they just will not listen,’ he said. L. criticized the German–Japanese pact, and the Franco-Soviet pact, too, saying that the latter had led to the former. L. is very afraid that Italy may join the German–Japanese pact. Then the world will split into two camps and, forced to choose, England will have no choice but to enter into alliance with France and the USSR (perhaps the USA will join in, too, if and when they recover from isolationism). Eventually, the history of 1914 may be repeated, and a new world war will become inevitable. L. clings to the hope that peace can be preserved for another three or four years; Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese will be broken, and the global atmosphere will improve.

I laughed and added that it was precisely the process of ‘broken dictators’ that was most likely to trigger an armed conflict.

L. nodded in reply and said sadly: ‘That is what I fear the most.’

Then L. returned to the question of the German–Japanese pact. He does not like it. In his opinion, it will result not in Nazi aggression against the USSR, since the USSR is far too strong, but in an increase of German pressure in Europe and of Japanese pressure in Asia. The British Empire, moreover, may easily suffer. Indeed, an attack against the USSR would be a very risky operation for Germany and Japan in any conditions. Far easier to make good at the expense of the ‘huge, rich, fattened-up, slow-moving, and highly vulnerable body which goes by the name of the British Empire; all the more so as this is a democracy characterized by a diversity of opinions and slow operation’ (L.’s own words). All this does not sound promising for the people represented by L.

As for the Spanish question, L. seems to be closer to us than I expected. Proceeding from the imperial interests of Great Britain, L. prefers the victory of the Spanish government. For this reason, he severely criticized the position of the British government. ‘All intelligent people understand,’ L. said, ‘that we are currently seeing in Spain the first serious duel between the USSR on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other. Much depends on the outcome of this test of strength, including the future orientation of British policy. The English always gravitate towards the victor. If the fascist powers prevail in this conflict, England may ultimately, and very reluctantly, join them. If the USSR wins, an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance will become a fait accompli in the near future.’

The situation is not quite so simple, of course, but L.’s arguments are very interesting and symptomatic.