Nevertheless, in an attempt to find some patterns in the political chaos, I would depict the current situation in the following schematic manner.

In England the fight is on between three main tendencies:

(1) Complete isolationists (Beaverbrook, Rothermere and others, recently joined, quite unexpectedly, by the Financial News), i.e. withdrawal from the League of Nations, abandonment of Locarno, arms build-up in Britain, overt return to ‘balance of power’ politics, and the global development of the Empire.

(2) Semi-isolationists (most of the Conservatives and the British government, The Times, Daily Telegraph, Morning Post and others), i.e. annulment (de jure or de facto) of Art. 10 and Art. 16 of the Covenant, transformation of the League into a kind of ‘conciliatory commission’, the limitation of military obligations under the Locarno Treaty, search for an agreement with Germany, and reconciliation between France and Germany.

(3) Real collective security (Labour, the Liberals, Conservatives such as Cecil and Lytton,

Victor Alexander Bulwer-Lytton (2nd earl of Lytton), British statesman and diplomat, chairman of the League of Nations mission in Manchuria, 1932.

Daily Herald, News Chronicle, Manchester Guardian and others), i.e. strengthening collective security and the League of Nations, a European mutual assistance pact admitting regional pacts, and firm commitments by the powers, including Britain, that, as a last resort, they will maintain collective security by force of arms in any part of Europe.

The second movement is the strongest today and, under certain circumstances, can easily obtain the support of the first. Objectively (and, to an extent, subjectively), these movements untie Germany’s hands in the east and in the south-east. However, the third movement is also strong. So, to a large extent, one side paralyses the other, which results in confusion and leads nowhere. As for the future, much will depend on the position of the USSR and the new French government, which looks like it will be headed by Blum.

André Léon Blum, member of the French Socialist Party from 1904 and of the Chamber of Deputies, 1919–28 and 1929–40; premier of France, 1936–37, 1938 and 1946, and vice-premier, 1937–38 and 1948.

Corbin (the French ambassador) and Masaryk (the Czechoslovak envoy), with whom I had a chat the other day, corroborated my appraisal of the situation. Corbin maintains that the semi-isolationist attitudes derive from Britain’s military weakness and the desire to somehow gain the two or three years needed to get its armaments in order.

Masaryk told me about Austen Chamberlain’s tour of Central Europe and said that C. drew the following conclusions from what he saw and heard there: the independence of Austria is the central problem for Europe today; and cooperation with the USSR is essential in order to stabilize the situation, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Upon his return C. had talks with Baldwin, Eden and the king. During the presentation of credentials on 5 April, the king asked Masaryk what he thought about C.’s visit to Central Europe. Does he think that it will have a positive influence on Central European affairs? Masaryk, of course, answered in the affirmative.

Incidentally, if we are to believe Masaryk, C.’s tour came about quite by chance. He is not rich (Masaryk estimates C.’s annual income at 1,000 pounds) and cannot afford the luxury of frequent travel abroad. Selby,

Walford Selby, British minister in Vienna, 1933–37.

the British envoy in Vienna whom C. promoted and whom he respects greatly, knowing about the straitened circumstances of his former boss, invited him to be his guest in Austria. C. agreed. When Eden learned about his trip, he asked C. to observe for himself what was going on in Vienna and then to inform him. So these were holidays intertwined with politics. When Masaryk learned about C.’s visit to Austria, he informed Beneš about it and Beneš invited C. to come to Prague. C. hesitated but finally agreed. While C. was in Prague, the British envoy in Budapest called him by phone and begged him to come to Budapest, too, so that the Hungarians would not think that C. was engaged in any anti-Hungarian intrigues. C. had to set off reluctantly for Budapest. The process resulted in a tour that the Germans are viewing as a premeditated, pre-prepared Machiavellian move on the part of ‘perfidious Albion’. The reality was far simpler.