(1) In general, GB belongs to the category of states which are satisfied with their possessions. This is ‘satiated imperialism’. Its concern is not the conquering of new territories, but the retaining of old ones. Hence the support of the status quo and of peace and the fear of any serious war as a threat to the integrity of the Empire. A re-division of the world can only be carried out at the expense of GB – whether wholly or partially. From the point of view of world politics, GB is a conservative force striving to avoid, as far as possible, great changes in the current state of affairs.

(2) British imperialists experienced a sense of danger twice in the post-war period. First in 1917 through 1920 – the Russian Revolution (my conversation with Churchill on 14 June this year). The reaction was intervention and blockade, which failed in their purpose. This fear subsided gradually (in zigzag fashion) over the following 15 years. Today British imperialists, represented by such prominent figures as Churchill, Vansittart, Eden and others, subjectively believe that the USSR carries no immediate danger for GB because it is preoccupied with its internal affairs. Furthermore, they still cherish the hope (yet to be fully extinguished) of the internal regeneration of the Soviet Union, in the sphere of foreign policy at least. There is talk of the onset of NEP in Soviet foreign policy (entry to the League of Nations, mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, etc.), which might open up favourable opportunities for the bourgeois world. The above representatives of British imperialism are opposed by others (like Montagu Norman,

Montagu Collet Norman, governor of the Bank of England, then president of the Bank of England, 1920–44.

Hailsham, Lord Lloyd,

George Ambrose Lloyd (1st Baron Lloyd), high commissioner for Egypt and Sudan, 1925–29; secretary of state for the colonies and leader of the House of Lords, 1940–41.

Hilton Young and others) who have not changed their attitude to the USSR; but their fear, too, has also dulled in recent times. So fear of the Russian Revolution as the major immediate threat to the British Empire has weakened considerably in conservative quarters. The possibility of a calmer attitude to the USSR has emerged. In the opinion of many Conservatives (such as B. [presumably Beaverbrook] for one), the ‘capitalism vs. communism’ problem may not become topical in England for another 40–50 years. In the meantime, why not try using the Soviet Union’s rejuvenated might in their international political game? These cold utilitarian considerations, however, sometimes retreat when fear resurfaces, elicited by a revolutionary outburst in some country or a new event suggestive of the ‘Red danger’ (the Comintern congress).

(3) British imperialists felt themselves endangered for the second time when the Japanese seized Manchuria, and especially when Hitler came to power in Germany. They did not want to give credence to this danger. Even today they do not want to recognize it fully and draw the proper conclusions. Traditions of ‘alliance’ with Japan and the balance-of-power policy on the European continent stand in the way. So, too, even more prominently, do the deeply rooted and only temporarily subdued traditions of hostility towards ‘Russia’ and Sovietism. But irrefutable facts force the British imperialists, step by step and against their will, to arrive at the unpleasant conclusions that an ever-increasing danger is looming over the head of the Empire, primarily from Japan and Germany; and that they will once again have to think seriously about how to protect their gigantic possessions.

(4) How? At first, the British imperialists reasoned along habitual and traditional lines: the impending danger must be diverted in ‘a safe direction’. Let the aggressive energy of Japan and Germany be directed against the USSR. Let the inevitable re-division of the world be carried out at our expense. In 1932–33, British imperialists dreamed persistently (and they did not only dream!) of a Soviet–Japanese war which, weakening both sides, would ease their own position in the Far East. Later they toyed with the idea of giving Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe, in order to weaken both the USSR and Germany and divert the German threat from Western Europe. However, contrary to the expectations of the British imperialist leaders, these projects were hard to realize, for two reasons: (a) the rapidly growing might of the USSR; and (b) sharp disagreements between the imperialist powers, particularly Germany and France. The prospect of an imminent Japanese–Soviet war became quite unrealistic in the spring of 1934 (or rather, the government arrived at the conclusion that a war between Japan and the USSR would likely result in victory for the latter, got scared, and set about opposing the outbreak of war in the Far East). The idea of using Germany against the USSR still excites the imagination of influential conservative circles, but more and more of them gradually perceive the enormous risk of such an adventure and the great likelihood of Britain’s involvement in a new world war, with all the ensuing implications. Ultimately, although the British imperialist leaders have not parted with the idea of the ‘safe channelling’ of Japanese and German aggression at the expense of the USSR, the idea has lost its initial attraction in view of the difficulties and risks of its realization. The split in the British imperialist elite is evidence of that. While some of the Conservatives (Norman, Hailsham and others) are still dreaming of a crusade against the USSR and are looking for an agreement with Japan and Germany with the participation of France (and Italy if possible), another group (Churchill, Eden, Vansittart and others) finds it more practical at the given moment to establish a bloc of countries that do not want war, i.e. primarily those countries that are ‘satisfied’ with their possessions: GB, France, the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, Scandinavia and, on certain conditions, the USSR. (Churchill: ‘a defensive union of all countries fearing Germany’; a modernized Entente, according to Vansittart, etc.) Vacillation persists in regard to the USSR – to admit or not to admit? – and there are fears of the Comintern. The struggle between the two tendencies continues, which gives British foreign policy its zigzagging shape, its lack of clarity and uncertainty.

(5) The moment is gradually nearing, however, when the British government has to decide whether it is with or against the USSR. It tries to delay this moment any way it can, and is seeking the possibility of at least temporary and partial agreements with Japan (a modus vivendi in China) and Germany (the naval treaty). All the same, British imperialism will have to ‘show its colours’ in the not-too-distant future.

(6) GB’s military weakness is another important factor leading to ambiguity and vacillation in British foreign policy. There is no doubt that British imperialism wasted no less than seven or eight years from the point of view of the ‘normal’ development of its armaments. The reasons: powerful pacifism among the masses; the influence of Labourites and pacifists such as Mander

Geoffrey Le Mesurier Mander, a Midlands industrialist, art collector and impassioned Liberal parliamentarian, 1929–45; an anti-appeaser and a crusader for the League of Nations in the 1930s; parliamentary private secretary to Sir Archibald Sinclair (minister for air), 1942–45.

and Cecil; the League of Nations; and the existence of Weimar Germany and (until 1931) a relatively peaceful Japan. As a result, when Nazi Germany and a highly aggressive Japan were born, GB turned out to be weak both at sea and in the air. GB will need two or three years to restore its minimum combat efficiency in the air and more time and far more money to achieve the same goal at sea (nearly half of the navy should be replaced). Hence the inevitable manoeuvring and the desire to avoid the worsening of relations with anyone – and primarily, at this moment in history, with Germany and Japan (and also the USSR).

(7) All this is vividly confirmed by GB’s attitude to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. The British government is definitely against the unleashing of war in Africa. The motives: (a) war there may easily trigger a world war and, consequently, a radical re-division of the world, which would hardly be beneficial for Britain; (b) more concretely: Italy, getting bogged down in Africa (which is inevitable), will cease to be an active factor in the European game; the present balance in Europe, poor as it is, will be shattered; Germany’s room for manoeuvre will increase immensely, it will seize Austria in one form or another, and maybe Lithuania, thereby activating the abundant dynamic forces latent in this part of the world. The danger of a European war will increase tremendously, and GB will not be able to escape it – hence the very dangerous consequences for GB’s position in the Far East and in other parts of the globe; (c) Italy’s victory in Africa will give her the waters of Lake Tana (a threat to Sudan and Egypt), and inaugurate Italian expansion in Africa and Arabia, primarily to the detriment of British interests. Furthermore, a major European power would hover over the sea routes to India (Suez and Aden would lose their importance). On the other hand, Italy’s failure would give a powerful impetus to the negro pan-African movement and create colossal troubles for GB in her numerous African colonies, where the rule of British imperialism rests mainly on the ‘white man’s prestige’. That is why GB will do her best to prevent an African war. If war does break out, GB will almost certainly do its utmost to localize and liquidate it as soon as possible (by offering to mediate, or by working out a compromise in which her own interests would not, of course, be forgotten). In the first period of war, especially if Italy were successful, GB would undoubtedly play dirty tricks on her, but in forms that would not lead to military conflict. If Italy were to fail, GB would also play dirty tricks on Abyssinia, but it would do so, once again, in a cautious manner, so as not to draw excessive indignation on the part of her numerous ‘coloured’ subjects.

(8) That group of British imperialists which supports the creation of a ‘peace bloc’ against Germany and Japan is currently groping for forms of closer contact with France (Baldwin’s phrase: ‘our frontier is on the Rhine’, etc.) and with the USSR. As its next move in our direction, the group plans to grant the USSR a loan for a term of 20–25 years, with the simultaneous settlement of ‘private claims’ deriving from the Russian Revolution. A permanent trade treaty is also envisaged. Cazelet’s and Marshall’s propaganda and my talks with Ashton-Gwatkin and Leith-Ross this summer are highly indicative. The settlement scheme is approximately as follows. We agree to pay 10–15% of the ‘private claims’ announced officially (about 250 million pounds during the 1929–31 talks). The ‘homeless’ gold of the tsarist government and former Russian banks that still sits immobile in the cellars of London banks (10–15 million pounds) will be used for this purpose. In addition, the USSR will obtain a loan to the tune of 30–50 million pounds for 20–25 years at 6% interest (the normal rate is 3.5%). The difference between the normal and actual interest will be spent on clearing ‘private claims’. Such intentions prevail in the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Office (Ashton-Gwatkin). The Trade Ministry seems to prefer an alternative pattern: a loan for 5–6 years irrespective of debts and claims (Horace Wilson

Sir Horace John Wilson, permanent secretary in Ministry of Labour, 1921–30; chief industrial adviser to the British government, 1930–39; seconded for special service with Chamberlain, 1937–40.

), provided trade is secured. The Finance Ministry, on the contrary, would like to use the deal for strengthening its position in relation to other numerous debtors of GB who fail to pay. As for the Foreign Office, it wants to clear the decks and create the glue for the construction of a ‘modernized Entente’. Now it is for us to decide whether or not to accept such a scheme for settling ‘private claims’. It is a serious moment and much depends on our decision.

Maisky now felt that the ground was quickly shifting under his feet. In a strictly personal letter to Litvinov, he expressed fears that he might be asked to replace Troyanovsky as ambassador in Washington, and raised fierce professional and personal arguments against his transfer: