First, the external details. The desk in the office has been moved – a new broom sweeps clean. What next, I wonder? Will H. limit himself to furniture rearrangement, or will he also start ‘breaking the ceilings’, in the spirit of Shchedrin?

Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin, prominent Russian satirist of the nineteenth century.

Time will tell.

H. is dry, elegant and quite short. His face is sharp, intelligent and guardedly attentive. He is very courteous and considerate, but cautious. He still feels unsure of himself in his new position, is unfamiliar with the current problems, and is afraid most of all of committing himself in any way to anybody. He wants to keep his hands free and to have room to manoeuvre in all directions.

Our conversation fell into several parts. First, what you might call the preface. Hoare began with the current problems in the international situation: the world is in a state of military-nationalist fever that spills over from one country to another, creating problems, mutual suspicion, etc. – all said in very general terms, without alighting on anybody in particular. I listened to H. for a good while, and finally interrupted him, saying: ‘This is all well and good, but it is important to localize the seat of the disease. Then it will be easier to fight the illness itself.’ H. was a little shocked by my unceremonious approach, but he was quick to agree. I then said that in my view there were currently two major hotbeds of ‘military-nationalist fever’. H. was once again quick to agree, noting that there were indeed two. However, neither Germany nor Japan was named.

Next came the chapter devoted to Anglo-Soviet relations. H. stated with satisfaction that although there had been difficulties in the past between Russia and England in Asia, they seemed to have vanished. I confirmed this, referring in particular to the Anglo-Soviet communiqué of 31 March (concerning Eden’s visit to Moscow). Then we quickly ran through all the Asian regions (Constantinople, Persia, Afghanistan, India, the Far East), establishing that no conflict existed anywhere between the two countries. H. wanted to raise the question of ‘propaganda’ in connection with India, but I easily led him away from it. He acknowledged that this question had lost its urgency. H. was interested in trade relations between the USSR and England and, having listened to my account, asked how it might be possible to facilitate the expansion of trade. I made it clear that it would be possible only on the basis of (at least) a five-year loan, like with Czechoslovakia. H. promised to give thought to these considerations. I reminded H. that in Moscow Eden and M.M. reached agreement on the exchange of information – H. promised to continue this practice. He also remarked: ‘We want peace. We believe that you want peace, too. Therefore, we have a great goal in common. If the powers that stand for peace do not stick together and cooperate, things may come to a very bad pass.’

We then moved on to the chapter devoted to European problems. I asked H. how he envisaged that peace could be secured in Europe. H. gestured his ignorance and refused to answer, emphasizing that he had only been foreign secretary for three days. I asked him what he thought about the communiqué of 3 February. Does the British government consider it indivisible as before? (I referred to my conversation with Vansittart on 6 June.) H. once again made a gesture and tried to evade a straight answer, pleading his insufficient familiarity with current issues. It sounded suspicious to me and I started besieging H. with various leading questions. Then H. started ‘thinking aloud’, and I soon had sufficient grounds to establish that my misgivings had not been unfounded. H.’s ‘thoughts’ boiled down to the following. The English are tired of endless, futile conversations. They want action, not talk. A small practical success is better than a truck-load of eloquent chatter. The disarmament conference failed because it set itself tasks that were too broad and all-embracing. If, 15 years ago, the powers had embarked on arms limitation via separate categories and not in general terms, we would currently be facing a very different situation. The British public now wants ‘something, somehow, somewhere to be done’.

I replied that I found H.’s theory very dangerous. Disarmament cannot be fulfilled piecemeal, while the term ‘somewhere’ might easily be interpreted in the spirit of Hitlerite notions: ‘security’ in the west and a free hand in Eastern Europe. Does H. support such notions? Does he think that peace is divisible? H. replied that the British government would of course take our point of view into account in developing its foreign policy, but he again dodged my direct question. It became clear to me that this was a serious state of affairs. For H., the question of the ‘indivisibility’ of the communiqué of 3 February was still open at best. He obviously wants to leave himself the maximum room for manoeuvre.

As I was taking my leave, H. said, with a certain embarrassment: ‘I hope that your government and your press will not hinder the development of the correct line of foreign policy through premature attacks on the new government.’ I replied: ‘I consider today’s conversation to be a sort of preface to the book of deeds that will be written by the new government and the new foreign secretary in particular in the sphere of international politics. One judges a book not by its preface but by its full content. We shall do the same. If the book’s content is good, the attitude of the Soviet government and the Soviet press will be good, too.’ H. expressed the hope that all would be well. I added: ‘Please remember, however, that it would be undesirable from all points of view to keep us waiting for good deeds for too long.’

What are my conclusions?

I’m somewhat alarmed. Although Vansittart reassured me that H.’s views basically coincided with his own, I think nevertheless that H. might prove more dangerous than Simon in the next few months. He is a novice, he underestimates the difficulties, and is prone to experimentation. He wants quick, concrete, demonstrative successes to justify his appointment in the eyes of the English public. He wants to oppose his ‘sober’, ‘concrete’, ‘practical’ policies to the ‘foggy’, ‘baggy’, ‘spineless’ policies of Simon. This is dangerous. Simon, for all his negative traits, had some experience. He had been bested more than once, and received many bloody noses in his attempts to regulate various international problems. He was skilled at knowing which sore spots should not be touched and which dangerous buttons should not be pushed. H. has still to master this tricky science. That is why I am a little anxious about the next five or six months. H. obviously wants to experiment in the sphere of Anglo-German relations – what will come of it? H. will learn, of course, but let’s hope this process doesn’t come at too great a price.

We must be doubly vigilant! France, the Little Entente and the USSR must demonstrate maximum activity!

Maisky reported home that he had gained a ‘strong impression’ that Hoare would strive to achieve a quick agreement with Germany. Indeed, five days later the naval agreement was signed; DVP, 1935, XVIII, doc. 268. Hoare ‘is trying to experiment in the foreign policy field,’ Maisky wrote to Kollontay. ‘He is gradually learning, but it would be good if the learning process didn’t cost England itself and many others too dear’; RAN f.1702 op.4 d.111 l.11.