Undoubtedly, the decision to send Eden and not Simon is a mild form of anti-Soviet discrimination on the part of the British government, although Simon’s personal reluctance to go to the USSR also played its part. It also seems clear that the British government intends to scare Hitler and to make him more complaisant. Fine! The Bolsheviks have never made a fetish of prestige, have never sacrificed content for form. In actual fact, Eden is better for us than Simon, for Eden’s star is rising, while Simon’s is setting. Eden has been promoted by Baldwin, an influential Conservative, while Simon essentially represents no one. Compromised at home, he is liked neither by the Conservatives, nor the Liberals, nor Labour. Finally, Eden takes a tolerant attitude towards the USSR, while Simon is our inveterate adversary. Yes, Eden is much better! Walter Elliot, who entertained Agniya and me for lunch today, argued at length that a visit by Eden is preferable to a visit by Simon. Vansittart said the same. The press, especially the Daily Telegraph, commends Eden in every way and asserts that the lord privy seal ranks either fifth or sixth among the ministers. The press department has been soliciting for a sympathetic response in the Soviet press to the decision to send Eden. [Gordon-]Lennox

Victor Gordon-Lennox, diplomatic correspondent of the Conservative Observer and Daily Telegraph.

(diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph) even informed me today by phone that, according to ‘the most reliable reports’, Simon will leave the Foreign Office after the king’s jubilee, to be replaced by Eden… The Foreign Office is really trying!

[The idea of a ministerial visit to Moscow was first mooted by Maisky in autumn 1934. The plan had been cooked up with Vansittart, behind the backs of Litvinov and Simon, long before the foreign secretary’s visit to Berlin was contemplated. Maisky hoped the visit would drive a wedge between the different factions in the Foreign Office, which were divided over the attitude to be adopted towards Germany. He received little encouragement from Litvinov, who (it is seldom recognized by historians)

One notable exception is Carley, ‘Down a blind-alley’, pp. 157–8.

continued to view the British with suspicion, assuming them to be the main stumbling block in the attempt to extend security arrangements to Eastern Europe. He feared that any Russian initiative might be snubbed by the British or used as a card in their negotiations with the Germans.

TNA FO 371 19450 N1072/17/38, Chilston to Vansittart and FO minutes, 2 and 5 March 1935.