I never had the slightest doubt that the reports in The Times and the Daily Telegraph about a British minister visiting Moscow were the work of the Foreign Office and of Vansittart in particular. Over the course of the following week, the press persistently and systematically inflated this topic in every way possible. Not by accident, of course. Leeper

Reginald Allen (‘Rex’) Leeper, press department of the Foreign Office, 1933–40.

(head of the FO press department) told Maiorsky

N. Maiorsky, TASS correspondent in London.

bluntly that he was guiding the press in this direction. When Simon lunched with us, he asked Agniya about the best routes to Moscow, letting it be understood that he was planning a visit to the USSR. Elliot, whom I met at Lady Astor’s party, told me that the British government was discussing the question of sending a ‘senior minister’ to Moscow. Vansittart told me, at about the time I was presenting Putna

Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna, who distinguished himself in the Civil War, sided with Trotsky’s opposition in 1923. Between 1927 and 1931 he was Soviet military attaché in three countries – Japan, Finland and Germany; and then in Great Britain, 1934–36. Recalled from London and arrested in summer 1936, tortured and sentenced to death. Maisky was forced to denounce him in Moscow in 1938. Rehabilitated posthumously in 1957.

to him, that although the Foreign Office had nothing to do with the press campaign concerning a minister’s visit, the idea itself deserved a very good hearing. In a word, it was absolutely clear that the British government, having realized that it would be impossible to cobble together ‘European security’ without us, had decided that it could at least turn a profit from engaging the USSR in the organization of security – in particular, by playing the role of ‘honest broker’ (a role the English have always enjoyed) in seeking a compromise between Berlin and Moscow on the question of the Eastern Pact. Election considerations also played their part here – after all, polling day is not far off. It was crystal clear, then, that the British government really wanted to send a minister to Moscow, but hesitated to raise the matter officially, fearing an affront from our side. We should have made an encouraging gesture, if only through the Soviet press…

But our people in Moscow wouldn’t yield. To my first request about the line I should adhere to, which I sent right after the first communications appeared in the press, I received the reply that newspaper reports lack authority, that I should remain calm, and that I was to inform Moscow if the Foreign Office approached me. Initially, it seems, the NKID even had the impression that Simon’s visit to Moscow would serve to camouflage his visit to Warsaw (it was said in the press that the British minister would go to Warsaw from Berlin and then on to Moscow). I objected, referring to the material at my disposal, and asked whether the Soviet press could show, albeit cautiously, that it was well disposed to Simon’s visit. But the NKID would not agree even to this, citing doubts about whether Simon really did want to go. Nevertheless, by 26 February I did manage to secure permission to at least encourage the idea for Simon’s visit in the event of the Foreign Office, or circles close to it, approaching me on the subject. That day Collier

Laurence Collier, head of the northern department of the British Foreign Office, 1934–42.

met Kagan at a reception and told him that the British government had decided the previous day to send Simon to Berlin and that during the same meeting the Cabinet members had exchanged views on the desirability of Simon’s visit to Moscow. In essence, nearly all were in favour of the visit, but on condition that the Soviet government sent an invitation. On 25 February, responding to a question in the House of Commons, Simon said that the government was considering the issue of his visit to Moscow. I appealed to M.M. again and today I at last received the instruction to tell Vansittart that I was authorized to extend an official invitation to Simon just as soon as the British government had definitively resolved the question of an English minister’s visit to the USSR. But the NKID wants to see Simon and nobody else… Hm! Surely, considerations of prestige are playing their part here: if Simon is going to Berlin, then it is he who must also go to Moscow. Clear enough. But still, I would not make such an ultimatum about Simon. Actually, Eden would probably be more advantageous. Be that as it may, today came as a great relief…