Early on the morning of 20 February I received from Moscow our evaluation of the London communiqué, with the request to hand the text over to Simon today. M.M. [Litvinov] had a talk with Alphand

Charles Alphand, French ambassador to Moscow, 1933–36.

in Moscow, after which Alphand approached his government asking whether he should obtain the response to the communiqué of 3 February from the Soviet government. Paris and London consulted between themselves, and finally Alphand and Chilston

Aretas Akers-Douglas (2nd Viscount Chilston), British ambassador in Moscow, 1933–38.

approached M.M. on behalf of their governments on 19 February with the official request that he state his views about the Anglo-French agreement of 3 February. M.M. wrote up a response on the same day to be presented the following day, 20 February, by me to Simon and by Potemkin

Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, a pedagogue, embarked on a career devising a revolutionary curriculum for schools in the People’s Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR. Success in political agitation during the Civil War led to a diplomatic career. He was Soviet ambassador in Italy, 1932–34, and in France, 1934–37, and deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, 1937–40. Survived Litvinov’s demise in 1939, but a year later was removed from office and entrusted with the revival of the traditional Russian national-cultural values in Soviet schools.

to Laval. I called Simon immediately and arranged to meet him at 4 p.m. This was clearly a burning issue in Moscow, because Gershelman

E.E. Gershelman, principal secretary of the NKID; relieved of his post in 1937.

telephoned me from the NKID at about 2 p.m. and inquired when I was likely to see the foreign secretary. We agreed that after my meeting with Simon I would tell Gershelman about it over the telephone.

Simon received me in the Houses of Parliament. Eden was present throughout the meeting, but he spoke little. Simon began with my speech at the League of Nations Union, complimented me and asked me to explain various points. Then I read our evaluation of the communiqué aloud and put the document on the foreign secretary’s desk. S. began speaking about the evaluation and expressed his satisfaction with the Soviet government’s positive attitude towards the communiqué of 3 February. It will greatly facilitate its implementation, he said. I reminded him that our positive attitude derived from an acknowledgement of the integrity and indivisibility of the whole London programme. S. replied that it could not be otherwise. The British government views the London programme precisely as a single package, and Germany’s attempt to tear out individual aspects of the programme was doomed to failure. The British government also continues to support the Eastern Pact… I put before S. the question I had put before Vansittart a few days earlier, namely, what would the British government do should Germany accept all the points of the London programme bar the Eastern Pact? My question embarrassed my interlocutor and he began talking through his hat using high-flown but incoherent phrases. What they seemed to amount to was this: if Germany were to resist our demand, the pact would be ‘castrated’ – instead of mutual assistance, we would have a straightforward pact of non-aggression.

I began objecting fiercely; I confess that I did not mince my words. I stated that mutual military assistance is the heart of the pact, that we could make no concessions on this point, and that without an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance there will also be neither disarmament nor European security, even in its limited Western form.

S. was clearly concerned. Massaging the bridge of his nose, he asked cynically: what are you ready to propose to buy Germany’s consent to the Eastern Pact? I replied that the guarantee of security which Germany would receive along with the other powers if the pact were concluded would be sufficient reward. S. raised his eyes to the ceiling and shrugged his shoulders in a rather ambiguous manner.

I left with the very definite impression that Simon had finally understood that the attempt to exclude the USSR from the resolution of the issue of ‘European appeasement’ had failed. If anything is to be achieved in this area, the USSR needs to be brought in on equal terms with the other great powers.

Excellent! Even those members of the British government most hostile to us have taken on board M.M.’s motto: ‘the world is one’. This is a step forward. And here’s the proof: today’s Times and Daily Telegraph carry articles of obvious provenance suggesting that the idea has arisen in government circles that a British minister should travel to Moscow. The Foreign Office reacts quickly.

The Russian version is in DVP, 1935, XVIII, doc. 72. Simon, as is obvious from his own account, left Maisky in no doubt that the main objective of the Eastern Pact was to ‘give confidence necessary to make an arms agreement possible’. ‘The sooner the Russians get used to this idea,’ it was minuted in the Foreign Office, ‘the better.’ This view was not shared by Vansittart and Eden; TNA FO 371 18827 C1429/55/18. The reason for the persistent gulf in the two countries’ attitudes (and the essence of the emerging appeasement) was the British government’s belief that a general European arms limitation agreement could still be achieved if Germany’s legitimate grievances were addressed. The Russians meanwhile had become convinced that Hitler could only be checked by resort to force. Maisky told Dalton: ‘By all means talk with Hitler, and come to agreements and compromises. But talk to him with a rifle in your hand, or he will pay no regard to your wishes.’ Pimlott, Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 188.