(1) V. is very sceptical about the prospects of talks with Germany. In his opinion Hitler will probably approve the air convention, may swallow the Rome agreements, but will never accept the Eastern Pact, the disarmament convention, or agree to return to the League of Nations.

(2) The programme set forth in the communiqué of 3 February is a single package that cannot be split up as the Germans would like. However, when I asked what position the British government would take if Hitler were to accept all the items of the communiqué bar the Eastern Pact, V., somewhat embarrassed, said that in such a case the British government would have to consult with the French government, then added that a solution might have to be found through a modification of the character of the pact. However, V. hastened to assure me of the British government’s continued support of the Eastern Pact of mutual assistance. I dropped a hint that a fresh public statement in support of the Eastern Pact from the British government might be desirable, but V. avoided giving a straightforward promise.

(3) V. was viciously critical of Lothian for his articles in The Times of 30 and 31 January, and of the position taken by the newspaper’s editors on the German issue. It runs entirely counter to that of the Foreign Office. V. ridiculed the stupidity of those who think it would be in England’s interests for Germany to be given a free hand in the east. He asks us to be realistic about these things and not to get worked up without good reason. The forthcoming talks between England and France present no danger whatsoever either to Franco-Soviet rapprochement or to the further improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations. The fundamental fact, which no conference or diplomatic document can eradicate, is the existence in the centre of Europe of a country, Germany, which is rapidly building up its arms and ‘whose true intentions are not known to anyone in any detail’. This situation is inevitably pushing the countries surrounding Germany towards rapprochement. With certain modifications, the situation that prevailed prior to 1914 is being repeated.

(4) V. expressed his regret concerning the personal attacks against Ovey

Esmond Ovey, British ambassador to the USSR, 1929–33.

contained in Molotov’s speech at the 7th Congress of the Soviets. What was the point of them? Why stir up old, half-dead passions? We should be thinking now not of the past, but of the future, and specifically of the further improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations, for which we currently have all the requisite premises. I gave V. the necessary explanations.

(5) Vansittart was very glad to hear from me that Moscow would welcome a private visit by him and Elliot to the USSR. He said he would now set about organizing this in a more concrete fashion; moreover, he named Eden as another possible candidate. Initially, V. (as if ‘thinking aloud’) named Simon. I naturally gave my approval, albeit with little enthusiasm. Then V. exclaimed: ‘No, you know what I think – Eden will be a better choice. He is accustomed to visiting foreign countries and he knows Mr Litvinov personally…’ I seconded Eden’s candidature heartily.

Vansittart’s report, in TNA FO 371 18826 C1321/55/18, does not mention at all the conversation concerning Eden’s proposed mission to Moscow, but he raised it during the Cabinet meeting of 25 February; TNA FO 371 19450 N1111/17/38.