MacDonald and Simon have always been advocates of Hitler, especially MacDonald. Baldwin and Eden cautiously supported the French. Vansittart stressed the particular importance of Italy’s participation in all European combinations. MacDonald made every effort to convince the French of the unfeasibility of the Eastern Pact (‘Germany doesn’t want it, and it is impossible to impose anything on Germany’), recommending that they should not insist on it, but limit themselves to the organization of Western security, leaving Eastern Europe to follow the natural course of events.

MacDonald and Simon encountered stiff opposition from the French. True, Flandin

Pierre Étienne Flandin, prime minister of France, 1934–35.

kept silent for the most part, but Laval spoke at great length. He said he was bound by promises to Litvinov and the Little Entente

On the ‘Little Entente’ see note 10 in 1934. Maisky reported home that the British government was divided on the issue. While MacDonald wholeheartedly supported Hitler, Simon was ambivalent; Baldwin and Eden were ‘cautiously’ supportive of France; while Vansittart strongly advocated rapprochement with Italy; DVP, 1935, XVIII, doc. 42, fn. 23.

(a typical argument: it is his promise that matters, not his personal conviction!) and he had to insist on including the Eastern Pact of mutual assistance in the communiqué. The English agreed, but MacDonald ensured the addition of the words ‘freely concluded’ (the pact, that is). Then Laval extracted a promise from the English that, if necessary, they would support the Eastern Pact with diplomatic démarches in Berlin and Warsaw. The French also suggested that an air convention based on mutual assistance should be concluded by the Locarno powers. The British government willingly accepted the proposal (with the exception of Cunliffe-Lister,

Phillip Cunliffe-Lister (1st earl of Swinton), Conservative president of the Board of Trade, 1922–29 and 1931; secretary of state for the colonies, 1931–35; secretary of state for air, 1935–38.

the minister for colonial affairs). The French tried to establish priorities in dealing with the issues listed in the communiqué, and favoured the advancing of the Eastern Pact. The English resisted, but a compromise was finally achieved: all problems included in the communiqué were to be resolved ‘concurrently’. However, this method lacks all clarity. Germany is not present in Geneva, but where outside Geneva could one find a suitable venue for holding such complicated negotiations with the participation of so many powers? The English seem to be willing to play the part of honest broker in negotiations between Germany and other states, but the French don’t like the idea at all. We’ll see.

The French are terribly annoyed with Poland. In his talk with the publisher of the Daily Telegraph, Flandin used the following expression: ‘I don’t give a damn about Poland’. Laval made a similar comment in private talks.

So the communiqué of 3 February represents a compromise between the English and French points of view, but the English are clearly still hoping to water it down to mean no more than the organization of ‘western security’. Very typically, today’s press barely mentions the Eastern Pact (not a single reference in The Times). Instead, attention is principally focused on the ‘air convention’ between the Locarno powers.