V. began by expressing his satisfaction with the result of our joint ‘survey’ of Anglo-Soviet relations. I also expressed my satisfaction, but added that rapprochement between the USSR and Great Britain remained a very tender and delicate flower that required much attention and care to grow normally and develop. Then, to illustrate the difficulties that stand in the way of a genuine improvement of relations between our countries, I presented a series of facts that may be placed under two headings: ‘Suspicions’ and ‘Discrimination’.

Suspicions. What really lay behind Lord Barnby’s mission to Manchuria? Is there any basis to the rumours that a Japanese loan is being prepared on the London market? V. hastened to reply that Barnby’s mission had been organized by the Federation of British Industries and was of a purely commercial nature. English industrialists want to find out whether they can make some money in Manchuria, and no more. The mission pursues no political ends. The FO had nothing to do with the sending of the mission and can express no solidarity whatsoever with the ‘absurd’ speeches made by some members of the mission in Tokyo. As for any plans for a Japanese loan, V. knew nothing about it (I added here that in our conversation of 9 November, Simon had promised to clarify the matter, but had not as yet replied), but he will make the necessary inquiries and inform me. In conclusion, V. remarked that the Soviet government is too suspicious and that if it took a more straightforward approach to various matters, it would get on better with other powers. I objected that the 17-year history of the USSR had, regrettably, given us good reason to be suspicious.

Discrimination. Why are two absolutely absurd and tasteless films of anti-Soviet persuasion, Fugitives and Forbidden Territory, being shown freely in London? I’m sure that the British censors would have taken a different line had the matter concerned Germany, France or Italy. Another point: why was the entire diplomatic corps invited to the official reception arranged by the aviation minister, Londonderry, on 19 November, on the eve of the parliamentary session, bar me? I’m not inclined to attach excessive importance to the above-mentioned facts (they are in themselves rather trivial), but it is significant that these facts are typical of the ‘discrimination’ towards the USSR which is so widespread in England. This sort of ‘discrimination’ poisons the atmosphere of Anglo-Soviet relations every day and every hour. It should be done with if we are really serious about improving these relations.

V.’s countenance changed somewhat, particularly when I mentioned Londonderry’s reception. He wrote something in his notebook and announced that he would take the appropriate measures. He promised to acquaint himself with the content of the films I had named and to try to do something to prevent similar incidents in the future; but he warned that this was a tall order in the English context.

We then addressed the question: what next? ‘The current phase of Anglo-Soviet relations,’ I said, ‘brings the following picture to mind: after a long spell of stormy days, calm weather has finally arrived. It’s a bit foggy. A bit chilly. The sky is overcast. The sun is not yet in sight. It is, of course, a great step forwards when compared with what went before…’

‘But it’s not enough, you wish to say,’ V. exclaimed with a laugh. ‘One needs a bit of sun, a bit of warmth…’

‘And why not?’ I replied.

‘I couldn’t agree with you more,’ said V.

So we began to discuss practical steps for achieving a better atmosphere in Anglo-Soviet relations. We agreed that the FO should exert whatever influence it can on the tone of The Times and other conservative papers in respect to the USSR; that it was most desirable that Cabinet members should speak in and outside parliament about the advisability of better relations between the two countries; and that it was especially important that the British government should make a clear and categorical statement in favour of maintaining peace in the Far East. Already in the summer, V. had assured me that Simon would make such a statement at the earliest opportunity, but the promise remained unfulfilled. V. made yet another note and said that he would do everything in his power to implement the steps that we had outlined.

At the very end of our conversation, we turned to the possibility of British ministers and major public figures paying visits to the USSR. ‘Why,’ I asked, ‘do high-ranking Englishmen travel easily and freely over the entire world, with the exception of the USSR? Is this not also a form of entrenched “discrimination”? Yet their visits could contribute greatly to the demolition of the Chinese wall that has arisen between our countries since the revolution.’

V. tried to defend British ministers by referring to their extremely busy schedules. ‘I hardly ever leave London,’ he noted, by way of a telling argument. ‘I’ve only been to America once, when I visited Hoover

Herbert Hoover, president of the United States, 1929–33.

with MacDonald in 1929.’

I smiled and remarked half-jokingly: ‘But you spent your holidays in Italy! Why not spend them in the Caucasus?’

V. laughed in some embarrassment and added that he still hoped to visit the Caucasus one day. Many years ago, before the war, he had spent a week there on his way back from Persia to London. The Caucasus produced an indelible impression on him. He saw no reason why, given the right circumstances, he shouldn’t make another visit to that truly fascinating land.

Maisky was advocating a blueprint for the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations. It sought the eradication of suspicion over British intentions in the Far East, and a ministerial visit to Russia. Vansittart was favourably disposed, the more so when he learned shortly afterwards that Maisky’s complaints were justified. But the idea of a ministerial visit, similar to the French radical Édouard Herriot’s, was discouraged in the Foreign Office, which feared that a visitor would be shown ‘Potemkin’s villages’. Vansittart condoned a visit by a minor official and further adopted Maisky’s idea of a statement by the foreign secretary in parliament denying any Anglo-Japanese collusion. Simon, however, was less responsive to Soviet suspicions, and far less enthusiastic about rapprochement. He, as the British record of Maisky’s meeting with the dismayed Vansittart on 27 December reveals, was more interested in raising Comintern subversion as a counter-argument; TNA FO 371 18306 N7104 & N7155/16/38.